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INTRODUCTION 
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THE INCOHERENT NEIGHBOUR 
 
The early Cold War is often the worst chapter in any narrative of the Western 
Hemisphere. A rewrite is long overdue. In a historiographical essay written for 
Diplomatic History in 1992, Mark T. Gilderhus noted that the few existing studies on US 
relations with Latin America during the administration of Harry S. Truman have left a 
number of significant issues in need of examination.1 The integration of the Western 
Hemisphere into a strategy of global containment is perhaps the most important of 
these issues that remains neglected. Studies on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere 
during the Truman administration have primarily focused on either the period of 
democracy promotion in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War or the 
emergence of an anti-Communist framework later in the second term. The Incoherent 
Neighbour fills a serious gap in the academic record with a historical reconstruction of 
the development of strategy in the Western Hemisphere between 1947 and 1948. 
 
The Western Hemisphere is almost always a missing chapter in the story of this key 
period in the Cold War. The omission is assumed to be consistent with the absence of 
Latin America in George F. Kennan’s original conception of containment. The region had 
not been completely neglected by the Truman administration however. The central role 
played by George C. Marshall in filling this strategic vacuum has so far been overlooked. 
He made a significant impact on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during his 
tenure as Secretary of State between January 1947 and January 1949. Marshall assumed 
the primary responsibilities for translating the abstract concepts of containment into 
the specific context of Latin America. 
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The evolution of strategy in the early Cold War did not determine a self-evident and 
necessary approach to the Western Hemisphere. The defining feature of the strategic 
approach shaped and implemented by Marshall was one of incoherence. He failed to 
reconcile significant tensions on various levels. At the most basic level was a 
bureaucratic conflict that prevented a consistent pursuit of strategic objectives in the 
region. Only the authority and reputation of Marshall as an inspirational leader 
maintained an illusion of coherence. This lack of domestic consensus originated in 
conceptual differences over the role of the Western Hemisphere in a global strategy of 
containment. The Cold War made US influence in the Western Hemisphere 
simultaneously more important and less of a priority for limited resources increasingly 
redirected to meet commitments to extended strategic objectives in Western Europe. 
This gap between the means and ends of global strategy proved further complicated by 
the absence of even a coherent strategic end in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall failed 
to reconcile conflicting commitments to restore the cooperation between equal 
sovereign states in the Good Neighbour Policy and to address the demands of a rising 
tide of expectations in Latin America for political and economic development. The myth 
of coherence is revealed most clearly in the resistance across the region to the meanings 
defined by Marshall of the Western Hemisphere in itself. 
 
The Incoherent Neighbour writes a new chapter on US strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere during the early Cold War. This re-examination of the development of 
containment strategy provides an essential revision of the established narrative on the 
role of George C. Marshall. The identification of failings in the Western Hemisphere that 
mitigated his successes in Western Europe also offers an important contribution to the 
wider historiography of the early Cold War. The Incoherent Neighbour further 
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demonstrates fresh insights into the effect of the Cold War on the meaning of the 
Western Hemisphere to US strategy that represent a major breakthrough for the 
academic record on US relation with Latin America. 
 
Securing the Peace for a New Era: A Narrative Introduction 
The appointment of George C. Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1947 presented 
an opportunity to address dual challenges that had inhibited the administration of 
Harry S. Truman for much of the previous year. President Truman looked to Marshall 
firstly to fill the strategic vacuum in the State Department. The resignation of James F. 
Byrnes just as the collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance seemed imminent left Truman 
regretful of this untimely loss of a ‘very good negotiator.’2 But the President had already 
begun to consider a new strategic direction. He had warned of the escalating danger 
that the nation confronted in his State of the Union address only a few days earlier. The 
growing difficulty in finding an agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of 
settlement for a ‘secure and just peace’ threatened the pursuit of a ‘collective security 
for all mankind.’3 Truman found reassurance that he could turn to Marshall however, to 
lead the US into an uncertain new era and unfamiliar global setting with a more 
coherent and assertive approach towards the Soviet Union. He held his new Secretary of 
State in the highest regard as both ‘a man and a soldier.’4 
 
Truman anticipated that the appointment of the ‘greatest man of World War II’ to take 
the helm at the State Department would bring more authoritative leadership and end 
the second problem of incohesion within the US. The absence of a domestic consensus 
had become increasingly obstructive to the pursuit of strategic objectives. The lack of 
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direction actually started within the State Department itself. Even Truman had been 
made aware of the joke circulating Washington: the State Department fiddles while 
Byrnes roams. This drift towards incoherence only invited other executive departments 
to contest the traditional leadership of the State Department in foreign affairs.  
 
The electoral defeats for the Democratic Party at the end of 1946 that ended their long-
held stranglehold over both the House of Representatives and the Senate represented a 
more serious disaster for the Truman administration. A bipartisan consensus with the 
new Republican-led 80th Congress seemed far from assured. The seriousness of the 
problem had led Truman to use his State of the Union address to warn against any 
‘retreat to isolationism.’ Franklin D. Roosevelt had relied on the ability of Marshall to 
maintain the cooperation of Congress in waging the Second World War; Truman would 
now depend upon him once again to maintain a broad internationalist consensus.5 The 
Senate had been swift and enthusiastic in authorising his appointment as Secretary of 
State. Marshall enjoyed a reputation amongst prominent legislative leaders that ‘was 
probably higher than that of any living American.’6  
 
Truman understood that a renewed commitment to internationalism relied on not only 
a bipartisan consensus but also uniting the entire country. A crisis of representation 
within the US public after the wearing experience of the Second World War threatened a 
more general rejection of further international engagement.7 Truman anticipated that 
Marshall would be well received amongst the people of the US. Despite their traditional 
guardedness towards military leaders, the US public liked and trusted Marshall as an 
individual representing both duty and work well done. The confidence in Marshall as a 
person supposed to know how to secure the nation from the new challenge posed by 
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the Soviet Union ultimately ensured the readiness of the US public to ‘back him to the 
limit’ in his ‘vigorous leadership’ of an internationalist foreign policy.8  
 
In order to address each of these challenges Truman ceded much of his authority in 
foreign affairs to his new Secretary of State. On taking his oath of office Marshall 
received the immediate gratitude of the President for assuming the burden of 
leadership. It appeared clear even at the time that Marshall had accepted the ‘greatest 
responsibilities of any US Secretary of State.’9 He later revealed that this transfer of 
power extended so far as to the President agreeing ‘to everything and anything I suggest 
or propose to him.’10 Marshall did not return to office with a prepared strategic vision to 
direct the US in the world however. His immediate impact lay more in his initial steps to 
lead the country in the absence of a coherent strategy. 
 
Marshall focused on mobilising the country with a shared sense of purpose. In his first 
public address as Secretary of State at Princeton University he warned of the dangers of 
a relaxed attitude or indifference towards threats to long-term national security whilst 
peace remained to be secured.11 But Marshall also realised that his success in 
maintaining a broad consensus depended upon establishing a unity of command, 
teamwork, and coordination within the Truman administration. Marshall made clear his 
intention to end the strategic drift by reasserting traditional State Department authority 
over foreign affairs under his leadership. An unparalleled military reputation meant 
that the increased sensitivities towards national security provided him considerable 
licence to reshape the disjointed organisation of the administration on foreign affairs. 
He understood the need for further action to ensure the acceptance of this however. 
Marshall swiftly reassured all other parties that he held no plans to dictate strategy and 
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intended to rebuild shared institutional meanings as a basis for more effective 
cooperation. He also recognised that widespread approval of restored State Department 
leadership depended upon shaping a new organisation capable of handling the 
‘intensive joint manoeuvres’ needed for global responsibilities.  
 
Marshall made a significant impact on the State Department. In spite of his initial 
‘delight with the high quality of the personnel’ that would support him in the State 
Department, Marshall soon bemoaned the observable ‘lack of organisation’ and internal 
personal conflicts.12 He immediately blamed this disorganisation on the traditional 
dominance of lawyers within the State Department. Marshall concluded that nothing 
short of a major shake-up would be necessary to instil more organisation and discipline 
in to the department than his predecessor had managed.13 Truman had certainly been 
frustrated with the ineptness of Byrnes’ leadership and expressed satisfaction that 
Marshall would establish a ‘real State Department now.’14  
 
Marshall used his experience to reorganise the State Department along a model of 
military authority. He introduced a clear line of command to end the bureaucratic 
tensions that had long characterised the State Department.15 He considered himself the 
“Commanding Officer” and was determined to lead from the front. Marshall also 
persuaded his Undersecretary, Dean G. Acheson, to delay his return to private law 
practice and continue as his “Chief of Staff”. Marshall instructed Acheson to vet 
everything unless he ‘chose to decide the matter himself.’16 But after making any 
decision, Marshall expected immediate and resolute implementation. 
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The tireless individual efforts of Marshall during his first month as Secretary of State led 
one State Department official to declare that he had ‘met a superman.’17 Acheson 
regarded the arrival of Marshall as an ‘act of God.’18 He also noted that keeping up with 
his new Secretary would be no easy task however: ‘I understand already why most of 
Marshall's former associates have stomach ulcers.’19 Marshall spent much of his first 
weeks preparing for the decisive negotiations with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming 
Fourth Meeting of the Council on Foreign Ministers in Moscow. On handing over the 
reins of the State Department, Byrnes had conveyed to Marshall the importance of 
securing an agreement with the Soviets in Moscow – a message he reaffirmed a few days 
later whilst making his parting words to the nation.20 After the disappointment of his 
earlier diplomatic mission to China, Marshall seemed determined to succeed in 
concluding a peace settlement with the Soviet Union. 
 
Although he had been appointed by Truman to establish a firmer line with the Soviet 
Union, Marshall appeared to be the last remaining top official within Washington to 
come to terms with the collapse of the Grand Alliance.21 Marshall could not control the 
rapid shift in the strategic climate in Washington during his absence however. Although 
he had ceded much authority in foreign affairs to his new Secretary of State, Truman 
could not resist exploiting an opportunity to arouse the country to the emerging danger 
posed by the Soviet Union. The President used an address to a Joint Session of Congress 
to demand assistance for Greece and Turkey to warn of the destabilising influence of the 
Soviet Union. The declaration of this Truman Doctrine realised the immediate aim of 
gathering support for a renewed commitment to internationalism; Life magazine 
described it as a ‘bolt of lightning’ that ‘cut through the confused international 
atmosphere.’22 In defining the ‘present moment in history’ as one when ‘nearly every 
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nation must choose between alternative ways of life,’ Truman managed to capture 
established narratives of exceptional US identity as well as provide a new manageable 
space for the ‘meaning of America in a globalised world.’23 
 
Marshall initially protested the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. Although the 
President had not directly pointed at the Soviet Union, Marshall objected to the use of 
strong rhetoric to frame the crisis in terms of a direct threat from external aggression. 
Marshall had been expected to adopt a firmer stance towards the Soviet Union than his 
predecessor, but the new Secretary could not see the benefit of conducting negotiations 
in Moscow whilst ‘hit[ting] a man across the face and call[ing] him names.’24 Marshall 
received advice from the State Department however, to postpone his reports from the 
Moscow Conference until he could ‘sense the change in atmosphere here which has 
occurred since your departure.’25 Marshall’s remonstrations were ephemeral however. 
His own resignations on securing peace with the Soviet Union soon began to develop in 
convergence with the transformation in strategic climate within Washington. The 
encounters with the Kremlin leadership at the Moscow Conference ultimately ‘made up’ 
the mind of Marshall that they ‘could not be negotiated with.’26  
 
The reputation of Marshall as a military leader made him the ideal figure to assume a 
prominent role in shaping a response to the inevitable confrontation with the Soviet 
Union. He remained unsatisfied with the defensive posture that characterised the 
Truman Doctrine and would not look to wait to fight each fire as it broke out.  It did not 
seem immediately clear that he had fully thought out the strategic objectives beyond 
this confrontation of the danger emanating from Moscow however. Acheson praised 
both his ‘mastery of precise information’ and vision that retained a focus on the bigger 
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strategic picture.27 But many of his military colleagues considered him more skilled as 
an organiser than a strategist. A lack of coherence soon became evident once Marshall 
began to shape a new strategic approach to securing the peace for a new era. 
 
Servant of the American Nation: A Revisionist Critique of George C. Marshall  
George C. Marshall is uniformly remembered as one of the most distinguished soldiers 
and statesmen in US history.28 After being named by Time magazine as their Man of the 
Year for 1943 and praised for his commitment and contribution as Army Chief of Staff, 
Marshall came to be revered at the end of the Second World War as the greatest military 
leader of the Allied forces and the “Organiser of Victory”.29 The accolades continued 
during his tenure as the fiftieth US Secretary of State. Time once again chose Marshall as 
their Man of the Year for 1947 after his first year in office.30 In what transpired as a 
momentous year of decision for the US on its future role in the world, Marshall was 
hailed once again as the ‘saviour of Europe.’ Although acknowledging the innate sense of 
justice guiding the US people in their commitment to the reconstruction of Western 
Europe, Time identified Marshall as the symbol of this new role in offering ‘hope to 
those who needed it.’ 
 
The enduring recognition of this legacy could be seen in October 2009 when the Virginia 
Military Institute held a symposium at the new Center for Leadership and Ethics to 
mark the 50th anniversary of Marshall’s death. It aimed to honour this “Servant of the 
American Nation” and his substantive contributions to ‘virtually every important event 
and issue comprising America’s rise to power in the first half of the 20th century.’31 
Speakers shared insights into his major leadership roles as both a soldier and a 
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statesman in arenas from Europe to Korea.  An examination of the important role played 
by Marshall in shaping US relations with Latin America during the early Cold War stood 
out as a notable omission however. This is perhaps no surprise; the VMI symposium 
only reflected a gap in the scholarly literature on Marshall.  
 
The lack in understanding of Marshall’s part in formulating strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere can be explained, to some extent, by his own aversion to public attention. 
He even refused to keep a journal or diary for posterity in order to remain focused on 
the immediate business at hand.32 The retired Army Major General Josiah Bunting III 
suggested that this means whilst ‘“Marshall” is not ‘anonymous or obscure, “George 
Marshall” remains for most a remote presence, an unknowable and distant entity, a 
noble piece of statuary.’33 The conscious efforts made by “George Marshall” to remain 
hard to know are not sufficient explanation for the gap in the academic record however. 
As important is an apparent reluctance to reassess the popular symbolisation of 
“Marshall” as an exceptional model of ethical leadership and strategic visionary.34 
Beyond the acknowledgement of a few minor character flaws, such as poor oratory 
skills, Marshall has been spared revisionist critique. 
 
The Incoherent Neighbour does not fit so readily within this established narrative of 
Marshall. Although it cannot provide a comprehensive reassessment of Marshall, a 
study of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere between 1947 and 1948 is able to 
demonstrate the limits of his leadership and ability to maintain cohesion within 
Washington. It can also reveal his failure to integrate a particular approach to the region 
into a coherent global strategy. The incoherence in the translation of his strategic vision 
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into effective policies in the Western Hemisphere only raises questions for the legacy of 
Marshall. He offered little hope to those Latin Americans who needed it.  
 
A New Approach to the Western Hemisphere in the Cold War 
The Incoherent Neighbour challenges the orthodox and later post-revisionist studies of 
the early Cold War that are best represented by John Lewis Gaddis and identify a neglect 
of the Western Hemisphere in the initial formulations of containment. Gaddis 
emphasised the specific focus of Kennan on securing strategic strongpoints such as 
Western Europe rather than overstretching US resources to contain the threat of 
Communism along the entire perimeter of the antagonistic frontier with the Soviet 
Union.35 Although he included a footnote that the Truman administration did not 
consider Latin America to be just another area on the periphery of US interests, Gaddis 
recognised that Kennan dismissed any review of strategy in the Western Hemisphere 
because of an absence of a Soviet threat.  
 
It was then only after the combination of the NSC-68 memorandum of 1950 when the 
Truman administration becomes more interested in perimeter defence and the 
perception of a growing Communist influence across Latin America, and in Guatemala in 
particular, that the Western Hemisphere was considered in strategies of containment. 
The Truman administration would not contemplate losing an established area within 
the US sphere of influence to the Soviet Union. The separate accounts of US relations 
with both the Soviet Union and Latin America finally came together after the Cuban 
Revolution highlighted the region as both a prize and battleground in the Cold War. 
Their destinies appeared to remain interconnected after President John F. Kennedy 
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declared the Western Hemisphere to be the most dangerous area in the world. The 
focus on the initial neglect of Latin America, by Kennan in particular, means that these 
traditional accounts fail to recognise the integral role of George C. Marshall in 
translating the logic of containment into a strategy in the Western Hemisphere. 
Marshall identified a vital interest in the region despite the lack of a direct threat from 
the Soviet Union.  
 
Revisionist interpretations of the Cold War identify some continuity in the efforts of the 
Truman administration to consolidate the US position in the Western Hemisphere.36 
They fail to provide a complete understanding of US interests in the region however. 
Revisionists such as William Appleman Williams suggested that the Truman 
administration pursued a strategic approach that remained focused on the necessity of 
economic expansion. Latin America continued to be regarded as primarily a market for 
exports and a source of raw materials.37 Williams also insisted that the internalisation of 
the assumptions and principles of the Open Door Policy by Kennan meant that his 
strategy of containment only extended this logic to Western Europe rather than 
articulating a radically different program. Thomas J. McCormick argued that the Truman 
administration considered regions such as Latin America as dependent variables in the 
priority of the dollar gap crisis in Western Europe.38 Gabriel Kolko agreed that the US 
attempted to define its relationship with other areas in the world in the context of 
prioritising limited resources and attention to secure interests in Western Europe but 
added that the US faced specific challenges in Latin America; the emergence of 
nationalism posed the main threat to US economic interests in the region.39 The 
economic importance of the Western Hemisphere meant that US strategy continued to 
focus on safeguarding the interests of private enterprise.  
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A focus on the narrow pursuit of economic interests overlooks Marshall’s coordination 
of wider strategic objectives. The prime position afforded to security in his 
considerations of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere meant that Marshall often 
deferred the immediate interests of US businesses operating in the region in order to 
maintain the cooperation of Latin American governments. The increasing prospects for 
armed confrontation with the Soviet Union in Western Europe made Marshall more 
interested in securing access to vital strategic resources in Latin America. Such 
priorities did not supplant the original focus of his strategy of containment in the 
Western Hemisphere however. Marshall identified the region as an important arena for 
the demonstration of a symbolic example of the positive nature of international 
relations within the US sphere of influence. He considered a commitment to solidarity in 
the Western Hemisphere to be a significant response to the psychological struggle of the 
Cold War. To fully understand this symbolic element of US strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere necessitates engagement with new approaches to the Cold War. 
 
The Incoherent Neighbour builds on the poststructuralist approaches to US strategy in 
the Cold War adopted by the likes of Frank Ninkovich, Anders Stephanson, Walter L. 
Hixson, and more importantly David Campbell.40 These approaches transcend the 
ongoing debate in the scholarship on the Cold War between the primacy of either 
security or economic priorities in US strategic objectives to focus primarily on a crisis of 
identity. Campbell identifies containment as more of a discursive strategy articulating a 
specific series of representations and practices of danger. The meanings articulated in 
this discourse actually constitute and consolidate, rather than simply describe, a 
dominant interpretation of US identity.41  
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Containment must then be considered not in the context of the strictly material pursuit 
of strategic and economic interests, but in that of a wider psychological struggle of the 
Cold War to project a positive image of the US. As Frank Ninkovich explained: 
‘The Cold War reversed the traditional relationship between 
reality and appearance. Instead of symbolism being seen as a 
weak form of power, power had now become a servant of 
symbolism. The Cold War was psychologically defined as an 
exercise in maintaining credibility and world opinion.... If symbol 
systems are constitutive of reality, then a loss of faith in these 
systems therefore creates a radical change in how that reality will 
be constituted.’42 
Kennan, after all, recognised that ‘what is important is not what things actually are but 
the shadows which are cast by those shapes upon the minds of men.’43  
 
The symbolic significance of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during the early 
Cold War cast a longer shadow than these scholars give credit for. It assumes more 
importance within an understanding of the Cold War that denotes for the US a struggle 
over identity that extends beyond the specific context of rivalry with the Soviet Union.44 
The narrative of containment is actually not a singular one that follows the genesis of a 
strategic approach in Western Europe to subsequent applications in different areas. As 
Alan Nadel explained: 
‘Under the common name of containment the Truman 
administration generated numerous, often contradictory or 
mutually exclusive, stories, each grounding its authority in the 
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claim that it is part of the same story. Without that story, none of 
the narratives would have the authority to generate the actions 
committed in its name; at the same time the claim to a common 
narrative renders the narrative itself incoherent.’45 
US strategy in the Western Hemisphere has then its own narrative that can be claimed 
to play an important part of a broader story on containment whilst simultaneously 
revealing the incoherence within it.  
 
The importance of the Western Hemisphere in the story of the early Cold War can be 
understood by building on the conceptual approach outlined by Campbell. He critiqued 
the essentialism of traditional state-centric analyses and insisted that the state is not 
finished as an entity. Campbell defended his own focus on the specific representations 
of US identity in the early Cold War then because ‘America is the imagined community 
par excellence.’46 This acquires more significance within an understanding of America in 
the context of the Monroe Doctrine as a founding myth for a community that is imagined 
as not only America the nation but also America the continent.47 A narrative of the US is 
also one that is easily translated into one of the Western Hemisphere. If the narrative of 
a nation is always one of family then this is similarly true of a narrative of an imagined 
community of the Americas.48 The conflicting stories of the Western Hemisphere were 
those of either the fraternity in the evolution of the Pan-American movement or the 
paternalism of US imperialism in the region. 
 
Marshall identified the importance of the Western Hemisphere not because of a genuine 
threat of Communism or an imperative to secure economic interests, but as an 
opportunity to claim the narrative of the region as part of the same story of the Cold 
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War. A commitment to the ongoing project of inter-American integration would provide 
a symbolic example of fraternal solidarity within the US sphere of influence. Rather than 
neglecting the Western Hemisphere as a region of strategic importance that remained 
beyond the threat of the Soviet Union, Marshall identified the relative strength of the US 
position in Latin America as an opportunity to use the space for an asymmetric 
response in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union. 
 
Kennan acknowledged this symbolic nature of the Cold War in his X article as he 
insisted that ‘the issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall 
worth of the US as a nation among nations.’49 He designated Western Europe as the 
primary space for the demonstration of the credibility of US commitment and capacity 
to guarantee the political and economic development of countries within its orbit. 
Marshall simultaneously pursued in the Western Hemisphere a symbolic demonstration 
of the nature of international relations within the US sphere of influence. The 
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt had previously considered a shining example of 
solidarity in the Western Hemisphere to be essential in showing the benevolent 
intentions of the US to the rest of the world. In his commitment to cooperation with 
equal and sovereign neighbouring Latin American states Marshall sought to project a 
positive image of the US that stood in contrast to the perceived relationship that the 
Soviet Union maintained with its satellites in Eastern Europe. 
 
Marshall did not bring the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere then; rather he 
projected the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. The particular demonstration of 
the fraternal relationship with Latin American neighbours would be used to determine 
a desired identity of the US. The inherent ambiguities in the logic of containment 
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ultimately ensured the failure in fixing this identity however.50 Campbell identified a 
significant problem facing the US as it attempted to handle different regional contexts 
and situations within a universal strategic approach.51 The tensions between the 
abstract universalism of the discourse of containment and the particularism of its 
application became increasingly evident as the Truman administration pursued 
divergent policies in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The gap between 
the expanded commitments of containment and the limited capabilities to fulfil them 
created further strategic incoherence.  
 
This incoherence did not simply reflect the idiosyncrasies of Kennan’s formulation of 
containment by Kennan; rather these contradictions were symptomatic of US strategy. 
The inherent inability to secure the meanings in any discourse means that ‘any 
apparently coherent system of thought can be shown to have underlying irresolvable 
antimonies, such that there are multiple and conflicting readings that must be held 
simultaneously.’52 The unfixed nature of the meanings of containment and the nature of 
relations within the Western Hemisphere also allowed for alternative understandings to 
challenge the dominant interpretation set out by Marshall. 
 
A New Approach to the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere  
The Incoherent Neighbour provides an understanding of US relations with Latin America 
that extends beyond the established debates between continuity and change. Orthodox 
historians of inter-American relations each provide similar accounts of a change in 
strategy under the Truman administration.53 A renewed focus on security following the 
initial conception of containment did not determine an immediate strategic shift. 
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Despite the renewed focus on security, the expansion of commitments in the Cold War 
brought a coherent recalibration of interests that required the redirection of resources 
to secure Western Europe. ‘Far from the Soviet Union’s borders,’ explained Lars 
Schoultz, ‘Latin America was not yet threatened, and so it did not require much 
attention.’54 The growing danger posed to US security by the rise of Communism in 
Latin America eventually led the Truman administration to the coherent application of 
containment in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
In these traditional accounts the Truman administration abandoned previous 
commitments to democracy promotion as it came to regard the Western Hemisphere as 
both a battleground and prize in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Anti-Communism 
became the central feature to define the US approach towards Latin American 
neighbours considered only as pawns in the Cold War. Although orthodox accounts each 
differ on the precise timeframe of this shift in regional strategy they agree in general 
that a Cold War framework had been constructed by the end of 1948. The Truman 
administration consequently made cold-blooded calculations to support Latin American 
dictatorships that proved more efficient in combating Communism. 
 
As orthodox historians dedicate no more than a few pages to the period between 1947 
and 1948 they fail to provide sufficient evidence to support assumptions that the 
application of containment represented a coherent shift in strategic approach to 
address the mounting threat of Communism in Latin America. In the only detailed 
examination of US relations with Latin America during the Truman administration, 
Steven Schwartzberg refuted the idea that the primacy of security and the 
establishment of a Cold War framework determined the abandonment of democracy 
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promotion.55 He suggested that a group of liberal policymakers during the first term of 
office regarded democracy promotion as central to the Cold War. This strategic 
approach only shifted once a competing group of conservative policymakers became 
more influential in the second term. They differed in attitude towards the prospects for 
democracy in Latin America and favoured cooperation with dictatorships to secure US 
interests in the Cold War. 
 
A narrow focus on the variable of democracy led Schwartzberg to the erroneous 
assumption that a change in policymakers determined a shift in strategic approach. He 
overlooked vast differences on a number of other issues between the earlier group of 
liberals that included the likes of Spruille Braden, Ellis O. Briggs, Adolf A. Berle Jr., and 
Nelson Rockefeller. Braden had even gone so far as to criticise the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, led by Rockefeller, as a ‘superfluous and wasteful 
agency’ full of ‘communist-fellow-travellers’ and ‘do-gooders and one-worlders.’56 
Schwartzberg was perhaps more flawed in associating the views of George F. Kennan 
with the likes of Louis J. Halle, Dean G. Acheson, and Edward G. Miller in the later group 
of conservatives. His simplistic demarcation of two competing groups provides a 
conceptual framework to support the argument that strategy shifted only after 
conservatives replaced liberals in the prominent positions within the Truman 
administration. 
 
The assumption of a seamless transition from the liberal to the conservative groups of 
policymakers can only be maintained with the neglect of the important time period 
between 1947 and 1948. In identifying the end of liberal influence with the resignation 
of Braden in early 1947 and the rise of conservative influence in late 1948 Schwartzberg 
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overlooked the significant roles of several key actors in the period in between. He 
ignored the likes of Robert Lovett, Norman A. Armour, and Paul C. Daniels who all 
assumed some responsibility in the State Department for coordinating strategy in the 
Western Hemisphere whilst the position of Assistant Secretary remained vacant. 
Schwartzberg also missed the influence of actors from across the rest of the 
administration as well as the Republican leadership in Congress. The most significant 
absence is the role played by Marshall however.  
 
Marshall did not abandon democracy promotion in favour of cooperation with 
dictatorships in combating Communism. The universal resonance of democratic ideals 
that arose during the Second World War created a rising tide of expectations across 
Latin America that Marshall simply could not ignore. He struggled instead to promote 
democracy at the same time as maintaining a commitment to cooperate with all Latin 
American governments as equals. Marshall did not shift between conflicting means as so 
much as ensuring their concurrent existence in irreconcilable tension. 
 
Revisionist interpretations of US relations with Latin America during the Truman 
administration shift focus from security and political issues to emphasise important 
continuities in economic policies. Stephen G. Rabe acknowledged the triumph of Cold 
War imperatives over the earlier democracy promotion by the end of 1948, but also 
identified a commitment to free trade and private investment as a constant in the US 
approach.57 David Green similarly pointed to economic priorities that made stability a 
watchword throughout the Truman administration.58 Neither dedicate more than a few 
pages to the era between 1947 and 1948 however. Green could only maintain his 
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argument for continuity with the erroneous identification of Braden as the architect of 
economic policy for the Truman administration.  
 
The prioritisation of free trade and private enterprise was neither necessary nor 
determined by the pursuit of economic interests in the region. Marshall considered 
economic relations only as one, albeit important, element in maintaining the 
cooperation of Latin American neighbours. He remained ready to abandon narrow 
economic interests if they undermined broader strategic objectives in the region. 
Marshall adopted a complex role of mediation between the competing interests of US 
businesses and Latin American governments in order to maintain the support of both. 
The redirection of limited resources for containment in Western Europe left Marshall 
only with offers of private investment to meet the demands of Latin American leaders 
for assistance in economic development in return for their protection of US interests.  
 
Bryce Wood suggested that this principle of reciprocity originated in the Good 
Neighbour Policy. Although Braden began to dismantle the Good Neighbour Policy, 
Wood highlighted a memorandum for Truman in March 1947 as a signal of another shift 
in approach: 
‘There is a widespread feeling in Latin America that the Good 
Neighbour Policy is being shelved... They feel, right or wrong, that 
since their champion, the late President Roosevelt, past [sic] away, 
the Good Neighbour Policy has taken a secondary place in the 
scheme of international relations, and they point out that neither 
the President of the US nor the Secretary of State have made any 
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major pronouncements on Latin America, nor have they stressed 
the Good Neighbour Policy.’59 
Despite this memorandum, Wood did not identify an official reaffirmation of the Good 
Neighbour Policy until August 1949. But the traditions of the Good Neighbour Policy 
must also be recognised in the strategic approach shaped earlier by Marshall. A 
renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy did not represent a simple 
continuity in inter-American relations however. Wood described the spirit of the Good 
Neighbour Policy as only abstract sympathies rather than specific strategic guidelines. 
This allowed Marshall to retroactively reflect his interpretation of containment back 
into the established meanings and political imaginaries of the Western Hemisphere.60 
Rather than any continuity or change in regional strategy in the new global context of 
the Cold War Marshall rearticulated previous strategies to make it appear as if his 
approach had all the time been possible. 
 
The Incoherent Neighbour: US Strategy in the Western Hemisphere 
The first section of The Incoherent Neighbour explores different levels of incoherence 
within US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter one reveals the bureaucratic 
tensions that prevented a coherent strategic response to the new dangers of the Cold 
War. The reputation of Marshall as a military leader meant that his appointment as 
Secretary of State presented an opportunity to end bureaucratic deadlock. Despite a 
convergence on renewed priorities of securing the region, a lack of consensus on 
specific measures, such as inter-American military cooperation, showed that a focus on 
security would not determine a necessary strategic shift however. Marshall initially 
demonstrated less concern for defining a coherent strategic approach than for restoring 
domestic cohesion. He identified his Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic 
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Affairs, Spruille Braden, as the main obstacle to establishing a coordinated approach 
under his leadership. Although the eventual departure of Braden made it easier for 
Marshall to prioritise the defence of the Western Hemisphere, the institutionalisation of 
alternative meanings of security left bureaucratic tensions unreconciled.  
 
Chapter two examines a further level of incoherence that emerged as Marshall struggled 
to integrate a distinct regional approach into a global strategy. Whilst Kennan focused 
primarily on a particular application of the abstract strategic concepts of containment in 
Western Europe, Marshall assumed the main responsibilities for translating these 
concepts into the context of the Western Hemisphere. Marshall did not bring the Cold 
War into the Western Hemisphere; he sought to project the Western Hemisphere into 
the Cold War. Marshall identified a strategic opportunity to use the region as a site for 
an asymmetric response in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union. A 
demonstration of hemispheric solidarity would provide a symbolic example of 
international relations within the US sphere of influence and a positive image of the US. 
The prioritisation of limited resources and attention for containment in Western Europe 
undermined the pursuit of these strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere 
however. 
 
The second section reveals numerous challenges faced by Marshall in the application of 
his interpretation of containment in the Western Hemisphere during the inter-American 
conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá. Marshall looked to restore solidarity in the 
Western Hemisphere with a renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. But he 
failed to understand that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no longer applied to 
a region transformed by a rising tide of expectations. Serious schisms that appeared 
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both particular to the region and transcendent of the Cold War exposed the absence of 
unity in the Western Hemisphere. The inability of Marshall to resolve these tensions 
only invited Latin American leaders to articulate competing meanings of the Western 
Hemisphere and their relationship with the US. 
 
Marshall defined a shared identity in the region primarily in terms of cooperation 
between equal and sovereign neighbouring countries. He struggled to reconcile this 
commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy to the growing demands across the region 
for political and economic freedoms however. Chapter three reveals the tension in 
simultaneous commitments to the promotion of democracy and cooperation with each 
Latin American government without discrimination on the basis of their internal 
political nature. The persistence of dictatorships across the region meant that Marshall 
faced growing demands to demonstrate the credibility of his rhetorical commitment to a 
shared democratic identity in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter four shows his failure 
to reconcile an adherence to the principle of non-intervention with a resolve for 
supporting progressive movements across Latin America. 
 
Chapter five explores the more serious challenge that Latin American economic 
underdevelopment posed to the harmony of the Americas. A rising tide of expectations 
created mounting pressure on Marshall to deal with inequalities in living standards. 
Latin American leaders facing domestic unrest appealed to Marshall for economic 
assistance. But the prioritisation of limited resources for Western Europe prevented 
Marshall from pledging the funds needed to maintain the cooperation of Latin America.  
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Chapter six shows how these restrictions made it difficult for Marshall to mediate 
between the divergent economic interests of Latin American governments and of the US 
and its private sector. Marshall could not offer the assistance needed to persuade Latin 
American leaders to reject economic nationalism. But he also failed to guarantee the 
private investment that he offered as an alternative solution for development. Business 
leaders in the US remained reluctant to risk investments in Latin American countries 
unwilling to respect private property. Marshall struggled to reconcile this need to 
provide adequate protection of private economic interests with his commitment to non-
intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours. 
 
The third section examines the efforts of Marshall to address the tensions that appeared 
during the negotiations at the inter-American conferences. Rather than reconciling 
these tensions Marshall instead depended upon representations of the Western 
Hemisphere as a coherent imagined space. Chapter seven looks at the failure of 
representations of exceptionalism to persuade Latin American leaders to sacrifice their 
own economic agenda and support the US in the reconstruction of Western Europe. 
Marshall relied upon the performative nature of exceptional rhetoric to establish this 
symbolic mandate of the Western Hemisphere as ‘always existing.’ He soon discovered 
that he could not define the identity of the Western Hemisphere alone however. Latin 
American leaders articulated alternative meanings of hemispheric exceptionalism to 
rationalise their continued demands for economic assistance. 
 
Chapter eight shows that Marshall instead came to depend upon new representations of 
danger to maintain the illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. The riots that 
erupted during the Bogotá Conference led Marshall to overlook the tensions that 
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transcended the Cold War to identify the subversive activities of local Communists as 
the main threat to solidarity in the region. A growing fear of a military confrontation 
with the Soviet Union also shifted strategic priorities in the Western Hemisphere 
however. Marshall focused less on projecting a symbolic example into the psychological 
struggle of the Cold War and more on mobilising and securing access to the vital 
resources needed for a war effort. He feared that local Communists would take 
advantage of the root causes of social unrest to pressure Latin American leaders in to 
adopting autonomous efforts to address their problems of underdevelopment. Marshall 
attempted to maintain Latin American cooperation in securing US interests with the 
reinvention of the myths and narratives of revolution as a foundation of a shared 
history and common purpose. But it remained clear that a lack of resources to raise 
living standards left a fertile ground for local Communists to exploit the rising tide of 
revolution across the region. 
 
The final section reveals the consequences of an inability to direct social transformation 
in the Western Hemisphere for the Truman administration. Chapter nine shows that a 
lack of resources to shape Latin American development left Marshall to seek measures 
to eradicate the Communist threat. The inability even to fund military assistance for the 
containment of subversive activities meant that the Truman administration remained a 
spectator as Latin American governments took matters into their own hands.  Marshall 
did not support military dictatorships as part of a deliberate attempt to establish an 
anti-Communist coalition in the Western Hemisphere. As the final chapter demonstrates 
he could only observe the conservative reaction to the rising tide of revolution in Latin 
America. The failure of the Good Neighbour Policy to shape developments across the 
region meant that Marshall looked instead to ensure the cooperation of these 
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dictatorships in securing US interests. The reactionary coups at the end of 1948 also 
exposed the illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. The most important task 
became the articulation of a new meaning of the Western Hemisphere that would 
protect a positive image of the US as a Good Neighbour.   
 
Marshall should be remembered as an “incoherent neighbour”. The key to 
understanding the incoherence in his strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere is 
found in the tension between the particular and the universal. Strategies of containment 
focused on demonstrating the universality of US leadership and the American way of life 
through symbolic examples in particular geographical spaces. Marshall identified both 
Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere as the initial theatres for this 
psychological struggle. The prioritisation of resources for the Marshall Plan helped 
ensure the successful demonstration of the American way of life in Western Europe. It 
also brought the failure of the symbolic example of the US as Good Neighbour in the 
Western Hemisphere however. As a result Latin America came to be regarded more as a 
source of vital resources needed for the success of examples in other theatres. The 
priority became the stabilisation of the Western Hemisphere. The failure of Marshall to 
address the rising tide of revolution across the region ensured that it would break later 
to present a challenge to the universality of US leadership and the American way of life.  
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1. INTERNAL INCOHERENCE 
 
The appointment of George C. Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1947 made an 
immediate impact on the strategic environment in Washington. On his arrival at the 
State Department he sought recommendations from his Undersecretary of State, Dean 
G. Acheson, on the priority issues requiring his urgent attention.1 Acheson advised him 
of a need to address growing conflict over the current approach towards Latin America. 
The lack of consensus could be attributed, in some part, to the continuous personnel 
changes within the State Department. Alongside the four Secretaries in as many years, 
three changes had been made in the position of regional co-ordinator. The strategic 
approach shaped by Spruille Braden after filling the post of Assistant Secretary of State 
for American Republic Affairs in October 1945 created more serious tensions however. 
Acheson informed Marshall of the inertia besetting US strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere as Braden struggled to defend his position from criticism mounting across 
Washington. He also warned that the clashes endangered his own authority as they 
spilled over into the public sphere and undermined the image of the State Department. 
 
Marshall sought an immediate resolution of the situation. He invited Braden into his 
office in order to identify the magnitude of the problem. Marshall noted being 
particularly unimpressed by the Assistant Secretary; he considered his strategic vision 
for the region to be ‘not all of one piece.’2 Marshall did bring some of his own ideas on 
the strategic priorities for the Western Hemisphere. His prior experience in securing 
inter-American cooperation in the mobilisation of the defences of the region during the 
Second World War appeared a more appropriate strategic focus as relations with the 
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Soviet Union continued to deteriorate. Marshall shared the fears of his colleagues in the 
armed services and those of Congress that the intervention of Braden in the internal 
affairs of Latin American countries endangered this regional cooperation and diverted 
attention from more serious business at hand. But Marshall appeared less concerned in 
shaping a coherent strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere than restoring 
internal cohesion within Washington. The tensions caused by the failure of Braden to 
command a broad consensus in support of his strategic approach typified the 
distractions that Marshall sought to root out of the State Department and the rest of the 
Truman administration. He soon identified Braden as the main obstacle to his priority of 
restoring a coordinated strategic approach under his leadership.3 
 
Hemispheric Security 
The Secretaries of War and Navy, Robert P. Patterson and James V. Forrestal, as well as 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarded the arrival of Marshall at the State Department as an 
opportunity to end the bureaucratic clashes that had ultimately led to impasse for 
strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The military leadership found Braden to be 
particularly uncooperative and obstructive to their agenda of securing the Western 
Hemisphere. They sought to re-establish the inter-American cooperation in preparing 
the defence of the region that had become the focus of strategy during the Second World 
War. Patterson and Forrestal, in particular, had become increasingly frustrated by the 
readiness of Braden and the rest of the State Department to dismiss their warnings of 
the potential threat that the Soviet Union posed to the security of the Western 
Hemisphere.4 Both had worked with Marshall in mobilising military forces in 
preparation for the Second World War. They anticipated that the arrival of their former 
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colleague represented a shift in focus within the State Department that would bring 
renewed collaboration on their security agenda. 
 
Marshall certainly shared their understanding of the vital interests for the US in 
securing the region. He had come to identify the defence of the Western Hemisphere as 
synonymous with the security of the US during his time as Army Chief of Staff. Marshall 
had been integral at the start of the Second World War in transforming the geographical 
concept of security, which had already expanded through more limited spaces of an 
“American lake” through to a quarter-sphere, into the defence of the entire 
hemisphere.5 Marshall emphasised the value of securing the region in a memorandum 
presented to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in May 1940; he prioritised defence of the 
Western Hemisphere over other interests in Europe and the Far East.6 This importance 
of hemispheric security had only been confirmed for Marshall as he observed the 
German advance across Africa towards the Atlantic. 
 
Marshall also rejected the view held by both Byrnes and Braden that the threat posed to 
the region by the Soviet Union lacked immediacy.7 He accepted their emphasis on a 
more pressing danger to Western Europe. In the event of an outbreak of war with the 
Soviet Union Marshall agreed with the assessments of General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
that he ‘wouldn’t expect South America to be a battleground in the strategic factors that 
apply in the world today.’8 Although he acknowledged that regional defence no longer 
remained sufficient for US security after the Second World War, Marshall shared the 
general impatience of the armed services to ‘get this hemisphere together’ before any 
possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.9  
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Marshall had already learned an important lesson in building readiness to defend the 
Americas in the event of a failure to meet a threat in Europe. He warned the House 
Appropriations Committee in February 1940, that ‘if Europe blazes in the late spring or 
summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western 
Hemisphere.’10 Substantial efforts were later necessary to divert resources into 
counteract the influence of Nazi Germany in the region. Marshall identified a vital 
interest in preparedness for an uncertain threat during an indeterminate peace. ‘No 
man can predict the outcome of the tragic struggle in Europe,’ he warned graduates of 
the Virginia Military Institute in June 1940. ‘No American can foresee the eventual effect 
on the Americas.’11 Marshall continued to preach these lessons in the post-war period. 
Shortly before his appointment as Secretary of State he testified in hearings before 
Congress that a program of hemispheric defence would remain necessary, even in 
peace, in order to avoid future repetition of previous mistakes.12 
 
The established record of Marshall encouraged Patterson and Forrestal to renew their 
appeals for collaboration with the State Department on securing the Western 
Hemisphere. They promptly solicited Marshall for his endorsement of their immediate 
priority of pursuing funding for a program of military assistance. Marshall had long 
been an advocate of inter-American military cooperation as an essential instrument for 
hemispheric defence. In his position as Army Chief of Staff he approved plans, promoted 
by both Patterson and Forrestal, to sell standardised and arms across the region. 
Marshall considered such a program to be ‘of first importance to the peace and safety of 
the Western Hemisphere.’13 Shortly before the Second World War he declared that: ‘we 
are determined that if it should become necessary for us to use a club to defend our 
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democracy and our interests in the Western Hemisphere, that it shall be a club of hard 
wood, and not of rubber hose.’14 
 
Marshall dismissed the concerns expressed by both Byrnes and Braden that a focus on 
inter-American military cooperation would divert vital resources away from Europe. He 
agreed with Patterson and Forrestal that failure to mobilise the military power of the 
rest of the region would only later lead to the redirection of US resources from the 
European frontier. Although he had warned against assuming sole responsibility for 
protecting the hemisphere before entry into the Second World War, Marshall criticised 
the eventual program of military assistance for Latin America that only came through 
‘convulsive, expensive expansion in an emergency.’15 After more than 100,000 US 
troops had to be re-stationed to defend the Western Hemisphere, Marshall supported 
the recommendations of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at the end of the 
war for a better planned program of military assistance for Latin American. Marshall 
also prioritised inter-American military cooperation to guarantee access to the strategic 
air bases, sea lines of communication, and raw materials that would be necessary for 
launching any defence of Europe. Eisenhower agreed that if Latin America was not 
going to be a key battleground, it would still provide ‘the main base’ of US power.16 
 
Marshall understood that his reputation amongst fellow military leaders meant that a 
shift to security as the strategic focus in the Western Hemisphere would allow him to 
reassert the authority of the State Department. Both Patterson and Forrestal 
acknowledged that the experience of Marshall in preparing and implementing plans for 
hemispheric defence during his time as Army Chief of Staff made him best suited to lead 
in securing the region from the emerging Soviet danger. Marshall remained in no hurry 
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to impose his own strategic vision however. He decided to defer his decision on inter-
American military cooperation until after his return from the Moscow Conference when 
time could be found to make a comprehensive review of strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
Marshall appeared to be more concerned with renewing cooperation between the State 
Department and the armed services. He provided Patterson and Forrestal with some 
encouragement that he would consider a review of the State Department opposition to 
their security agenda after authorising a preliminary study of possible requests from 
Latin America as part of a wider program of military assistance.17 As the 
recommendations of this study would form the basis of the review of State Department 
strategy in the Western Hemisphere, both Patterson and Forrestal welcomed the 
decision by Marshall to remove the responsibility for this study from Braden and the 
Office of American Republic Affairs. As General John H. Hilldring proved ‘very receptive’ 
to their objectives after being chosen to lead the review, Patterson and Forrestal 
anticipated that this reflected Marshall’s own support for their agenda of hemispheric 
security. 
 
Hemispheric Solidarity 
The prospects for some convergence between the State Department and the armed 
services after the return of Marshall to Washington by no means assured a coherent 
shift in strategy in the Western Hemisphere. A domestic consensus on a strategic 
approach towards Latin America faced a more serious challenge from the new 
Republican leadership in Congress. Marshall soon realised that the support of Congress 
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would be difficult to maintain without marginalising Braden. The strategic approach 
shaped by the Assistant Secretary incited animosity amongst legislators seeking to 
restore the earlier era of the Good Neighbour Policy. The new Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI), summarised the fears of 
the Republican leadership that the interventionist campaigns conducted by Braden 
against Latin American dictators only undermined the continental solidarity established 
in the Good Neighbour Policy. He warned Marshall that the US would face a 
“communistic upsurge” in the region if Braden continued to force the Americas apart. 
Vandenberg demanded an immediate shift in strategic approach from Marshall and 
insisted that his commitment to bipartisan cooperation with the Truman administration 
would not extend to ‘the policy in Latin America now operating in a vacuum created by 
Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden.’18 
 
Marshall understood the enmity that Braden provoked amongst the Republican 
leadership threatened his objective of domestic consensus. Only days after the House of 
Representatives censured Braden as a ‘muddling jug head,’ he privately assured senior 
Congressional members that he would deal with the Assistant Secretary in the near 
future.19 Marshall informed the House Foreign Affairs Committee that he would 
formulate his own approach to the region on his return from the Moscow Conference; 
he could however, promise them that he would not be adopting Braden’s policies.20 
 
Marshall understood as well as the military leadership that the priority for Congress of 
restoring the hemispheric solidarity of the Good Neighbour era could make them 
reluctant to support a renewed focus on securing the Western Hemisphere. The 
preceding 79th Congress had rejected appropriations for an earlier draft of the Inter-
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American Military Cooperation Act after failing to be persuaded of the immediate need 
to prepare regional defences.21 The armed services increasingly adopted the discursive 
meanings of the Good Neighbour Policy to frame their own security agenda in order to 
satisfy the demands of Congress. ‘Hemispheric solidarity was the word [sic] we used for 
national security,’ later noted Major General Kenner F. Hertford, who led the War 
Department’s Pan-American Group.22 
 
Patterson and Forrestal recognised that the smooth passage of future legislation for an 
expensive program of military assistance for Latin America however, relied on gaining 
the support of Marshall. The outgoing Democratic Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Sam Rayburn, made clear the importance of testimonial support from 
Marshall: ‘He laid it on the line. He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause. Congress 
always respected him. They would give him things they would give no one else.’23 
Marshall had already joined the military leadership in efforts to persuade Congress that 
inter-American military cooperation provided the necessary corollary to restoring the 
continental solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy:  
 ‘I think it is fundamental that we should do everything within our 
power in a reasonable manner to unify the entire Western 
Hemisphere, so far as we can, in our thinking and in our 
arrangements, for our own security, for our own well-being.’24  
Only weeks before his appointment as Secretary of State, Marshall told the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee that: ‘Pan-American solidarity is a highly essential military 
need at the moment.’25  
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Patterson and Forrestal hoped that the reputation of Marshall would secure success in 
their pursuit of legislation on inter-American military cooperation. Marshall’s departure 
for the Moscow Conference did not deter them from pressing the State Department to 
reconsider its opposition to a focus on securing the region however. The significance of 
hemispheric solidarity to the Good Neighbour era presented an opportunity to 
Patterson and Forrestal to mobilise Congress in support for a commitment to military 
cooperation. A short visit to Mexico had brought an impulsive promise from Truman to 
seek congressional authorisation for the sale of military equipment to the 
administration of President Miguel Alemán Valdés.26 Patterson and Forrestal insisted 
that the credibility of Truman’s commitment to friendly and collaborative relations with 
neighbouring countries relied on the smooth passage of the Inter-American Military 
Cooperation Act.  
 
The strategic vision of inter-American solidarity and security shared by Marshall and 
the military leadership seemed to offer a chance to end the bureaucratic deadlock in the 
executive branch over the control and direction of hemispheric strategy. Patterson and 
Forrestal anticipated that a commitment to inter-American military cooperation from 
the popular Secretary of State would present a united front needed to convince 
Congress to support their strategic priorities. Even with the absence of Marshall from 
Washington, they hoped that the momentum continued to shift in their favour. As a 
result they renewed their appeals for the State Department to reverse its opposition to 
inter-American military cooperation. 
 
The State Department would not overturn its established position simply because of the 
appointment of Marshall as Secretary of State however. The tensions between Braden 
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and the armed services represented more than a clash of bureaucratic interests. The 
promotion of divergent priorities rested on the evocation of different strategic 
traditions as ideological rationale. Braden dismissed outright the Soviet threat and the 
assurances made to Mexico by Truman as sufficient rationale to shift the State 
Department position in support of a return to the earlier wartime footing of the Good 
Neighbour Policy. The State Department had already outlined two major problems in 
making an association between securing the region and consolidating solidarity in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
 
Firstly, the prioritisation of inter-American cooperation did not converge with an 
effective defence of the Americas. The need to offer comparable assistance packages to 
each of the Latin American governments, regardless of strategic location, in order to 
maintain hemispheric solidarity, wasted essential resources for regional defence. 
Increasing the military capacity of the smallest Republics would also bring little 
additional security to the hemisphere. The reluctance of many military planners in the 
US to depend upon a number of Latin American Republics for anything more than 
secondary responsibilities in hemispheric defence only demonstrated that the US would 
still need to assume their duties in the eventuality of an outbreak of war.27 This 
disinclination to trust some Latin American militaries with important roles for regional 
security was evident during the war; the US, for example, maintained the Inter-
American Defense Board only as a symbolic channel for collective security, whilst 
continuing to take on the key operations.28  
 
Secondly, a prioritisation of security objectives only created more serious problems for 
hemispheric unity. Braden warned of a repeat of the ‘very serious situation’ that arose 
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when military assistance packages had been prioritised for countries vital for regional 
defence. The State Department noted during the war that Truman’s directive to grant 
Lend-Lease military aid only to those Latin American countries essential for continuing 
the war effort caused widespread resentment and tension that undermined the 
solidarity of the hemisphere.29 The directive made sense from a military perspective; 
the defence of priority geographic areas, such as the northeast Brazilian ‘bulge’ at Natal 
and the Panama Canal, had been identified by the War and Navy Departments during 
the war.30 The limited allocation of resources and attention however, left other Latin 
American allies feeling neglected by the US and increasingly cautious of the rising 
military capabilities of their neighbours. 
 
The State Department continued to highlight the inherent tensions in the simultaneous 
pursuit of security and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere particularly through a 
focus on inter-American military cooperation. Braden also recognised the momentum 
building against him however. He persuaded Acheson not to wait for Marshall to return 
from Moscow before responding to Patterson and Forrestal. The Assistant Secretary 
seized the opportunity to draft a memorandum defending his opposition to inter-
American military cooperation for Acheson to authorise. 
 
Hemispheric Order 
The declaration of the Truman Doctrine further shifted the strategic environment days 
before Braden completed his memorandum on inter-American military cooperation. 
The emerging security discourse that followed the identification of a hostile enemy in 
the Soviet Union articulated a new nodal point around which Patterson and Forrestal 
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could attempt to redefine the meaning of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The 
military leadership had long warned the State Department of the serious danger of the 
intrusion of Soviet influence would undermine the US position and threaten to 
destabilise the region. This danger appeared to provide them with a response to the 
limitations highlighted by the State Department of a multilateral approach to defending 
the region. Although he acknowledged that the rationale for an assistance program 
remained ‘more political than military,’ Patterson repeatedly emphasised the interest in 
securing a stable flank in South America and the necessity of action to avoid any 
‘confusion’ and disorder caused by ‘enemy penetration – political, economic or 
military.’31 He insisted on the need to support military institutions that dominated 
politics across Latin America as the only safe means to ensure the exclusion of Soviet 
influence over prominent positions.32 The failure to exclude foreign military missions 
and equipment from Latin America would present a ‘grave danger to the US.’ 
 
State Department officials agreed on the vital strategic interest in stabilising the region. 
Their fundamentally different understanding of the nature of order in the Western 
Hemisphere however, prevented the War and Navy Departments from fixing meanings 
that would determine a self-evident or necessary strategic approach towards the region. 
These alternative constructions simply established the strategic objective of order in 
the Western Hemisphere as a site for struggle. Whilst Patterson and Forrestal insisted 
that the cohesion of the region could be maintained through the simple exclusion of 
external influences, Braden identified internal dynamics that caused dysfunction in the 
order of the Western Hemisphere.33 He had drawn an antagonistic frontier within the 
region that isolated authoritarian leaders as the primary obstacle to the realisation of 
order. 
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Braden did not consider the context of confrontation with the Soviet Union to be just 
cause to shift the focus of his strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The representations 
of danger only provided new rationale for the alternative interpretations of US 
objectives in the Western Hemisphere constructed within the State Department. He sent 
his memorandum to Patterson and Forrestal warning of the ‘wholly undesirable 
consequences’ that inter-American military cooperation would invite.34 
 
Braden highlighted foremost that military assistance would undermine individual 
political freedoms across the region. The State Department had long warned against 
strengthening Latin American militaries that would offer authoritarian leaders the 
legitimacy and means to turn on their own citizens.35 The popular discontent at 
widespread repression of democratic movements would become a source of instability 
across the entire region. Secretary Byrnes had even asked Patterson to curtail military 
visits to Latin American Republics as they could be misinterpreted in those countries 
facing political turmoil, particularly those with upcoming elections.36 The US 
Ambassador in Paraguay, Willard Beaulac, reaffirmed this message from his experience 
in Asunción: ‘The point that is sought to be made, is that our military cooperation with 
Paraguay …tends to make democratization of Paraguay more difficult.’37 
 
State Department officials and Foreign Service Officers agreed on the need to maintain 
strong relationships with Latin American leaders in order to prevent subversive 
influences. But Acheson had warned the War Department that cooperation with 
authoritarian militaries,  
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‘would lose much of the support and friendship of those people of 
Latin America who are devoted to the cause of peace and of stable 
democratic government. In the long run we must in large measure 
rely upon the support of those groups if our position of leadership 
among the American Republics is to be maintained and 
strengthened.’38 
Braden had long maintained that military cooperation would only perpetuate ‘the grip 
of reactionary military groups’ that actually created the conditions favourable to the 
spread of communism. He insisted that hemispheric order could only be secured on the 
foundation of continued inter-American cooperation between progressive democratic 
movements. 
 
Braden also warned Patterson and Forrestal that military assistance threatened to 
exacerbate dependent and ‘backward’ economic conditions across the region. State 
Department officials repeatedly stressed the danger in encouraging Latin American 
governments to redirect limited resources from improving destabilising standards of 
living towards expenditure on military programs for hemispheric defence. Braden had 
previously managed to persuade Byrnes to move away from hesitant conciliation with 
the War and Navy Departments and harden the State Department position, by showing 
that even a post-war interim program of arms sales had been beyond the economic 
capacity of many of the Latin American Republics.39 
 
Braden adopted the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine to warn of the destabilisation that 
the economic handicaps of a military assistance program would cause: 
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‘[It would] aggravate conditions of economic and political 
instability which already constitute a serious problem for this 
Government in Latin America, and which this Government now 
proposes to spend large amounts of money to overcome in other 
parts of the world. These conditions are the soil in which the 
seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured.’ 
Many of the progressive leaders in Latin America agreed. ‘The armaments race has been 
one of the bad factors in Latin America,’ stated the Chilean President, Gabriel González 
Videla. ‘We are too poor to bear the load and [we] need the money to raise [our] 
standard of living. As a Chilean and ... an American, I am, frankly, an enemy of over-
arming.’40 After the revised studies carried out by Hilldring revealed that a Latin 
American program of arms standardisation would approach a cost of $1 billion Braden 
took an even stronger tone.41 ‘Encouragement of expenditures on arms by the Latin 
American countries,’ Braden noted, ‘runs directly counter to our basic economic and 
political policies which aim to encourage an improvement in the living standards and 
economic welfare in those countries.’ He concluded that the military assistance program 
proposed by the War and Navy Departments was, in short, ‘dangerous to hemisphere 
security.’ 
 
Braden provoked immediate responses from both Patterson and Forrestal. As well as 
reasserting that their security agenda could not be neglected, the military leadership 
also emphasised that inter-American military cooperation did not undermine State 
Department objectives. The armed services had agreed during the war that regional 
stability required the US to ‘avoid the stimulation of political rivalries or other political 
developments which would prejudice our good relations with the other American 
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Republics.’42 But Patterson and Forrestal maintained a pragmatic approach to realising 
those objectives. The US could not afford to lose their influence over Latin American 
military leaders that would not relinquish their predominant position in government 
life. Failure to do so risked a significant danger of encouraging extra-hemispheric 
influences. Patterson and Forrestal still insisted that inter-American military 
cooperation however, would still ‘introduce and demonstrate, to individuals in key 
positions, US democratic principles.’43 
 
The armed services also insisted that a program of military assistance would not be so 
expensive as to impede shared objectives and would similarly encourage Latin 
American leaders to embrace American ideals and way of life.44 Patterson stressed that 
as many Latin American governments wanted to buy arms regardless, it was important 
to ensure that the US furnished them rather than a European – or worse – Soviet-bloc 
country. He reminded the State Department that the US needed to maintain Latin 
American military establishments that ‘they, not we, feel they require.’45 Patterson felt 
that the increased prospects for war should not raise a question of whether the Latin 
Americans should receive arms, but whether they would have US or foreign arms?46 He 
asserted that the US could not afford to play into the hands of the Soviet Union by 
allowing them to gain influence through military missions.47 If crises were costly in 
money, time and blood, Patterson suggested, prevention was cheap and the US could 
‘lock the stable door’ before the horse was stolen.48 He argued that inter-American 
military cooperation had been designed ‘to prevent the very type of crisis which has 
arisen in Turkey and Greece.’ 
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Strategic Shift 
The representations of danger in the Cold War did not determine a strategic approach 
in the Western Hemisphere and it would be necessary for Marshall to end the 
bureaucratic deadlock on his return to Washington. His experience at the Moscow 
Conference meant that he now looked to defer the comprehensive strategic review 
promised before his departure. The ongoing bureaucratic conflict on the issue of inter-
American military cooperation undermining internal cohesion still required his 
immediate attention even in the absence of a coherent strategic blueprint.  He decided 
to delegate authority to Acheson to represent the State Department at a meeting of the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on the morning of 1st May however. Although 
Acheson had endorsed his memorandum opposing inter-American military cooperation 
only a few weeks earlier, Braden realised that his exclusion from the meeting likely 
signalled the end of his influence over shaping strategy in the region. 
 
Acheson opened the meeting by informing Patterson and Forrestal ‘that he had over-
ruled objections within his department against the [Inter-American Military 
Cooperation Act] and that the State Department would now support it.’49 This shift in 
position certainly did not represent a genuine change of heart or a reconciliation of the 
tensions identified in the strategy pursued by the armed services. The decision 
appeared to be a measure of political expedience – a combination of avoiding any 
damage to his reputation during his last days in office or those of his superiors. 
 
Firstly, Acheson had considered it necessary to respond to the significant 
transformation in the strategic climate within Washington whilst Marshall remained 
absent in Moscow. He had already learned important lessons that convinced him of the 
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imprudence of waiting to persuade Marshall of the State Department opposition to 
inter-American military cooperation. The intervention of the President alerted Acheson 
to the costs of maintaining State Department opposition to the security agenda in the 
Western Hemisphere. He had recognised the tide moving away from his liberal views on 
the Soviet Union in late 1946 and shifted to a more hard-line approach.50 After the shift 
in strategic climate created by the Truman Doctrine, Acheson detected the possibility of 
similar changes for strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The recommendations for a 
comprehensive military assistance program delivered by Hilldring in his interim report 
only supported these trends. Acheson showed reluctant to risk maintaining a position 
that would likely be reversed once Marshall received recommendations in support of 
his own preferred approach. The new attitude that Marshall brought back from Moscow 
only confirmed the decision for Acheson. After a bitter experience as Roosevelt’s Acting 
Secretary of the Treasury early in his career, Acheson had become “quite determined” to 
avoid any arguments with his superiors that threatened to undermine their prestige or 
damage his own status.51 
 
Secondly, Acheson shaped his decision within the context of a restructured State 
Department. He welcomed the effective coordination introduced by Marshall and 
managed to establish an effective working relationship with the new Secretary; but 
Acheson typified the veteran diplomats that found some difficulty in adapting to the 
military approach in the personal style of Marshall.52 He recognised the Secretary’s 
willingness to accept the recommendations of his advisers, but remained concerned 
that Marshall did not spend enough time considering alternative solutions to problems. 
Shortly after his arrival, the new Secretary instructed two subordinates arguing over 
recommendations to not ‘fight the problem,’ but ‘decide it.’ To reduce his own exposure 
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to personal clashes that could influence decisions, Marshall delegated responsibility for 
coordinating action to his Special Assistant, Colonel Marshall S. J. Carter.53 Acheson was 
not expected to promote deliberation within the State Department, but rather to ensure 
that everyone sang from the same hymn sheet. Acheson recognised that standing by a 
position promoted by Braden would be far from expedient within this new institutional 
context.  
 
Braden was less willing to accept the reversal of his position however. He wrote to 
Marshall accusing him of deceiving the public on the problems faced with military 
assistance.54 Braden felt that the refusal of the Secretary to heed the warnings of his 
own department constituted a deliberate manipulation of the facts. Marshall considered 
Braden’s protest letter to be the final straw. As Army Chief of Staff he had proved to be a 
‘merciless redliner’ and readily fired inefficient high-ranking officers.55 Marshall called 
Braden into his office, where he was ‘quietly informed that his services would not long 
be needed.’56 Truman’s authorisation to send the Inter-American Military Cooperation 
Act to Congress a few weeks later only convinced Braden that he could not have 
continued in his post with any authority anyway. 
 
The realignment of the State Department with the agenda of security in the Western 
Hemisphere did not represent the implementation of a coherent strategic vision. 
Although Marshall did consider the approach adopted by Braden to be damaging to both 
the security and solidarity of the region, his primary concern remained to re-establish a 
unity within Washington. Marshall could only manage to establish an “illusion of 
coherence” through the identification of Braden and his strategic approach as the 
empirical obstacle to this unity however. The isolation of Braden only objectified the 
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ontological impossibility of articulating a discourse that fixed all meanings for the 
Western Hemisphere. Marshall could not simply throw Braden out of the State 
Department as dirty water and expect to be left with a pure strategic vision; it was the 
incoherence of these strategic concepts that had soiled Braden in the first place.  
 
The differences over hemispheric strategy during the first few months of 1947 had been 
based on alternative conceptualisations as well as organisational conflicts of interest. A 
simple commitment to inter-American military cooperation ultimately could not 
reconcile the tensions that emerged from a failure to represent those demanding an 
alternative commitment to promoting the political and economic freedoms of the 
region. Although security emerged as the dominant discourse to frame strategy in the 
Western Hemisphere, the divergent meanings used by the State Department would 
survive beyond Spruille Braden. 
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2. STRATEGIC INCOHERENCE 
 
The strategic shift in the Western Hemisphere during the first months of 1947 did not 
originate from a coherent framework. Marshall’s decision to rescind the long-standing 
State Department opposition to inter-American military cooperation emerged only 
partially from a concern to secure the US from the danger posed by the Soviet Union. 
Marshall showed more concern for restoring internal cohesion within Washington. The 
departure of Spruille Braden cleared an easier path for building a consensus around a 
strategic priority of securing the Western Hemisphere. Yet Marshall still recognised the 
need for a comprehensive strategic review. This was no simple task. Aware of his own 
limits as a geopolitical strategist, Marshall also identified a lack of capacity across the 
State Department to simultaneously plan and implement strategy. 
 
Marshall continued his restructuring of the State Department in order to address this 
problem. He turned first to the appointment of Robert A. Lovett as a replacement for 
Acheson as Undersecretary of State. The two had previously worked together and found 
that they ‘normally reacted the same way to issues and problems.’1 Lovett did not 
expect any difficulty in integrating their ideas into shaping a wider strategic vision. He 
used the brief weeks before officially relieving Acheson however, to turn to fellow 
members of the Council on Foreign Relations for recommendations on strategic 
priorities. A dinner meeting held at the New York offices of the Council brought a 
unanimous agreement on the need to secure both the Western Hemisphere and 
Western Europe within an extended US sphere of influence.2 The group could not offer 
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Lovett any suggestions on how to integrate the existing separate approaches towards 
these different regions into a coherent global strategy however.  
 
Marshall had already decided to establish an autonomous group within the State 
Department to undertake this task. He instructed Acheson whilst he travelled to the 
Moscow Conference to recruit George F. Kennan to direct this Policy Planning Staff in 
reconceptualising US strategic objectives for a new global context.3 Marshall anticipated 
that Kennan would introduce a conceptual framework from which to integrate the 
unique spaces in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere into a new global 
strategy. Kennan had already made a significant impact on the strategic environment 
with his renowned “Long Telegram” sent from Moscow in February 1946.4 He had been 
developing his ideas on the Soviet threat since his initial involvement in establishing the 
Riga Axioms and continued through private communications and lectures at the 
National War College.5 These ideas culminated in a memorandum prepared for 
Secretary Forrestal, entitled “Psychological Background of Soviet Foreign Policy”. The 
growing awareness in Washington of the Soviet threat ensured an enthusiastic welcome 
of the recommendations for the containment of the Soviet Union. Kennan’s reputation 
as a Soviet expert continued to grow and from his new office adjacent to Marshall in the 
“New State Building” on C Street, he now had the institutional support to influence 
strategic thought and redefine US interests in a new global role.6  
 
Marshall remained a more important figure in reshaping a strategic approach in the 
Western Hemisphere however. It soon became clear that Marshall would need to fill the 
gap left by the Policy Planning Staff as it avoided ‘any complete or global answer to the 
problems of US foreign policy’ in order to focus on ‘individual areas of policy.’7 The 
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decision to leave the position of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic 
Affairs vacant after the departure of Braden appeared myopic once Kennan’s narrow 
focus on Western Europe became apparent. Marshall not only struggled alone in finding 
a solution to integrating distinct regional approaches into a coherent global strategy; 
the prioritisation of Western Europe in the initial formulations of Kennan’s strategies of 
global containment only created further problems for both the means and ends of the 
US approach in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
Strategic Priorities 
Serious developments in Western Europe overtook plans for a comprehensive review to 
address the drift in strategy towards the Western Hemisphere. The State Department 
provided Marshall with numerous briefings that warned of an imminent economic crisis 
in Western Europe. He had witnessed the poverty and hunger suffered in Western 
Europe first hand en route to Moscow. Marshall warned the delegates at the Moscow 
Conference that the European patient sank whilst the doctors deliberated and insisted 
that there be no further delay in finding a remedy for their malady.8 The problem could 
not ‘fester any longer – the time for launching the boil was now at hand.’9 Marshall 
deferred a broad strategic review and issued Kennan with a narrower remit of finding 
an immediate solution to this crisis. 
 
Kennan did not consider this remit and the plans to shape wider strategic objectives to 
be mutually exclusive. Although the Truman Doctrine had implied the need to resist 
Soviet aggression wherever it emerged, Kennan initially focused his strategies of 
containment on defending specific strongpoints like Western Europe.10 He regarded the 
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security of the American way of life as dependent upon the effective integration of the 
vital industrial core of Western Europe into the US sphere of influence. Inertia would 
only undermine the consolidation of the base of US economic power; an interdependent 
economic system based upon freedom of trade, capital flow, and currency convertibility 
underpinned US strength.11 State Department analysts also warned that economic 
collapse in Western Europe could destabilise the economic system already secured in 
the Western Hemisphere. If European nations failed to sell enough produce to raise the 
dollars needed to import from the Americas, the growing dollar gap would only 
generate incentives for Latin American governments to turn towards economic 
autarchy.12 
 
Kennan presented Marshall with recommendations in Policy Planning Study 1 that a 
program of economic aid would be the most effective tool to stabilise and strengthen 
European infrastructure. He also asserted that a successful demonstration of improved 
standards of living through economic assistance would also further encourage 
European integration into the American orbit. Marshall authorised these 
recommendations in PPS/1 and presented the plans for a European Recovery Program 
in a speech at Harvard University two weeks later.13  
 
The leaders of Western Europe welcomed the announcement of this Marshall Plan; but 
this did not represent an immediate success for the broader aim of shaping a 
comprehensive strategic approach however. Senior officials within the Truman 
administration acknowledged that the elevation of the economic reconstruction of 
Western Europe to the highest priority even created significant problems for the pursuit 
of strategic objectives by seriously limiting the resources available to fulfil existing 
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commitments. The armed services expressed concerns that extended financial 
commitments would stretch their capacity to guarantee the security of the entire US 
orbit. The Assistant Secretary of War, Howard C. Petersen warned that ‘our goals are out 
of balance with our means.’ The Chief of Staff for the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, also 
emphasised that resources were not available for ‘our great bag of commitments.’14 
Although the prioritisation of defending strongpoints like Western Europe over the 
entire perimeter of the US sphere of influence provided the benefit of matching ends to 
the limited means available, Kennan worried that the limits of these resources would 
not be sufficient even for the economic reconstruction of Europe.15 ‘It may be that we 
have undertaken too much,’ he warned an audience at the National War College. ‘There 
is a serious gap between the things we have set out to do and our capabilities for doing 
them,’ he concluded.16 
 
Staunch internationalists stepped up to argue the need to match resources to the 
commitments necessary to maintain US global credibility. Hamilton Fish Armstrong 
insisted that the ‘American way is not to ask if the US can afford to ask.’17 The resolution 
of this serious tension between commitment and resources is credited to Marshall 
however. He understood that strategic initiatives, such as the prioritised program of 
economic assistance in Western Europe, would be short-lived if Congress could not be 
persuaded to authorise necessary funding. The general reluctance of Congress to extend 
already stretched resources did not make for an easy task however. The Republican 
leadership had campaigned on spending cuts and were keeping a tight hold of their 
“powers of the purse” to restrain any overreaching commitments. The personal 
credibility of Marshall became essential as he focused his attention on persuading 
Senator Vandenberg to help him work through legislation on the ERP through 
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Congress.18 Although he had not consulted the Republican leadership before his 
Harvard speech, Marshall hoped that his renouncement of any bid for the Democrat 
nomination to the Presidency would alleviate their fears that his accomplishments 
would be credited to Truman and thus make it easier for them to cooperate.19 Marshall 
held regular secret meetings with Vandenberg at the President’s official guest house in 
an attempt to find a solution; he noted that the two ‘couldn't have gotten much closer 
together unless I sat in Vandenberg's lap or he sat in mine.’20 Marshall later suggested 
that ‘Vandenberg was my right hand man and at times I was his right hand man.’ 
 
Marshall was not entirely successful in his efforts however. Vandenberg could not 
guarantee appropriations even for the Marshall Plan. Although he emphasised his own 
commitment to ‘saving civilisation in Europe’ in a private letter to Marshall, Vandenberg 
informed the Secretary that he did ‘not take it for granted that the American public is 
ready for such burdens as would be involved.’21 Vandenberg reaffirmed his own 
intentions to pursue a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs, but this would not 
guarantee a blank cheque for the Truman administration. ‘We are not suddenly resolved 
to underwrite the earth,’ Vandenberg cautioned. ‘That would be fantastic, improvident, 
and impossible.’22 
 
This refusal to match limited resources to extended commitments proved to have a 
significant impact on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The efforts made by 
Marshall to extend the responsibilities of the US to Western Europe had already 
established a sense of overstretching limited resources. Something would have to give. 
The submission of the request to fund a program of inter-American military cooperation 
only a few weeks after the announcement of the Marshall Plan evidently represented a 
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commitment too far for Congress. The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised 
objections to the costs of the program that Patterson promised would not exceed $10 
million per year. The military leaders did their best to emphasise the urgent need for 
preparations for hemispheric defence. Patterson testified before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that the bill was necessary for the ‘planned system of collective 
action to safeguard the peace and security of the Continent.’23 A few days later, the US 
delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board, General Matthew B. Ridgway, informed 
the committee members that by strengthening the regional system, inter-American 
military cooperation would ‘contribute to the effective maintenance of world peace and 
security.’24 
 
Marshall made his own appeal with similar conviction. Demonstrating the new unified 
approach towards strategy in the Western Hemisphere, Marshall ‘urgently 
recommended early and favourable action.’ His failure to assure the smooth passing of 
House Resolution 3836 revealed the limitations of not only his influence in Congress, 
but also the coherence of his strategic approach for the Western Hemisphere. Marshall 
appeared mistaken once again in his assumption that the prospects of war meant that 
legislation on inter-American military cooperation would ‘skid through like a wet 
duck.’25 Although the Cold War provided a rationale for inter-American military 
cooperation, it also prioritised limited resources to be redirected to the new frontier in 
Western Europe. Significant opposition arose from continued doubts as to the urgency 
of returning the Good Neighbour Policy to a wartime footing.  
 
Senators and House Representatives also remained unconvinced that other long-held 
objections to a hemispheric program of military cooperation had been resolved. The 
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House Foreign Affairs Committee again raised questions on the use of a military 
rationale for what was essentially a political program. On the one hand they expressed 
concerns about the fitness of a program that did not prioritise aid to those Latin 
American countries assuming responsibilities vital to hemispheric security.26 On the 
other hand however, they feared it would offer opportunities for specific Latin 
American governments and their supporters in the US to develop political reasons for 
more assistance.27 A divisive use of preponderant US power to support political allies 
would only undermine the Good Neighbour commitment to a regional fraternity of 
equal and sovereign American Republics. 
 
Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH) led demonstrations in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee against even putting the bill on a tight legislative agenda before 
adjournment. Marshall reluctantly agreed with Senator Vandenberg to postpone any 
further consideration of the bill until the next session of Congress. The ultimate failure 
of Marshall to assure legislative action from, what Truman later referred to as, the “do-
nothing” 80th Congress cast a first major blow for his efforts to reshape strategy in the 
Western Hemisphere.  
 
Strategic Frontiers 
The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act did not fail simple because of a disparity 
between ends and means. Strategy in the Western Hemisphere vacillated in the early 
months of 1947 more fundamentally from the absence of clearly defined ends. The State 
Department only began to conceptualise a broader framework for strategic objectives at 
the global level in response to the struggle it faced in finding a clear path through 
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Congress for the Marshall Plan. The efforts to explain the meaning of US economic 
assistance for Western Europe first in terms of a broader self-interest and then of more 
universal purpose only created further problems for US strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere. The conceptualisation of the abstract principles guiding a broader 
strategic approach with a primary consideration of the specific problems of Western 
Europe ensured tensions in their application to the different context of the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
The need to appeal to enduring constructions of national exceptionalism to frame the 
new US role in the world became evident as the State Department failed to explain the 
meaning of economic assistance to Western Europe in more simple terms of self-
interest. Acheson used an address to the Delta Council in Mississippi to provide an 
explanation for the American public on what the crisis in Western Europe ‘meant for the 
US and for US foreign policy.’28 In what Truman would later describe as the ‘prologue to 
the Marshall Plan,’ Acheson described the substantial financial commitment to the 
economic reconstruction of Western Europe as ‘chiefly a matter of self-interest.’ 
Administration officials repeatedly emphasised that future US prosperity and security 
depended on consolidating European integration into an American system of free 
trade.29 Although Marshall insisted that the intention all along had been to ‘spring the 
plan with explosive force’ to prevent premature political debate, the ultimate failure to 
drum up popular support meant that the State Department actually expended more 
effort in limiting the exposure of the commitment to Europe in the American press.30 
 
The Council on Foreign Relations led criticisms of the ineptitude shown by the State 
Department in its efforts to encourage the scale of sacrifice necessary for the 
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reconstruction of Europe.31 Senator Vandenberg warned that Congressional 
authorisation of assistance to Western Europe remained difficult ‘until it is far more 
efficiently demonstrated to the American people that this is in the latitude of their own 
available resources and serves their intelligent self-interest.’32 Marshall continued to 
frame the program as an ‘entirely a selfish move’ after further consultations with 
Vandenberg.33 He increased efforts to sell the ERP in areas such as the Middle West 
however. Marshall later described these attempts as if he ‘were running for office.’ The 
need for a different approach became increasingly clear however. 
 
Kennan had already acknowledged this need to explain ‘to an informed public in our 
country the complexities of some of the problems which confront it and the background 
of some of its solutions.’34 He consented for the Council on Foreign Relations to publish 
his memorandum drafted for Forrestal in Foreign Affairs in the hope that it would foster 
similar support amongst the public for action to contain the Soviet Union. The editor of 
the journal, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, included the memorandum as an essay entitled 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under the pseudonym – X.35 
 
The Council on Foreign Relations later described the immediate impact that the X article 
made upon the national climate: 
 ‘Perhaps no single essay of the twentieth century can match the X 
article for its impact upon the intellectual curiosity of a confused 
nation, upon the mindset of equally confused policymakers and 
scholars, upon national policy in at least seven presidential 
administrations to come.’36 
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The influence of the X article did not emanate from Kennan presenting a comprehensive 
strategic vision for the US or even the prescription of specific policies; it derived 
precisely from the fact that it had been framed in ‘terms of principles’ rather than clear 
strategic objectives. The X article simply provided a timely and widespread 
dissemination of an intellectual framework that reaffirmed the ‘gross oversimplification 
of reality’ in the Truman Doctrine.37 The Manichaean construction of the ‘US and Soviet 
Union representing two opposed hostile poles in the world’ rearticulated a ‘geography 
of evil’ that made the international environment understandable.38 The identification of 
the new face of evil in the Soviet threat served as a negative agent to rearticulate 
enduring constructions of American exceptionalism. In order to meet the challenge 
posed by the Soviet Union, Kennan declared that the US ‘need only measure up to its 
own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.’ He 
appealed to the American people to assume ‘the responsibilities of moral and political 
leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.’39  
 
In these constructions of containment Kennan provided Marshall with more of a 
discursive strategy ‘associated with the logic of identity.’40 The discourse of 
containment became central in defining an American identity that ‘left a sort of tidal 
stain’ on Marshall.41 In promoting the ERP as a strategic priority Marshall moved away 
from a narrow focus on US interests and reverted instead to similar appeals to the 
messianic tendency in American identity. He emphasised the duty of the US to confront 
the universal threat of hunger, poverty and chaos. Marshall called on the American 
people ‘to face up to that responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our 
country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.’ He also framed the 
economic reconstruction of Western Europe in terms of securing the extended US 
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sphere against Soviet expansion. Soviet attempts to exploit political and economic 
instability posed a serious threat to the integration of Western Europe into the 
American orbit. Marshall emphasised that subversive communist movements thrived on 
the kind of crisis seen in Europe. He warned that the Soviets would do everything 
possible to stir unrest; it was a parasite or cancer feeding on European infirmity.42 
 
Kennan feared that the use of the universal rhetoric employed in the Truman Doctrine 
and his X article to frame the Marshall Plan in terms of the containment of the Soviet 
Union would undermine the focus on defending strategic strongpoints. He warned that 
the Messianic rhetoric and Manichaean constructions necessary to mobilise domestic 
support would simultaneously rouse fears amongst leaders in Western Europe of being 
drawn into a crusade or confrontation with the Soviet Union. The editor of Foreign 
Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, agreed that the European preoccupation with ‘the 
bare essentials of existence’ meant that the US could not win their hearts and minds 
with the insistence that ‘everyone must now choose sides in an ideological battle.’43  
 
Kennan became more concerned that his X article would be used to rationalise a more 
universal strategic commitment. He faced immediate criticism from the likes of Walter 
Lippmann that limited resources would be stretched further with such an 
indeterminate commitment. In his appeal for the US public to embrace their national 
purpose, Kennan had effectively asked for a ‘commitment to the idea of commitment.’44 
The PPS Director later acknowledged that the failure to distinguish the geographical 
areas of vital interest brought prompt demands for commitments comparable to the 
Marshall Plan in other regions of the world. The Latin Americanists within the State 
Department certainly felt that further resources could be useful in securing US interests 
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in the Western Hemisphere. Kennan realised that open-ended commitments such as 
eradicating poverty, which were not unique to the crisis in Western Europe, would only 
divert resources away from strategic priorities.45 ‘The notion should be dispelled that 
the Truman Doctrine was a blank check to be used for economic and military aid 
anywhere in the world where the Communists show signs of being successful,’ he also 
warned. 
 
Kennan reconciled the tension between the abstract conceptual framework of 
containment found in the likes of the Truman Doctrine and the X article on the one hand 
and the limited measures pursued in the specific space of Western Europe on the other 
with the rationale that global containment had to be focused on the strategic frontier of 
Western Europe instead of wasting resources on the periphery. He considered the 
prioritisation of Western Europe to be essential not only for security and economic 
interests but also its central position along the antagonistic frontier drawn between the 
US and Soviet spheres. Western Europe provided the Cold War terrain where the 
relations of force and material interest converged with symbolic and imaginary 
representations of identity.46 This situation made Western Europe the first important 
battleground for the opposing universal claims for the future that had been outlined in 
the Truman Doctrine.  
 
Kennan understood that European integration into the US sphere remained at stake in 
this psychological struggle. Although the experience of the Second World War and the 
subsequent economic devastation had dislocated previous European constructions of 
identity, Kennan warned that recent European identification with a shared American 
way of life in an imagined “Western” community could yet prove transient if the Soviet 
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Union provided an attractive alternative. The rhetoric of containment had simply 
redrawn established boundaries between “civilisation” and “barbarism” with the 
demarcation of the European frontier; Kennan understood that resistance in Western 
Europe to Soviet claims to the future would prove short-lived if the US showed unable 
to guard civilisation and its progress from the barbaric hordes at the gate. Success in his 
particular application of containment in the symbolic theatre of Europe was necessary 
to prevent widespread identification with Communism as ‘the coming thing, the 
movement of the future - that it is on the make and there is no stopping it.’47 
 
The boost to European confidence would provide a psychological counter-offensive to 
demoralise the Soviet orbit. Kennan identified an opportunity to compel change in 
Soviet behaviour by making those living under the Communist system question the 
reality constructed for them by their leaders. He was convinced that the inherent 
contradictions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the fundamental weaknesses in the 
Soviet society and economy were only being concealed by the false “reality” established 
by those who had consolidated power in the higher echelons of the Communist Party. 
‘Soviet power,’ he wrote in his X article, ‘like the capitalist world of its conception, bears 
within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well 
advanced.’ An assistance program in Europe would demonstrate that neither the US nor 
the American capitalist way of life was in decline. Kennan demanded that ‘the aims of 
Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of 
Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's 
foreign policies.’ If the strategic instrument of economic aid could encourage Europeans 
to identify with American universality, this particular success could, in turn, 
demonstrate the credibility of the American telos. The particular symbolic examples 
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would form a reflexive loop of power that gave the Truman administration the prestige 
to assign acts of liberation to its own teleological destiny. The prioritisation of strategic 
instruments for psychological warfare recognised the Hobbesian concept of reputation 
for power as power. Immediate action in Europe was necessary but the key to 
containment would be patience. If the US could avoid war in the short-term, it would 
have more opportunities to demonstrate the inalienable truth of the dismal “reality” of 
the Communist way of life. 
 
Kennan dismissed the significance of the Western Hemisphere in his initial 
constructions of containment. The lack of vital material interests and the absence of any 
immediate symbolic threat of identification with the Soviet Union in the Latin American 
periphery only confirmed his prioritisation of attention and resources for securing 
success in the primary example of containment in Western Europe. ‘The trouble with 
Kennan’s prescription,’ as one diplomatic correspondent would later suggest however, 
‘was that different people read words differently.’48 The assumption made by Kennan 
that the Truman administration should focus on defending the strongpoint of Western 
Europe did not necessarily mean that others within the US would tolerate the neglect of 
Latin America as a peripheral region. The established sphere of influence in the Western 
Hemisphere made it of vital interest for many.  
 
The failure of Kennan to rearticulate the specific approaches pursued in each region 
into a comprehensive strategy only left Marshall to translate the abstract concepts of 
containment into the context of the Western Hemisphere. The use of this conceptual 
framework by Kennan to rationalise the prioritisation of measures pursued in Western 
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Europe however, ensured that strategy in the Western Hemisphere would be framed to 
some extent within this context.  
 
Strategic Asymmetric Responses 
The development of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere suffered from the 
redirection of attention and resources considered necessary to reconcile the 
discrepancy between available ends and means. The antagonistic frontier between the 
US and Soviet orbits in Kennan’s articulation of containment had also established 
Western Europe as the primary terrain for the struggle between conflicting ideological 
narratives. This symbolic element made success in Western Europe essential for the 
broader psychological confrontation with the Soviet Union. The dismissal of the 
importance of the Western Hemisphere by Kennan left Marshall without necessary 
institutional support for reshaping a strategic approach to this specific region. In 
translating the abstract concepts of containment however, Marshall identified both 
serious threats and an opportunity to use the Western Hemisphere as an established 
political space in the US sphere of influence in which he could choose to apply the 
strengths of the US for an asymmetric response in the symbolic struggle of the Cold 
War. 
 
The Western Hemisphere endured as a unique space in US foreign policy. The blurred 
horizon between the inside and outside of American identity that followed the 
expansion of the US sphere of influence in the Monroe Doctrine made the Western 
Hemisphere integral to the psychological battle in the Cold War for two reasons. On the 
one hand inter-American relations provided an important representation of the wider 
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relationship that the US held with its external world. On the other the need to separate 
the US orbit from traditional models of imperialism had led to the internalisation of the 
Western Hemisphere; the extension of American identity from nation to continent 
assimilated Latin American countries into an “Empire of Liberty”.49 In the Western 
Hemisphere the US faced both the internal and external challenges of containment that 
had been articulated by Kennan. 
 
Kennan had warned in his X article that ‘exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal 
disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist 
movement.’ Marshall simply applied this domestic context of containment to the inter-
American community long identified in the Good Neighbour Policy. Marshall feared that 
any failure to maintain the continental solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy would 
also be exploited by the Soviet leadership as demonstrative of Latin American 
resistance to the American way of life and US leadership in the region. It became 
important to unite not only the American people behind the commitment to confront 
the Soviet Union, but also the rest of the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Although Kennan disregarded serious Latin American identification with Communism, 
Marshall recognised that even Latin American protest against “Yanqui imperialism” 
would damage the US image.  Kennan had, after all, expressed similar concerns that any 
strategic loss in the “zero-sum” nature of the global bipolar conflict would be exploited 
as a victory for the Soviet Union.50 The greater fears that European resistance to the 
American orbit would create a “bandwagon” effect were described by Acheson during a 
meeting with Congressional leaders in the White House:  
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‘Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption 
of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry 
infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe 
through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest 
domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union 
was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. 
It did not need to win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered 
immense gains.’51  
 
Kennan focused on preventing any strategic losses that would provide encouragement 
for the Soviet Union in Europe. But in this immediate prioritisation of the strategic 
frontier he could only defer consideration of containment in other regions that would be 
essential in the longer-term. Kennan also recognised that the Kremlin would inevitably 
pursue new opportunities elsewhere if forced to retreat from Europe. He warned that 
the psychological battle would be no brief endeavour as the Soviet leadership believed 
in the teleological inevitability of their own victory and would be patient in their design. 
Marshall took a more far-sighted approach to containment in assuming responsibility 
for preventing the eventuality of engaging the Soviet Union in the established strategic 
settlement of the Western Hemisphere. 
 
The partial and ambiguous nature of containment provided Marshall with neither a self-
evident nor necessary response to these strategic threats in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Policy Planning Staff had formulated “measures short of war” as the response to the 
Soviet threat in Western Europe. Marshall retained faith in the assessments of the PPS 
that dismissed the capabilities of the Soviet Red Army stationed along the European 
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frontier to mount a military strike even in the face of increased references to the 
“lessons of Munich” amongst the leadership of the armed services. He had to assert his 
status and expend some political capital within the military establishment in order just 
to moderate their demands for the mobilisation of a “preponderance of power” and gain 
support for the reduction of US armed forces in Europe and a reliance on the European 
Recovery Program as the primary instrument of statecraft. Marshall relied on his own 
previous experience and observations of inter-American relations to formulate a 
response in the Western Hemisphere however. He had recommended the continued 
pursuit of preponderant power during peacetime in his final report to the Secretary of 
War before the end of the Second World War: 
 ‘We must, if we are to realize the hopes we may now dare have 
for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We 
must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if 
they dare break our peace, they will do so at their great peril. . . . 
We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of 
peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.’52 
Despite rejecting the mobilisation of military force in Western Europe, Marshall drew 
immediately upon his wealth of experience in preparing for the defence of the Americas 
in formulating a response in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
The extensive organisational clashes over inter-American military cooperation and the 
return of the Good Neighbour Policy to a wartime footing suggested that the response 
adopted by Marshall did not represent the most suitable means for integrating the 
Western Hemisphere into a global strategy of containment. The strategic approach 
formulated by Marshall demonstrated more nuanced origins than a simple reflection of 
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‘the growing fear of Soviet aggression in Latin America’ however.53 His approval of the 
assessment of the Soviet threat made by the PPS for Western Europe suggested that he 
did not consider the defence of the Americas to be the sole or even primary objective for 
strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall recognised that support from Congress 
and the US public would not be guaranteed by a simple focus on hemispheric security. 
Although polls revealed that 72 percent of the American public supported sending US 
armed forces along with other American Republics to stop an attack against a South 
American country, the absence of an imminent threat undermined the rationale for 
prioritising hemispheric security.54 Marshall even acknowledged the lack of urgency in 
regional defence preparations during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
 
Marshall did not look to bring the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere however; he 
sought to project the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. He identified the long-
awaited Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and 
Security as a particularly useful opportunity for an asymmetric response in the Cold 
War. The negotiation of an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance that would 
make permanent the defence pact of the Act of Chapultepec continued the emphasis on 
security in hemispheric strategy. But Marshall considered the importance of the Rio 
Conference more as a ‘political rather than military agreement, establishing terms of 
inter-American political solidarity for the maintenance of peace and security.’55 Whilst 
the Latin American Republics offered little additional military capacity for hemispheric 
defence, let alone action “out of theatre”, cooperation in providing vital resources and 
markets was fundamental to US strategy in Europe. The consolidation of a hemisphere 
united in common cause would be vital for the integration of his regional approach into 
 77 
a global strategy; it would allow the US to project the entire power of the New World 
back into the main Cold War theatre in the Old World. 
 
Marshall identified the pursuit of hemispheric solidarity under the banner of wartime 
cooperation of the Good Neighbour Policy as an integral component of containment. A 
shared focus on security in the region would provide the next chapter in writing 
hemispheric identity.56 The absence of an immediate Soviet threat meant that security 
could not constitute the basis for continental solidarity alone however. If the machinery 
of collective security provided a narrative of integration of the Western Hemisphere – it 
also narrated an inter-American family.57 Marshall regarded the multilateralisation of 
the Monroe Doctrine as essential in demonstrating the renunciation of the paternalistic 
interventionism under Braden. A renewed commitment to the consultation and 
cooperation between sovereign and equal American Republics that characterised the 
Good Neighbour Policy would form the basis of hemispheric fraternity.  
 
Marshall also considered the successful demonstration of genuine inter-American 
fraternity to be a powerful psychological instrument in the Cold War. The 
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt had already adapted the Good Neighbour Policy 
in pursuit of more global strategic objectives. In an article for Foreign Affairs in 1928 
Roosevelt warned that ‘the outside world views us with less good will today than at any 
previous period.’58 He suggested that a demonstration of good will behind its leadership 
would ‘regain the world’s trust and friendship.’59 His formal commitment to non-
intervention at the 7th Pan-American Conference held later in 1933 in Montevideo 
would project the benevolent use of US power as a positive ‘example to the rest of the 
world’ in the hope that there would be ‘some moral repercussions in Europe.’60 The 
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further development of a shared approach to the defence of the Americas through the 
1936 Buenos Aires Conference to the 1945 Chapultepec Conference would also 
demonstrate to the rest of the world the benefits of collective security over the 
established balance of power in Europe. 
 
Marshall looked for further demonstration of a “shining example” of hemispheric 
solidarity at the Rio Conference. The Marshall Plan in Europe would provide a 
successful example of the American economic model and US commitment to assist 
recovery, whilst the Good Neighbour Policy would present a model of peaceful 
cooperation between the US and smaller neighbouring countries that stood in contrast 
with the Soviet interventionist domination of regional satellites. Marshall hoped that the 
commitment to self-determination and cooperation between regional allies would 
encourage Europe to renounce the self-destructive aggression and conflict of the Second 
World War and invite further integration into the American orbit.61 
 
The Congressional leadership welcomed this renewed commitment to the Good 
Neighbour Policy. Senator Vandenberg acknowledged that the successful negotiation of 
the Rio Treaty would provide a ‘useful and impressive model of how big and little states 
can work together on a basis of absolute equality of both obligation and power in the 
pursuit of international peace and security.’62 The minority leader of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Thomas T. Connally (D-TX), declared that: 
‘The treaty will do much to the spirit of pan-American solidarity 
and creates substantial provisions for the preservation of peace in 
this Hemisphere and for the cooperation of the American states in 
resisting aggression from any source whatever. The treaty marks 
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an onward step in behalf of international cooperation and world 
peace.’63 
The Council on Foreign Relations later noted that ‘harmony in the Americas was the 
watchword of the Rio Conference.’64 
 
Marshall managed to reinvent the Good Neighbour Policy and its specific focus on 
continental solidarity as the anchor point for his translation of containment for a 
regional context. Rather than bringing the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere, he 
looked to use the asymmetric advantage of the US position in the Western Hemisphere 
to guarantee success in the primary struggle at the European frontier of the Cold War. 
This strategic approach left a number of significant problems however. Firstly, it 
remained unclear as to whether the integration of the Western Hemisphere should be 
considered as an end in itself or primarily as a means to defend the new frontier in 
Western Europe.  This problem became more pronounced as Marshall applied the 
universal framework of containment without addressing the particular challenges that 
faced the region. It is the failure to reconcile enduring tensions in the Good Neighbour 
Policy that Marshall frequently relied on to address specific regional issues however, 
which ultimately guaranteed the incoherence in US strategy in the Western Hemisphere 
during the rest of 1947. 
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II. ILLUSIONS of COHERENCE  
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3. POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Marshall identified the Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental 
Peace and Security and the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá 
as opportunities to renew the regional integration of the earlier Good Neighbour era. He 
hoped that such a commitment would demonstrate to Latin American leaders that the 
policies pursued under Braden could be dismissed as a brief aberration in the recent 
tradition of inter-American relations. Marshall also focused on the restoration of inter-
American solidarity in integrating the Western Hemisphere into a strategy of 
containment. He looked to project a shining example of international relations within 
the US sphere of influence as a symbolic response in the psychological struggle of the 
Cold War. 
 
The conferences at Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá revealed the incoherence in this strategic 
vision however. The Rio Conference had been originally scheduled for October 1945 to 
make permanent the temporary collective security pact agreed earlier in March at the 
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Chapultepec in 
Mexico. This would be followed by the creation of a formal inter-American political 
system at the Bogotá Conference. Marshall publicly criticised Braden for the ‘confusing 
and disturbing propaganda’ that had created the ‘frustrating delays’ in convening these 
conferences. He feared that further postponement would cause irreparable damage to 
the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere and undermine the credibility of the US 
commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. In conceptualising solidarity in the Western 
Hemisphere in terms of cooperation between equal and sovereign neighbouring 
 87 
countries however, Marshall neglected a number of significant problems particular to 
the region that transcended the Cold War. The failure to reconcile serious tensions 
exposed the absence of unity in an imagined community of the Western Hemisphere. 
Marshall appreciated less than Braden that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no 
longer remained applicable to a region transformed by a rising tide of expectations.  
 
The first lesson that Marshall failed to understand was that a commitment to the Good 
Neighbour Policy did not address the growing demands for democratic freedoms across 
the region. The original commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy had not precluded 
the Roosevelt administration from seeking ways to discriminate between different 
forms of Latin American governments in order to demonstrate a disapproval of 
dictatorships.1 However, the architects of the Good Neighbour Policy ultimately 
dismissed discrimination between Latin American governments on the basis of their 
internal political nature as ineffective or even damaging to inter-American relations.  
 
The shift in political climate during the Second World War made this understanding of 
self-determination increasingly difficult to maintain however. The State Department 
faced growing demands to support democratic movements from Latin American 
countries fighting alongside them under the banner of freedom. The commitment to a 
policy of non-discrimination only exposed the empty rhetoric of freedom and invited 
criticism of the Roosevelt administration as the ‘good neighbour of tyrants.’2 The State 
Department soon recognised that ‘the US must embrace nations that represent 
democracy.’3 In the aftermath of the Second World War the Truman administration 
increasingly distanced itself from Latin American dictatorships and replaced its 
commitment to equal treatment with discrimination in favour of democratic allies. 
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Braden highlighted the inherent tension in the Good Neighbour Policy of a simultaneous 
commitment to democracy and toleration of dictatorship in an article for Atlantic 
Monthly. ‘Either the Hemisphere is united or it is broken. There is no room anywhere for 
middle ground.’4 Marshall failed to understand that he could not re-establish equal 
treatment as the basis of cooperation with neighbouring countries without determining 
the meaning of solidarity and the nature of a shared identity in the Western 
Hemisphere.  
 
Hemispheric Discrimination 
The tensions inherent to this first lesson of the Good Neighbour Policy appeared 
foremost in US relations with Argentina. The convention of the Rio Conference would 
require a fundamental reassessment of the State Department position established by 
Braden to refuse recognition or enter a diplomatic agreement with the government of 
Argentina. Although the departure of Braden presented Marshall with the opportunity 
to reverse this position, the New York Times warned that it would not be a simple task to 
resolve an issue ‘so filled with controversy.’5 After the overthrow of President Ramón 
Castillo in June 1943 by military leaders of the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, the State 
Department continued to hold reservations against successive leaders in the Argentine 
government displaying political sympathies for the Axis nations. From his position as US 
Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Braden warned that tolerance of a repressive and 
dangerous dictatorship in Argentina would undermine the credibility of the global 
struggle for democracy.6  
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Braden managed to persuade the State Department to withhold diplomatic recognition 
of the new regime headed by de facto President General Edelmiro Julián Farrell. He 
warned that several figures in the Farrell regime harboured Nazi affinities and 
identified General Juan Perón, who simultaneously served as Vice-President and 
Secretary for Labour and War, as the most serious threat. Although Perón shared 
neither the social base nor the brutality of comparable European fascist leaders, Braden 
remained concerned for his admiration of Mussolini and his broader ideas on the role of 
the State in directing the public sphere and controlling the masses. Despite their 
commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy, Congress also recognised the need to isolate 
the Argentine regime. The Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs at 
the time, Nelson Rockefeller, even faced fierce attacks from Congressional leaders for 
his decision to admit Argentine representatives to the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization in San Francisco. The sustained criticism eventually led 
Rockefeller to make a public denouncement of the Farrell regime before handing in his 
resignation.7 
 
Braden began to shape a more aggressive campaign for discrimination against the 
Farrell regime after replacing Rockefeller in the role of Assistant Secretary. He warned 
the US public that the priority for the region ‘is to know whether a country is moving in 
the direction of dictatorship and disregard for the rights of man, or whether it is moving 
toward government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’8 Braden led the 
State Department to reject framing hemispheric solidarity in the terms of non-
discrimination and cooperation between equal states found in the Good Neighbour 
Policy. The pursuit of unity at all costs, Ellis O. Briggs warned, would ‘not infrequently 
result in whittling down principles to fit the lowest unanimous denominator.’9 Braden 
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also continued more active interference in the domestic affairs of Argentina that 
reached its peak as Perón campaigned in presidential elections during early 1946. 
Braden provided support to the activities of an opposition movement. Although he 
eventually submitted to the demands to jail Perón from the opposition marchers roused 
by Braden, Farrell released his Vice-President within the month after supporters 
themselves took to the streets with the claims to be the heirs of a true Argentina.10  
 
Braden responded by gathering Latin American diplomats at Blair House to present 
them with a 130-page book, entitled “Consultation among the American Republics with 
Respect to the Argentine Situation,” outlining Nazi infiltration in Argentina. Many 
officials within Washington criticised this “Blue Book” as cynical interference in the 
Argentine elections. As a primary architect of the principle of non-discrimination in the 
Good Neighbour Policy, the former Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, condemned 
the “Blue Book” as ‘an almost unbelievably crass blunder.’11 The eventual electoral 
victory for Perón demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Braden’s interference and 
represented ‘the worst diplomatic defeat...[the US] ever sustained in the Western 
Hemisphere.’ 
 
Welles led demands from within the US for Braden to end his campaign against 
Argentina and return to the key principles of equal treatment and cooperation found 
previously in the Good Neighbour Policy. In an article for the New York Herald Tribune, 
he warned that further discrimination against Argentina would ‘arouse popular support 
for the military leaders and weaken [Argentina's] liberal and democratic forces.’12 
Welles also insisted that without rapprochement with the Perón regime ‘no inter-
American conference can now be held without risking . . . the total destruction of Pan-
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American solidarity.’13 Although Braden insisted that the participation of the Farrell 
regime in the Rio Conference would make a ridicule of the plans to formalise 
hemispheric solidarity, senior figures from the Good Neighbour era, such as Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr., agreed that discrimination against Argentina damaged the US image across the 
region and argued that their commitment to regional integration had been abandoned.14 
 
The divisions within Washington ultimately led to an incoherent strategic approach 
towards Argentina. Byrnes initially responded to the demands from Senate leaders to 
change approach by filling the vacant post of Ambassador to Buenos Aires that Braden 
had continued to control from Washington.15 After Braden threatened to resign Byrnes 
decided not to tell him that the President had granted freedom of action to the new 
Ambassador, George S. Messersmith, to improve relations with Argentina. Braden 
continued to receive the support of Truman and Byrnes however, as he sought to isolate 
Argentina and further postpone the Rio Conference.16 Byrnes even considered some 
means of signing a treaty at the Rio Conference without Argentina.17 Although publicly 
announcing the path open for Argentina to attend the Rio Conference, Byrnes outlined a 
roadmap that required ‘deeds and not merely promises’ for the fulfilment of Argentina’s 
‘solemn commitments’ at Chapultepec to eliminate Axis influence.18 
 
Byrnes also continued to defend the “Blue Book” against the criticisms of interference. 
‘We are not concerned with what type of Gov[ernmen]t Argentine electorate chooses for 
itself,’ he explained to diplomatic representatives, ‘but rather with specified elements in 
whom confidence is entirely lacking.’19 Braden joined him in emphasising that 
confidence in Perón could not be restored without some positive action from Buenos 
Aires in meeting these demands.20 This inconsistent approach created an increasingly 
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bitter feud between Braden and Messersmith over control and direction of US relations 
with Argentina.21 The impasse ensured that, by the time Marshall arrived at the State 
Department to replace Byrnes, policy had drifted towards, what Time described as, the 
‘traditional Latin pattern of mañana.’22 
 
Marshall deferred a full review of the issue until after his return from the Moscow 
Conference. In the meantime the Argentina Ambassador to the US, Dr. Oscar 
Ivanissevich, was informed that Perón was still expected to fulfil the demands made 
earlier by Byrnes.23 Messersmith sent recommendations to reinstate diplomatic 
relations immediately after Marshall returned to Washington. He attempted to persuade 
the Secretary that Perón had shown to be doing everything in his power to comply with 
US demands.24 He even appealed to the new Cold War climate that had emerged during 
the Moscow Conference. ‘By continuing this situation with the Argentine longer,’ he 
suggested, ‘we are serving the interests of only one country, and that is Soviet Russia.’ 
Most of the State Department remained sceptical of any Argentine assurances to meet 
such demands however. The Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs found it ‘difficult 
to believe’ the argument that the Argentine government could perform no better in 
dealing with Axis influence. He noted their failure on a number of commitments and 
suggested their program was ‘limited.’25  
 
The responses from Marshall lacked clear consistency. At first he maintained the 
pressure on Perón to conform to previous State Department demands.26 Ivanissevich 
received an invitation to return to the White House only weeks later however; Truman 
promptly informed him that all obstacles to friendly relations had been removed.27 
There had been no significant steps made by the Argentine government to fulfil its 
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commitments during that time. The growing awareness of Cold War threats may have 
diminished some importance in dealing with the Axis influence. The shift in approach 
towa.rds Argentina emerged primarily as a reaction to domestic pressures however. 
The departure of Braden from the State Department brought immediate demands from 
Senator Vandenberg to repair relations with Argentina and renew ‘our indispensable 
Pan-American solidarity.’28 Marshall swiftly reassured him that a new approach 
towards Argentina would soon be clarified ‘in clear and unmistakeable terms.’29 
Although the departure of Braden made it easier to undertake this task, Marshall also 
considered it necessary to reassign Messersmith. The Ambassador had gone too far in 
circumnavigating the State Department to press his case before Congress.30 Marshall 
would tolerate no one undermining his authority. 
 
The formal recognition of Argentina opened the door to reschedule the long-delayed Rio 
Conference.  It also presented a clear path to rescind an existing arms embargo against 
Argentina. The State Department had previously considered it necessary to discriminate 
in providing military assistance against dictatorships like the Argentine regime. The 
new Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Bruce, took little time to recommend that 
further discrimination of Argentina would be ineffective and damaging to US interests.31 
Marshall had already made his decision to lift restrictions on arms sales to Argentina 
however; inter-American military cooperation to prevent external influences remained 
central to his pursuit of hemispheric solidarity.32 Although he had repeatedly declared 
his preference for reducing costs and difficulties by buying standardised American 
arms, Perón threatened to pursue arms from Czechoslovakia if necessary. Marshall 
determined that arms supplied to Argentina from outside the Western Hemisphere, 
particularly from the Soviet bloc, would damage the prestige of the US. The importance 
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of restoring hemispheric solidarity on the basis of equal cooperation within the region 
led Marshall to dismiss the previous concerns raised in the State Department on 
military assistance.  
 
This decision to lift the State Department embargo on arms sales to Argentina created 
immediate problems for Marshall. He faced complaints from the Ambassador for the 
Dominican Republic, Luis F. Thomen, that similar restrictions on the Dominican 
Republic were unfair.33 Marshall noted that the political factors determining the original 
sanctions remained ‘as cogent today as ever.’34 In December 1945 the State Department 
considered the sale of arms to be neither reasonable nor necessary for the defence of 
the Dominican Republic or the Western Hemisphere. State Department officials also 
warned Marshall of the prospects of US arms being used by the regime of Rafael Trujillo 
against neighbouring Latin American countries or the people of the Dominican Republic. 
They still considered military assistance to Trujillo’s authoritarian as adverse to the 
development of freedom and democracy in the region.35 Trujillo still managed to 
persuade Marshall to reverse the State Department embargo on arms sales to the 
Dominican Republic by following the earlier example of Perón in threatening to 
purchase arms from elsewhere if the US remained unwilling to supply them. The 
absence of a clear roadmap to navigate between competing principles of discrimination 
and equal cooperation left Marshall to make his decision ‘on pragmatic grounds.’36 It 
also ensured that this decision would not remain unchallenged however.  
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Hemispheric Cooperation 
Marshall regarded his renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy as necessary 
to reassert coherence to US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. He anticipated that the 
recognition of Argentina would restore an image of unity in the Western Hemisphere. It 
could not guarantee cohesion within Washington however. The cooperation with the 
Argentine regime made Congress increasingly apprehensive. Despite their earlier 
criticism of Braden for his ‘mistaken policy’ of ‘messing in too much,’ Congressional 
leaders remained unenthusiastic about arming a leader castigated as a fascist dictator. 
State Department officials recognised the difficulty in reconciling the Good Neighbour 
Policy to the mounting pressure to safeguard democratic freedoms across the Western 
Hemisphere. The State Department representative to the State-War-Navy-Coordinating 
Committee, John C. Dreier, warned Marshall that cooperation with dictators of the likes 
of Perón would remain unpopular with Congress and the public. He argued that it would 
be particularly difficult to petition Congress in public and recommended refrain from 
press or radio comments.37 As Congress simultaneously pressured the State 
Department to restore the inclusive unity of the Good Neighbour Policy and 
demonstrated unease in cooperation with Latin American dictators, Marshall could be 
forgiven for accepting the earlier conclusions made by Time magazine: ‘Damned if you 
do, damned if you don’t.’38 
 
The difficulty in reconciling the principle of equal treatment of sovereign countries 
established in the Good Neighbour Policy to the demand for discrimination on behalf of 
individual political freedoms ultimately undermined domestic cohesion as different 
actors favoured one over the other. The State Department under Braden had begun to 
realise that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no longer remained completely 
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relevant. Although Braden had divided the region he understood better than Marshall 
the rising tide of expectations across the region. Braden continued to influence the 
strategic environment in Washington even after his departure from the State 
Department however, after his memorandum outlining opposition to military 
cooperation leaked to Representative Mike Mansfield (D-MT). Despite his insistence 
that full release of the memorandum would not be ‘in the interest of best relations with 
Latin America,’ Marshall understood that the disclosure of opposition to his decision 
within the State Department undercut his authority. 
 
The departure of Braden did not mean that Marshall could reverse the commitment to 
democratisation entrenched within the State Department. Any support for the decision 
to cooperate with Argentina would remain primarily in form rather than substance. The 
military leadership immediately rallied in support of Marshall. General Ridgway 
criticised the conduct of the ‘little coterie in the State Department’ that opposed 
Marshall. ‘There is no such thing as loyalty in the State Department,’ he complained. ‘If a 
subordinate doesn't like a decision that is handed down, he will obstruct it as far as he 
can delay it, take no action, but he will buck it to the end.’39 Resistance to military 
cooperation represented more than bureaucratic inertia however; the State Department 
had institutionalised an entirely different strategy. This alternative had not been framed 
in binary opposition to the objective of hemispheric solidarity but in a different 
meaning of it. Rather than viewing Argentina as an equal and sovereign American 
Republic, the State Department under Braden identified Perón’s regime as incongruent 
to the inter-American community and its shared values and interests.40 The departure 
of Braden would not displace these meanings of hemispheric solidarity established in 
the State Department. The concepts would continue as, what Michel Foucault described 
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as, ‘strategies without a knowing strategist,’ or similarly as Pierre Bourdieu understood 
as a ‘conductorless orchestration of collective action and improvisations.’41 
 
Marshall shared concerns held within Congress that the State Department no longer 
remained fit to even re-establish the Good Neighbour Policy. His efforts to assert some 
authority threatened to undermine the capabilities of the State Department to formulate 
a coherent understanding of the strategic environment in the Western Hemisphere 
however. Marshall decided not to fill the post left vacant by the departure of Braden. But 
the lack of an Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs meant that regional 
expertise would be left underrepresented in the higher echelons of strategic planning. 
Although he had earlier acknowledged the need for a designated actor to deal with 
specific regional issues after supporting the establishment in the War Department of a 
Pan-American Group led by Kenner F. Hertford, Marshall now faced mounting criticism 
for the reliance on his Undersecretaries as the principal figures to assume the duties 
previously undertaken by Braden. Despite their reputation and ability, both Lovett and 
his counterpart – William Clayton, who was appointed to a new position of 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs – received criticism for their lack of 
regional experience either within the State Department or in the field. Neither had first-
hand experience of specific conditions in Latin America that came from a background in 
diplomatic service.42 
 
Despite his own reputation Marshall also invited criticism for his measures taken to 
circumnavigate the entrenched thinking within the State Department. He faced 
disapproval for his efforts to break the tradition of civilian leadership with the gradual 
militarisation of the State Department and the increasing shift of responsibilities from 
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regional experts to leaders from the private sector.43 One State Department careerist 
writing in a letter to the New York Times under the pseudonym A.B.C. criticised Marshall 
for the increasing prominence of “ins and outers” like Clayton and Lovett within the 
higher echelons of the State Department.44 Clayton had found his success in cotton-
trading before entering government and Lovett had returned to private banking after 
the war. The official complained that previous appointments of expert career officials to 
top positions had been replaced with the selection of amateurs with little or no training 
and who ‘have come and gone with scene-shifting rapidity.’ The problem appeared 
more acute in relation to inter-American affairs, where Marshall also filled lower 
appointments with business leaders. The most recent appointment to the Foreign 
Service under Marshall, James Bruce, left his vice-presidency of the National Dairy 
Products Corporation to take the post of Ambassador to Argentina without any 
diplomatic training.45 
 
Marshall soon realised that the successful implementation of the Good Neighbour Policy 
required filling this organisational vacuum that had opened in the State Department. He 
decided to introduce James Harris Wright as a replacement for Ellis O. Briggs who had 
worked under Braden as Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs and 
appointed Robert Forbes Woodward as his deputy. As established Latin Americanists 
both would bring regional experience and expertise.46 Marshall seized an opportunity to 
integrate this regional office into a more centralised and hierarchical organisation 
however. He felt that the Office of American Republic Affairs held too narrow remit for 
reshaping a coherent regional approach as part of a comprehensive global strategy. The 
regional specialists would be more useful to him as credible officials to implement and 
build support for his wider strategic vision for the Western Hemisphere. 
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Marshall also brought Norman A. Armour out of early retirement to fill a newly created 
role of Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs. The return of Armour to the State 
Department was widely welcomed. With previous service as Acting Director of the 
Office of American Republic Affairs and a wealth of experience acquired during several 
Ambassadorships in important Latin American capitals, Armour would be the ideal 
candidate to oversee regional activities. One leading Congressional representative 
described Armour as ‘a man with profound knowledge of all Latin America.’47 Referring 
to Armour as a ‘courteous gentleman’ and ‘staunch American,’ the New York Times 
praised his appointment: ‘We know of no one who could better exemplify for the US 
south of the Rio Grande the role of the Good Neighbour.’48 Armour would still struggle 
to use this expertise to influence the formulation of regional strategy however. In 
extending the remit of Armour beyond the immediate concerns of the Western 
Hemisphere, Marshall looked to institutionalise a vision of the Good Neighbour Policy 
first promoted by Cordell Hull.49 Marshall ensured that solutions to the problems 
specific to the region would be situated primarily in the broader context of global 
strategic objectives. These organisational shifts would only create problems for 
Marshall once he began to be confronted with such regional challenges. 
 
Hemispheric Democracy 
Marshall believed that the renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy would 
ensure a successful demonstration of hemispheric solidarity at the Rio Conference. He 
arrived at Petrópolis with a preliminary draft of the Rio Treaty that defined the 
cooperation of sovereign and equal American Republics as the basis for the ‘fulfilment 
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of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace.’50 He cast himself in the lead role for 
negotiations and chose to embody the Good Neighbour Policy with his own personal 
diplomacy. Marshall identified his first task as re-establishing personal contact with 
each of the smaller Latin American nations that Byrnes had typically ignored.51 After 
receiving criticism for not mixing with the other representatives at the Moscow Meeting 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Marshall made a concerted effort to visit each of the 
Latin American delegations staying at the new Hotel Quitandinha. His efforts were 
warmly welcomed; the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Dr. Enrique García-Sayán, suggested 
that Marshall ‘had gone far beyond the needs of diplomatic good taste.’52 
 
It became immediately evident once negotiations opened that the Latin American 
delegates would not simply accept the basis of inter-American cooperation proposed by 
Marshall. The rising tide of expectations that broke across much of the region led Latin 
American leaders to prepare their own agendas for the Rio Conference. The US 
delegation lacked the direction of a regional specialist at its helm that could navigate 
these currents flowing through the region. Marshall did not stand against the movement 
towards democratic freedom but he maintained the mistaken belief that hemispheric 
solidarity could be guaranteed with a return to the Good Neighbour principles of non-
discrimination and cooperation amongst sovereign and equal states. He failed to 
recognise that ‘Latin America did not and could not settle down to “normalcy” after the 
strain of a world war.’53 
 
The pursuit of a symbolic model of solidarity at Petrópolis left Marshall with the 
considerable problem of shaping a coherent concept of a Western Hemisphere that 
included both progressive democracies and repressive dictatorships. The evidence at 
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the Rio Conference of an antagonistic divide between these divergent elements made 
his idea of equal respect and cooperation regardless of internal political makeup 
increasingly difficult. Marshall soon realised that he alone could not determine the 
meaning and role of the Western Hemisphere in the world. An alternative to his draft 
agreement for the maintenance of continental peace presented by the Guatemalan 
delegation revealed the contingency of his representation of hemispheric solidarity. 
 
The head of the Guatemalan delegation and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. 
Carlos Leonidas Acevedo, proposed that the Rio Treaty include the identification of any 
Latin American government denying their citizens the fundamental rights of man as a 
threat to collective security.54 Authoritarian elements would be identified as “foreign” to 
the Americas and constituting a danger to the security of individual freedoms found in a 
common way of life.  
 
Although Marshall ultimately dismissed the Guatemalan draft proposal, his decision did 
not represent a deliberate and coherent shift away from earlier optimism within the 
State Department for the prospects of democracy in Latin America. Marshall did not 
reject the basis of shared ideals of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. He even 
accepted initial drafts of the Rio Treaty that formalised alongside the principle of 
sovereign and equal states the idea of individual freedom as an essential feature of a 
common hemispheric identity. The Rio Treaty also asserted hemispheric peace as 
founded on a justice and moral order that required the ‘recognition and protection of 
human rights and freedoms,’ the ‘indispensible well-being of the people,’ and the 
‘effectiveness of democracy for the international realisation of justice and security. 
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Marshall understood the declaration of the collective security of the Americas as 
‘essentially related to their democratic ideals.’  
 
Marshall unequivocally asserted the importance of individual freedom and democratic 
rights to a common American way of life in his own major address to the delegates at 
Petrópolis: 
‘We of the American republics won our freedom in the name of 
democracy. We have fought for the dignity of the individual - an 
individual endowed with certain inalienable rights that cannot be 
taken from him by law or decree, an individual whose standards 
of moral conduct are the essence of a peaceful world.... We must 
reject encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the 
individual with the same determination that we reject any 
encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the state. I am 
confident that we all agree that the state exists for man, not man 
for the state-and that we abhor any limitations upon the freedom 
of expression of men throughout the world. For only when we 
have access to the thoughts of men, to the forces of public opinion 
free of coercion or connivance, only then can we develop a 
wholesome common interest while at the same time respecting 
separate national traditions.’55 
The identification of both democracy and state sovereignty as positive elements of 
hemispheric identity made either difficult to oppose. The prioritisation of one element 
rarely brought a willingness to reject the other as descriptive of a common identity. As a 
result the Rio Treaty would simultaneously assert both the rights of states and 
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individuals in an incoherent construction. Although he attempted to draw the 
equivalence between the both principles, in rejecting the estrangement of regional 
dictators Marshall became the latest to tip the balance of what Time magazine describes 
as the ‘see-saw’ of conflicting rights of states and individuals.56 
 
The incoherence of his image of the Western Hemisphere should have been clear to 
Marshall. The State Department had previously struggled to reconcile the rights of 
states and individuals in attempting to identify the ‘distinguishing ideals and beliefs 
which bind [the American Republics] together in contrast with other non-American 
powers.’57 Although he was not the first to identify the region with positive features that 
it did not fully represent, the determination of Marshall to demonstrate an example of 
cooperation rather than establishing a genuine hemispheric solidarity compelled him to 
overlook the persistence of authoritarian regimes across Latin America and the 
hollowness in the declaration of protection for the fundamental rights of individuals.58 
His prioritisation of projecting the credibility of the US commitment to voluntarily 
restrain its own preponderant power in relations with neighbouring countries in its 
sphere of influence led Marshall to insist that a few governments straying from the 
democratic path should not encourage delegates to weaken the force of the Rio Treaty. 
 
Marshall considered the US commitment to cooperation with sovereign and equal Latin 
American states to be a significant weapon in the psychological battleground of the Cold 
War. His approach did not represent a necessary or cohesive response to the Soviet 
threat however. Marshall constructed hemispheric identity in opposition to the 
violations of sovereignty within the Soviet orbit. The construction of a Soviet Other in 
the imagery and symbolic discourse of containment did not provide a single lens from 
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which to view the struggle for hemispheric identity however. Alternative existing 
constructions of hemispheric identity could be framed in opposition to different threats 
posed by the Soviet Union. In their initiative for the Rio Treaty the Guatemalan 
delegation had identified repression in Latin American dictatorships as analogous to the 
Soviet abuse of individual political rights. Marshall had underestimated these competing 
pressures and simply attempted to establish an illusion of coherence by projecting the 
positive elements of democracy in the US onto the identity of a region that contained 
repressive dictatorships in order to pursue his own strategic objective of demonstrating 
the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan delegation appealed to the 
rest of the Latin American delegates to resist this myth of democracy and demand the 
formalisation of the political rights of individuals as a condition of national sovereignty 
within the Western Hemisphere. 
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4. POLITICAL INTERVENTION 
 
The disagreements at the Rio Conference revealed that Marshall could not operate alone 
in defining the meaning of the Western Hemisphere in the global context of the Cold 
War. The failure to reconcile the demands of Latin American delegates for recognition of 
a shared identity of democracy with the commitment to a principle of non-
discrimination in inter-American cooperation threatened to undermine his 
demonstration of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall did not deliberately 
stand as an obstacle to the spread of democracy however. The toleration of Latin 
American governments that failed to protect individual rights originated, in large part, 
from his inability to resolve the dilemma highlighted by the Council on Foreign 
Relations: ‘Granting the desirability of obligations to respect human rights, the essential 
problem remained one of enforcement.’1 It would be particularly problematic to find a 
formula in the Americas where non-intervention had become a ‘sacred cow.’ 
 
Marshall once again showed unable to recognise the incoherence in the application of 
the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy to an environment transformed by the Second 
World War. The architects of the Good Neighbour Policy had considered the 
renunciation of intervention as essential for demonstrating their commitment to treat 
Latin American governments as equal partners.2 The former Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles insisted that ‘neither the individual interests of the US nor the cause of 
Inter-American unity is served when the US Government or its representatives take 
action which is regarded by the peoples of the Latin American nations as derogatory to 
their national sovereignty.’ In his article for Foreign Affairs in 1928, Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt declared it neither the right nor the sacred duty of the US alone to intervene 
even in support of democracy across Latin America.3 Roosevelt insisted that such an 
absolute commitment to non-intervention would not only restore Latin American good 
will towards the US, but also project a positive example of US intentions to ‘regain the 
world’s trust and friendship.’  
 
The principle of non-intervention sat more uncomfortably after the “lessons of Munich” 
however. Braden in particular regarded attempts to find accommodation with dictators 
like Perón as nothing short of appeasement. Despite their criticism of interference in the 
domestic affairs of Argentina during the confirmation hearings for the appointment of 
Braden to the post of Assistant Secretary, the Senate ultimately provided their 
unanimous support in fear of being painted as appeasers.4 Although the demands that 
the US support democratic rights created similar sentiments across much of Latin 
America, the subsequent interventionism under Braden engendered some fears of a 
return to an earlier period of “two Americas”. A question remained for Marshall and the 
other delegates at Petrópolis: ‘How could intervention, unilateral or collective, to force a 
government to grant certain rights to its own citizens be reconciled with the principle of 
national sovereignty, which was supposed to be the cornerstone of the inter-American 
system?’5 
 
Hemispheric Intervention 
The failure of Marshall to provide a suitable answer to this question invited the other 
delegations to consider their own solutions. The head of the Uruguayan delegation, the 
Foreign Minister Dr. Mateo Marques Castro, suggested that Marshall’s 
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multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine could be extended from the defence of 
regional territory to the integrity of individuals. He argued that the Rio Treaty 
presented an opportunity to assign collective duty for the protection of individual rights 
within the Western Hemisphere. The proposal had already received some consideration 
within the US. Roosevelt himself had suggested that the internal conditions of states 
affecting others should become the joint concern of the entire continent.6  
 
The State Department under Byrnes and Braden had given its unqualified support to a 
similar proposal made by Marques Castro’s predecessor, Dr. Alberto Rodriguez Larreta, 
for collective intervention against regimes violating ‘the elementary rights of man and 
of the citizens.’7 Both recognised the inherent problem in the abandonment of the 
principle of non-intervention in the Larreta Doctrine however. The ongoing 
contestation between the rights and duties of states and individuals meant that efforts 
to reconcile this tension increasingly focused less on favouring one over the other and 
more on rearticulating the meanings in this debate. Rather than renounce non-
intervention, Byrnes and Braden constantly reaffirmed their observance to this 
principle, whilst simultaneously adding the caveat that ‘non-intervention in internal 
affairs does not mean the approval of local tyranny.’  
 
The State Department under Byrnes embarked upon a significant campaign to assuage 
critics of collective intervention and demonstrate that it could be safeguarded against 
abuse.8 Byrnes defended the Larreta Doctrine on the assumption that national 
sovereignty ‘may not be used as a shield behind which a government of force violates 
those very rights for which we have expended so heavily of our human and material 
resources.’9 In a public radio broadcast, Braden stressed that, ‘our policy of non-
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intervention in the affairs of the other American nations is fundamental and will 
continue. We have no intention of taking that kind of action of unilateral action.’10 
Provisos were added again however:  
‘Neither do we intend to stand idly by while the Fascist ideology 
against which we fought a war endeavors to entrench itself in this 
hemisphere. But our policy is one of joint action with the other 
republics - group action for our mutual security.’11  
The Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Ellis O. Briggs, also used a 
speech to Philadelphia's Pan American Association to emphasise that collective action in 
the Americas was not intervention, but the ‘legitimate exercise of collective initiative.’12 
It was the normal and democratic way of handling regional affairs. 
 
Marshall refused to support the proposal outlined by Marques Castro however.13 He 
understood that, despite the aspirations for democracy across the region, many Latin 
American leaders remained wary that duties to protect individual rights could be used 
against them as a pretext for undue interference in their internal affairs. Many Latin 
American governments responded negatively to the Larreta Doctrine, ‘despite, or 
perhaps because of, the strong endorsement of it by the Unites States.’14 The State 
Department’s John C. Dreier later identified the problems for the Latin American 
leaders: ‘The potential dangers inherent in permitting any kind of intervention were 
considered greater than the evils which intervention under the Rodriguez Larreta 
Doctrine were intended to correct.’15 Even a number of progressive Latin American 
governments eventually rejected the formal proposal from the Guatemalan delegation 
to include in the Rio Treaty necessary measures against attacks on ‘the democratic 
structure of American governments,’ on the basis that the task of defining “democratic” 
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governments remained too subjective.16 Their antipathy towards the authoritarian 
regimes that opposed the proposal did not eradicated suspicions of previous unilateral 
efforts made by the US to isolate and intervene under the guise of “tutelage”. 
 
The fear of “Yanqui imperialism” persisted in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall 
understood that the primacy of power ensured that the US would need to lead, or at 
least provide disproportionate influence, in any intervention to fulfil even a collective 
duty to protect individual rights. He wanted to avoid the perception of any unilateral 
use of US power that could draw criticism. Despite affirmations of the importance of 
individual rights and democracy across the region, Marshall prioritised the larger global 
fight against the Soviet Union for the principle of democracy. The importance of the US 
image in the psychological battle of the Cold War meant that Marshall remained 
unwilling to project any impression of imperialism in the Western Hemisphere.17 
 
Marshall appreciated the negative consequences of an absolute rejection of measures 
for the active promotion of democracy however. In his address to the Rio Conference he 
attempted to rearticulate the meaning of democratic ideals within the context of the 
Good Neighbour Policy. Marshall emphasised the importance of being ‘…devoted to the 
principle that states and nations should be bound by the same standards of moral 
conduct we set for the individual.’ But he shifted the basis of these standards of 
individual conduct from the value of freedom used by Byrnes and Braden to the 
principles of equality and respect: 
 ‘Good faith and fair dealing, honesty and friendly cooperation, 
mutual respect and freedom of intercourse - these we expect of 
each other as individuals, these we should demand of each other 
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as states. This is the basis of our fundamental belief in the equality 
of individuals, of the equality of states. We stand to all the world 
as an example of states striving to live in harmony, determined to 
abide by the same principles of moral conduct we demand of the 
individual citizen.’ 
Rather than holding up Latin American governments to shared standards of individual 
political rights, Marshall simply attempted to shift the meaning of a common 
hemispheric identity to one that fit within the context of international relations in the 
Good Neighbour Policy. President Truman had used his first presidential trip to Mexico 
City just before the Rio Conference as an opportunity to prepare the path for this 
discourse. He not only reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention in the Good 
Neighbour Policy as the ‘keystone of the inter-American system,’ but also rearticulated 
the domestic values of democracy to the systemic level: ‘The Good Neighbour Policy 
applies to international relations the same standards of conduct that prevail among self-
respecting individuals within a democratic community.’18 Marshall could not replace the 
meaning of non-intervention in the inter-American system. His subjectivity emerged in 
his own ambiguous interpretation of ‘a term not easy of definition.’19 The negotiations 
at the Rio Conference demonstrated that Latin American delegates would maintain their 
own divergent interpretations of the meanings of shared values in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
Hemispheric Clashes 
The Good Neighbour Policy established a model of international relations between the 
states of the Western Hemisphere, but the commitment to the principle of non-
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intervention failed to provide a meaning of continental solidarity that could 
accommodate both the democracies and dictatorships of the region. The absence of a 
coherent approach from Marshall led the Argentine delegation to propose a solution. 
The Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia, recommended that ‘all other 
considerations’ of relations within the Western Hemisphere be subordinated to 
securing the region from the threat of the Soviet Union.20 The internal nature of the 
region should be overlooked in favour of maintaining a ‘completely united front’ in 
response to extra-hemispheric aggression. Marshall rejected this proposal as he 
remained less interested in securing the Western Hemisphere than projecting a 
successful example of inter-American cooperation. Congressional representatives on 
the US delegation agreed that the solidarity of the region could not dismiss intervention 
within the region to focus only on hemispheric defence. ‘A crime was a crime wherever 
the criminal came from,’ warned Vandenberg.21 
 
In his determination to demonstrate a successful model of solidarity in the Western 
Hemisphere on the basis of cooperation and adherence to the principle of non-
intervention amongst equal and sovereign states, Marshall ignored numerous warnings 
that a harmonious neighbourhood simply may not be possible. Despite the cooperation 
shown by the Argentine delegation at the Rio Conference, the fears that Perón continued 
to harbour expansionist designs for an austral bloc left the likes of Vandenberg cautious 
of any distinction in the Rio Treaty between internal and external intervention.22 The 
Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Dr. Carlos Morales, warned Marshall against a resolute 
commitment to non-intervention. Although he agreed that the shared interest in 
securing the peace would bring unity in the face of external aggression, Morales insisted 
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that this did not preclude the intensification of armed struggle between the opposing 
forces of authoritarian and democratic countries.23 
 
In dismissing intervention against any Latin American country on the basis of its 
internal nature, Marshall failed to understand that relations between states in the 
Western Hemisphere would be shaped by the political relations within states. The open 
antagonism that followed the demand for democracy across the region became evident 
in the Caribbean and Central America in particular. The refusal of several dictatorships 
to protect individual rights and the adherence to the principle of non-intervention from 
some of the progressive governments meant that non-state actors had actively assumed 
the duties to promote democracy.  
 
The organisation of exiled democrats into a “Caribbean Legion” had led to several 
armed attacks against the dictatorships of the region. Those authoritarian governments 
targeted, such as the regimes in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
often retaliated against neighbouring countries like Cuba and Guatemala that they 
accused of staging the bases for launched attacks. The incoherence of an absolute 
commitment to non-intervention had already appeared shortly before the Rio 
Conference. Despite his own misgivings towards the regime of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo 
Molina in the Dominican Republic, Marshall condemned plans made by the Caribbean 
Legion to launch a coup attempt from Cayo Confites in Cuba.24 He feared that an attack 
would irreversibly damage the credibility of the inter-American system just as global 
attention was about to converge on Petrópolis. But he had to hold the Cuban President, 
Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, responsible in order to condemn the planned attacks as a 
violation of the principle of non-intervention.  
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Morales expressed his doubt that the principle of non-intervention could be framed in 
such terms when a state aggressor was not self-evident. The Venezuelan representative 
warned that situations could be further complicated if opposing governments claimed 
the other as aggressor and planned pre-emptive strikes to eliminate the imminent 
threat of attack. Morales also warned Marshall that hemispheric solidarity would be 
endangered if conflict drew in neighbouring countries to opposing sides. The 
presentation of the Guatemalan proposal for the Rio Treaty had demonstrated the 
potential for a regional antagonism. The progressive governments like Cuba offered 
their immediate support, whilst the Argentine regime swiftly joined the autocratic 
governments in registering opposition. Marshall could only inform Morales that he 
would think further on his recommendations. He did insist that the terms of the Rio 
Treaty would ultimately be less important than the good faith in which it was carried 
out. Marshall was adamant that ‘even if we allowed for two or three exceptions we 
could count on the good faith and influence of the vast majority of the American 
Republics to make our treaty work.’ He failed to see that the internal conflict within the 
region could undermine the symbolic example of an “indivisible Americas” however. 
Marshall could not reconcile this tension inherent to his construction of regional order 
upon a traditional state-centric approach to inter-American diplomatic relations.  
 
The dismissal of this incoherence revealed the importance that Marshall attached to the 
demonstration of the US commitment to non-intervention in its relations with Latin 
American states over any genuine pursuit of peace and solidarity in the Western 
Hemisphere. He did not need to address the tensions between Latin American 
neighbours to project a symbolic example of US relations with them. Such an approach 
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ignored the increasing pressure on hemispheric solidarity exerted by the growing 
movement for democratic freedom and ensured that events quickly overtook US 
strategy in the region. The rapid proliferation of destabilising movements of revolution 
and reaction increasingly revealed the incoherence in Marshall’s commitment to non-
intervention.  
 
The failure to reconcile the Good Neighbour Policy with the demands for democratic 
transformation became clearer as the delegates at the Rio Conference turned their 
attention to the civil war that had raged in Paraguay since March. The assurances of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states made in the Good Neighbour 
Policy could not deal with the antagonism between repressive dictatorships and 
democratic movements that emerged within state boundaries. The representatives at 
the Rio Conference unanimously passed a resolution urging warring parties to lay down 
arms and end the conflict, but Marshall’s own response to the Paraguayan civil war 
appeared to demonstrate a strategic shift from the promotion of democratic rights to 
support of conservative reactionaries.25 Braden had earlier opposed any assistance to 
the authoritarian President of Paraguay, General Higinio Moríñigo Martínez, as initial 
unrest had been instigated by the dictator’s expulsion of political opponents.26 The State 
Department informed Moríñigo that assistance would be determined by ‘the degree of 
evolution toward liberal, democratic government in Paraguay.’27 Acheson also 
cautioned against any subsequent support for Moríñigo that would be ‘interpreted by 
various unfriendly groups as intervention in Paraguay’s internal affairs aimed at 
propping up a “reactionary dictatorship” by the suppression with US arms of a “popular 
revolt.”’28 Marshall’s commitment to a neutral position and strict adherence to non-
intervention in the internal affairs of Paraguay however, removed any tools to secure 
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peace or protect individual rights.29 The failure to gain any support inevitably 
guaranteed the failure of the considerably weaker democratic insurrection. 
 
The renewed requests for assistance from the Moríñigo regime after the defeat of the 
Paraguayan uprising left Marshall to confront the inconsistencies of his strategic 
approach during the negotiations at Petrópolis. In a meeting during a lunch break in the 
conference, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, Dr. Federico Chaves, showed eager to 
demonstrate to Marshall the democratic nature of his ruling Partido Colorado and its 
opposition to all forms of dictatorship. Chaves could not demonstrate the democratic 
reforms that had been demanded by Braden, but he identified his country, in its 
‘friendship to the US,’ with the side of democratic freedom and in opposition to the 
dictatorial threat of the Soviet Union and Communism.30 This Manichaean construction 
created the illusion of coherence for Marshall’s approach to democracy and non-
intervention at the Rio Conference; he later agreed to the requests for assistance in 
reconstructing the country and reinstating US military training.31 Marshall could not 
continue to guarantee hemispheric solidarity by simply removing the spectre of US 
intervention however; the conflict between democratic movements and dictatorial rule 
threatened to persist. 
 
Marshall continued after the Rio Conference to pursue hemispheric solidarity through 
the renunciation of US interventionism, but the escalation of tensions in the Caribbean 
exposed his misjudgement of Latin American actors’ capacity to destabilise the region. 
Marshall remained confident, nonetheless, that the conflict in the Caribbean could be 
resolved through the machinery of the Rio Treaty.32 He assigned responsibility for 
forging a solution to Paul C. Daniels, who filled the post of Director of the Office of 
 120 
American Republic Affairs after the tragic death of James H. Wright. Like other State 
Department careerists, Daniels joined the Foreign Service after graduating from 
Harvard and then gained regional experience whilst serving in a number of diplomatic 
posts and special missions.33 More importantly for Marshall however, Daniels shared 
his belief that US intervention in the Western Hemisphere would ‘undermine confidence 
in the Good Neighbour Policy.’34 Daniels sought to ensure that the forthcoming Ninth 
International Conference of American States at Bogotá would be approached with the 
same spirit of ‘mutual respect and voluntary cooperation for common interests’ 
demonstrated in Rio de Janeiro.35  
 
Daniels initially hoped that an informal evocation of this cooperative spirit would 
encourage some peaceful settlement of the Caribbean situation; he encouraged all 
conflicting parties to declare commitments to comply with the duties of states 
stipulated in recent inter-American agreements.36 But Marshall had already been 
warned of the limitations of these agreements, particularly the Rio Treaty, in the context 
of the Caribbean crisis. The provisions for restoring peace with measures of reciprocal 
assistance set out in the Rio Treaty’s Article 7 relied on a designation of belligerence; 
the conflicting accusations of aggression from Venezuela and the Dominican Republic 
only complicated this situation. The claims of aggression could not be based upon the 
definitions of armed attack or invasion by another state outlined in Article 9, but on the 
clandestine support of insurgent movements. 
 
A reliance on traditional diplomatic concepts, based on the particular estrangement of 
states, meant that the State Department failed to address the forces transcending 
national borders. States may have assumed the duties of non-intervention, but dissident 
 121 
exiles continued to cross borders to promote unrest. The State Department could only 
deal with this instability instigated by non-state actors by focusing pressure on any 
states providing support. The Inter-American Convention Concerning the Duties and 
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife signed at the 1928 Sixth Conference of 
American States in Havana demanded each American Republic prevent their territory 
being used to launch insurgent actions.37 The State Department was left with the 
problem however, of whether belligerent states were ‘us[ing] all means at their 
disposal’ to prevent these insurgencies.  
 
Marshall was initially encouraged by reassurances of the Cuban President, Dr. Ramón 
Grau San Martín, that he would prevent rebels from attempting to invade the Dominican 
Republic from their main bases within Cuban territory; but reports from various 
sources continued to detail ongoing plans for invasion being made from within Cuba.38 
Even when Marshall eventually managed to pressure Grau into arresting revolutionary 
exiles, many were allowed to escape to safe havens in Venezuela and Guatemala.39 Far 
from restraining these remaining rebels, the Guatemalan President, Juan José Arévalo, 
engineered the Pacto del Caribe to bring them together and organise their efforts.40 The 
Ambassador for the Dominican Republic in Washington, Luis F. Thomen, expressed 
fears that Guatemala, as well as Haiti, were already providing support for actions 
against his country.41  
 
The Trujillo regime also faced charges of smuggling arms to Venezuelan exiled rebels.42 
The Chargé at the Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo, Charles R. Burrows, confirmed that 
Trujillo sought to avoid the launch of any direct attack, but would provide support for 
revolutionary movements in Venezuela and Cuba.43 The US Ambassador, George H. 
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Butler, had already reported connections between the Dominican military and forces 
being assembled to attack Venezuela.44  
 
Daniels received counsel that the failure of his informal approaches brought general 
agreement in the State Department that the situation had become serious enough to 
warrant collective action through established instruments of mediation.45 From the 
Embassy in Caracas however, Thomas C. Mann cautioned that these processes would be 
unable to settle the issue; the polemical divergence on ideology meant that no 
settlement would be satisfactory to both parties. Indeed, neither the Venezuelan nor 
Dominican government showed willingness to invoke any inter-American machinery for 
conciliation.46 They both found legitimacy for their actions in conflicting discourses of 
hemispheric identity. 
 
The persistent repression of individual rights by the dictatorships of the region 
certainly undermined the objective of institutionalising hemispheric solidarity at 
Bogotá. Those seeking to escape authoritarian regimes identified a fundamental 
antagonism in the region; they identified with the construction promoted by the State 
Department under Braden that labelled Latin American dictators, such as Trujillo, as 
dangerous Others to the security and liberty of the hemispheric Self. The declaration 
that the ‘obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American 
Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals’ in the Rio Treaty only 
encouraged rising expectations. Rómulo Betancourt argued that the inter-American 
system could not enjoy real support until the Western Hemisphere became truly 
democratic; he added that Venezuela and the other Latin American Republics could not 
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be expected to speak out against dictatorship in the global struggle against the Soviet 
Union whilst tolerating it in the Western Hemisphere.47  
 
Betancourt claimed the remaining Latin American dictators to be the clearest danger to 
the unity and peace of the Americas. He had expressed unease with the initial decision 
made by Marshall to reverse the military embargo against the Trujillo regime. They 
complained that the supply of arms to the Dominican Republic also provided 
justification for other Latin American Republics, such as Brazil, to sell munitions for use 
in aggressive actions against Venezuela.48 Dreier advised Marshall to refuse the request 
made by Trujillo for a large quantity of US medium and large bomber aircraft and 
pursuit fighter planes; he should provide an example of discrimination against 
repressive and belligerent dictators. A settlement of the crisis would be difficult whilst 
the Dominican Republic was identified by the Venezuelan government as the ‘real 
enemy.’49 
 
Latin American dictators, like Trujillo, did not recognise themselves as the antagonistic 
obstacle to the realisation of an exceptional hemispheric identity however. They found 
the Manichaean constructions of containment discourse useful instead to identify their 
regimes with the democratic sphere of influence of the US. As Trujillo defined his goals 
in terms of a common response to the threat of the Soviet enemy-Other, he also marked 
the threat facing his ‘democratic’ nation during the Caribbean crisis as Communist-
inspired.50 The State Department found itself dragged into the conflict as Trujillo 
expressed his great alarm at Venezuelan acquisition of arms and aircraft and further 
attempts to purchase airships from the US.51  
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The Truman administration remained unwilling to project such Cold War constructions 
into their relationship with the Dominican Republic. Butler, in particular, argued that 
Trujillo was a ruthless dictator who did not share the democratic traditions of the US. 
He also advised Marshall that it was ‘extremely unlikely’ that the Dominican Republic 
faced any serious communist threat; Trujillo indiscriminately branded all of his 
opponents as “communist.”52 The new Central Intelligence Agency similarly found little 
credibility in the labelling of the Venezuelan government as Communist.53 Butler 
advised Marshall that the charges against Betancourt were part of Trujillo’s ‘devious 
means to obtain arms and munitions from the US.’ He also warned that claims were, in 
fact, ‘smokescreens’ to cover plans to use ‘defensive’ armaments against neighbouring 
countries. Although Marshall did not share Butler’s legitimisation of the revolutionary 
exiles’ targeting of dangerous regional dictatorships, he was also unready to accept anti-
Communism as the primary criterion for friendly relations with the US. 
 
Marshall supported a declaration of the Fundamental Rights and Duties of States in a 
chapter in the Charter of the Organization of American States at the Bogotá Conference; 
but he did not abandon constructions of democratic ideals as guiding principles of inter-
American solidarity. A pioneering agreement at Bogotá on an American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man would also assert the individual right to vote and participate 
in government. The decision to make the latter declaration separate from the main body 
of the Organic Pact of the Bogotá Conference and without binding force illustrated the 
continued prioritisation of non-intervention as the basis of inter-American cooperation. 
This commitment only removed effective means for the US to enforce any conditionality 
on the sovereignty of Latin America’s remaining dictatorships. 
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Hemispheric Neutrality 
The commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy 
could not be reconciled with the need to establish cohesion within the Western 
Hemisphere. Marshall received numerous warnings that the ideological antagonism 
defining the conflict in the Caribbean made any resolution difficult without decisive US 
action. The State Department found resistance from the American Republics to inter-
American measures for peaceful settlement and a reluctance of the Governing Board of 
the Pan American Union to instigate action.54 The machinery of the Rio Treaty could not 
settle the crisis in the Caribbean; stipulations requiring the restoration of the status quo 
ante bellum were clearly not acceptable for the progressive parties involved. From 
Ciudad Trujillo, Butler advised Marshall that the situation would deteriorate further 
without US action; it would ultimately need more time and attention in the future to 
prevent any disruption to the forthcoming Bogotá Conference.55 He warned that the 
unrest was symptomatic of a more basic trouble across the Western Hemisphere: ‘As 
long as internal political situations in many countries are such that political exiles must 
plot from abroad, there probably will be a continuation of these difficulties.’56  
 
Butler was amongst many State Department and Foreign Service officials to argue that 
the US must accept, even if reluctantly, that preponderant power conferred primary 
responsibility for securing individual rights within the Western Hemisphere. As the 
Office of American Republic Affairs’ chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs, Butler 
wrote an article during the Second World War arguing that, ‘[t]he US must throw its full 
weight to achieve democracy [in the Western Hemisphere].’57 The “Butler Doctrine” 
emphasised that the US should not be deterred by the ‘cry of Yankee Imperialism’ from 
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Latin American Republics placing an undue emphasis on the sovereignty of states. ‘If we 
do not lead in the fight for these principles,’ he asked, ‘who will?’ 
 
The urgency of the situation in the Caribbean led Butler to restate the assertions of his 
earlier “doctrine” – the principle of non-intervention was at ‘variance with history and 
experience’ that showed not all Latin American states ‘act always in such a manner that 
the welfare of the American community of nations will not suffer thereby.’58 Butler 
insisted that the roots of the crisis came from the failure of the US to hold Latin 
American regimes accountable to the basic principles of democracy declared in 
numerous inter-American agreements and promoted by the Truman administration.59 
He argued that the US approach should be guided by President Truman’s address before 
the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in April 1946.60 Truman had declared 
that lasting peace in the region required the dedication of resources to the ultimate 
objective of securing a democratic American way of life; such a commitment to 
democracy should be the positive example that the Western Hemisphere provided to 
the rest of the world.61 
 
Butler emphasised that Truman had recognised the need to resort to force to maintain 
solidarity in the Western Hemisphere and proposed US leadership of a multilateral 
action based on the democratic principle of majority rule. Although recognising that his 
recommendations created complications for the State Department, Butler insisted that 
the abuse of democratic principles, that all American Republics at least proclaimed to 
observe, legitimised US support for collective intervention against the Dominican 
Republic.62 Even Braden had remained hesitant to support the original assertion of the 
Butler Doctrine however. Although he agreed that multilateral action did not constitute 
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intervention and should actually be considered as the antithesis of intervention, Braden 
warned that US leadership of such actions, or even proposals for action, would 
ultimately ensure resistance from many Latin American governments. The enduring 
suspicion of US unilateral intervention under the guise of collective action must simply 
be accepted as their “penalty of power”. 
 
Marshall considered this “penalty of power” to be too high to reverse his commitment to 
non-intervention. The use of hemispheric discourse on democracy to frame 
revolutionary movements in the Caribbean only increased the need to demonstrate the 
credibility of this rhetoric before the Bogotá Conference. The failings of the Good 
Neighbour approach to assume the necessary duties to protect those individual rights 
asserted in inter-American declarations became more apparent as others continued to 
assume such responsibilities.  
 
Marshall grew concerned that the eruption of another local conflict could further 
undermine regional stability after the US Ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davies, 
informed him of the unrest breaking out across Costa Rica63 The country had been 
destabilised by the declaration of the presidential election victory of Otilio Ulate Blanco 
of the National Union Party as null and void by an Electoral Board sympathetic to the 
ruling National Republican Party’s candidate, Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia. Civil War 
broke out as the military and police loyal to Calderón and the sitting President, Teodoro 
Picado Michalski, responded to a strike initiated by Ulate supporters with violent 
reprisals that culminated in the imprisonment of Ulate and the death of his close 
associate, Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde. 
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Marshall considered this new crisis a serious and untimely threat to another symbolic 
example of hemispheric solidarity at the Bogotá Conference.64 But the Good Neighbour 
approach was limited by the need to refrain from any interference in a domestic 
conflict. The State Department strictly adhered to Marshall’s position on non-
intervention; Robert Newbegin notified parties that the US would act only to prevent 
any outside interference that would make Costa Rica a scene of conflict between 
opposing external interests.65 Marshall faced a serious decision as such conflict became 
the reality of the situation in Costa Rica. 
 
Developments in Costa Rica meant that Marshall could no longer dismiss the warnings 
proffered at Petrópolis that limited domestic conflicts would quickly draw in 
neighbouring countries to destabilise the entire region. When Costa Rican government 
forces confronted troops led by the exiled José María Hipólito Figueres Ferrer, the 
Ambassador in Washington, Francisco de P. Gutiérrez, immediately emphasised the 
training and support provided to Figueres by Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion. 
Gutiérrez expressed fears that Arévalo intended to conquer all of Central America.66 
Maurice Bernbaum, the Chargé in Nicaragua, also advised Marshall that fears of a 
Guatemalan invasion to follow Figueres’ revolt caused Anastasio Somoza to consider 
sending support to Teodoro Picado.  
 
As the Truman administration refused to stop Figueres and his rebels move on San José, 
it appeared that there was an intentional plan to undermine a government sympathetic 
to local Communists.67 The State Department made it clear to Somoza that it did not 
share his belief that Guatemalan support of Figueres and his ‘War of National 
Liberation’ provided the justification for responding to Picado’s appeals for assistance.68 
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Somoza cancelled his plans after Robert F. Woodward informed him that any further 
action without inter-American agreement would be considered unilateral 
intervention.69 Daniels simply evaded a response to the appeals of the Costa Rican 
Ambassador, Francisco de P. Gutiérrez, that Costa Rica could legitimately request 
assistance to defend itself, whilst the Havana Convention obliged Guatemala not to 
assist insurgent groups.70 
 
State Department obstruction of Somoza’s attempts to support the Costa Rican 
government, whilst failing to prevent Arévalo’s assistance to rebels, were not the result 
of Cold War considerations however; they were illustrative of the limitations inherent 
to the traditional state-centric approach of inter-American diplomacy. Somoza’s 
declared intention to unilaterally send Nicaraguan state forces across the Costa Rican 
border made condemnation more straightforward as a clear violation of the principle of 
non-intervention in the Rio Treaty. Arévalo’s consistent denials of involvement with a 
non-state actor made similar censure through the Havana Convention more difficult.71  
 
The Truman administration faced Latin American criticism for maintaining the neutral 
position in its commitment to non-intervention. Braden had identified the price of 
neutrality earlier during the Second World War: ‘Whatever we refrain from saying and 
whatever we refrain from doing may constitute intervention, no less than what we do or 
say.’72 He considered this price to be sound reason to embrace intervention in favour of 
democracy across the region: 
‘The problem we face is not how to avoid using our power. We 
cannot possibly avoid using it, for it weighs in the balance just as 
much even when we do not deliberately apply it or when we 
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deliberately seek to avoid applying it. . . . If a nation has great 
power, as we have it in abundance, it cannot shun the obligation to 
exercise commensurate leadership . . . positively on behalf of 
human rights.’  
Braden also later insisted that: 
‘Not to use our power in the interests of peace and freedom may 
be misusing that power just as much as if we brought our 
influence to bear on the wrong side of an issue. We must lean over 
backwards to avoid intervention by action or inaction alike.’73 
In an article for Foreign Affairs the Colombia University academic, Professor Frank 
Tannenbaum, restated this argument that whatever the US did or did not do would have 
the effect of intervention because of its strength.74  
 
Marshall faced criticism not for his active intervention in support of pro-American 
regimes, but for the incoherence in his determination to avoid any appearance of 
interference in the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours. Ambassador Davis 
reported back the consequences of this tension between the penalty of power and the 
price of neutrality in Costa Rica: ‘[W]e are condemned for the failure to come to the 
rescue of which Costa Ricans themselves have not been able to resolve.’75  
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5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Marshall prioritised a commitment to the principle of non-intervention in order to 
restore the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The coherence of this pursuit was 
undermined at Petrópolis by the persistence of Latin American demands for democracy 
however. In his adherence to non-intervention at the expense of other objectives, 
Marshall also demonstrated further lack of understanding of its prior relevance in inter-
American relations. Although non-intervention had become the rhetorical focus of the 
Good Neighbour Policy, the Roosevelt administration had only considered it as a useful 
concession in maintaining the cooperation of Latin American governments. The 
Roosevelt administration would refrain from intervention in the anticipation of a 
reciprocal commitment from Latin American governments to secure the private 
property of US companies.1 The Roosevelt administration used non-intervention 
alongside other instruments of statecraft as part of a more complex role of mediating 
between the competing interests of private enterprise and Latin American 
governments.  
 
Economic assistance proved to be increasingly important as a strategic instrument for 
maintaining this relationship of reciprocity. The chief architect of the Good Neighbour 
Policy within the Roosevelt administration, Sumner Welles, identified the mutual 
interest in such assistance: 
‘The US has to continue wholeheartedly its policy of economic 
cooperation with its American neighbours. Such bread cast upon 
the waters will come back to this country a hundredfold. One of 
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the most profitable opportunities for American investment and 
for American foreign trade lay with the neighbouring republics of 
the hemisphere.’2 
The use of economic incentives became even more essential during the Second World 
War as the State Department shifted its focus from protecting property to securing 
access to vital strategic resources. Marshall worked closely with Nelson Rockefeller, 
acting at the time as the State Department’s Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, to 
coordinate this evocation of reciprocity.3 Rockefeller pursued a “comprehensive 
approach” to securing the region against aggression from Nazi Germany. He maintained 
that inter-American military cooperation would not guarantee the security of the 
Western Hemisphere. The US would also need to “sell” the American way of life in order 
to prevent Axis exploitation of the widespread economic deprivation in the region.4 
Rockefeller used economic assistance to raise living standards across the region and 
demonstrate that to Latin American leaders that the development and progress of their 
countries would be best achieved through capitalist modernisation that came with 
further integration into the US sphere of influence. A commitment to Latin American 
economic development would also enhance the global prestige of the US and dispel any 
images of it as ‘the most feared and hated country.’ 
 
Alongside these small measures of economic assistance during the Second World War, 
the State Department maintained the cooperation of Latin America, in large part, 
through promises for a larger program of assistance to develop industrial capacity at 
the end of hostilities. Merwin L. Bohan was amongst many economic advisers at the 
Chapultepec Conference that felt a demonstration of the US commitment and capability 
to provide Latin American leaders with a model of ‘economic salvation’ would be 
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essential for maintaining inter-American cooperation after the war. The stretch on US 
resources as the US looked to extend its commitments into Western Europe however, 
led William L. Clayton, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
to recommend that Latin American leaders postpone their industrialisation plans. ‘It 
isn’t going to be at all as you'd like it in the post-war period,’ he warned.5  
 
Latin American disappointment was immediately evident. Delegates at the Chapultepec 
Conference pleaded for the US to honour its pledges to provide assistance for their 
economic development. The Mexican President, Manuel Ávila Camacho, received a 
standing ovation for his demands that the security of the Western Hemisphere 
depended upon sound economic and social conditions established by Latin American 
industrialisation.6 ‘The Latin Americans,’ as the Commerce Department’s regional 
specialist, George Wythe, highlighted, ‘have gone hog-wild for industrialisation.’7 Yet the 
Truman administration continued to stall on their wartime pledges of development 
assistance and returned to the idea of free market principles as ‘religion or creed.’ Once 
the Truman administration cancelled wartime purchases and raised tariffs on their 
primary exports, Latin American leaders complained that the US had fixed inter-
American economic relations in its favour ‘not once, but twice.’8  
 
The exacerbation of Latin American economic problems brought criticisms from a 
number of former State Department officials from the Good Neighbour era that the 
principle of reciprocity had been abandoned. Laurence Duggan, the Director of the 
Office of American Republic Affairs under Sumner Welles, feared that the Truman 
administration had relegated Latin American leaders to the status of second-class 
citizens in the region: 
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 ‘Today we are paying a minimum of attention to New World 
problems and this neglect is all the more marked because only 
yesterday we were making an all out effort to persuade our 
neighbours of our friendship.’9 
The neglect of the economic conditions throughout much of Latin America posed as 
serious danger to the solidarity of the region than the rising tide of expectations for 
democratic freedoms. Marshall needed to address the wide differences in living 
standards that undermined the imaginary of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
Economic Reciprocity 
The announcement of the European Recovery Program offered Latin American leaders 
some encouragement that Marshall would honour earlier US commitments for 
assistance in their economic development. He had declared his commitment to address 
‘hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’ Although they anticipated some discussion on 
economic cooperation at the Rio Conference, the Latin American delegations made sure 
that Marshall was aware of their agenda. The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres 
Bodet, received rapturous applause for his opening address to the Rio Conference after 
restating the importance of economic development for both hemispheric security and 
solidarity.10 Torres Bodet stressed that economic inequality posed a significant threat to 
the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere:  
‘One of the deepest yearnings of the continent is to develop the 
economic cooperation of our countries to the end that many of 
them shall not become simply armored invalids artificially 
ironclad in time of emergency, but rather communities that are 
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strong through production, sound through equitable exploitation 
of their resources....Nations that are weak owing to their economy 
will be unable to exercise rapid and decisive action against 
aggression.’11 
Despite constant questions asked from Latin American delegates however, Marshall 
insisted each time that economic discussions could not be added to the agenda of the 
Rio Conference.12 
 
The general message offered by Marshall to the Latin American delegates appeared 
clear: the US could no longer afford further commitments to economic assistance on top 
of the reconstruction of Europe.13 Marshall realised that Latin American cooperation on 
negotiations over the Rio Treaty required some commitment for later discussions on 
their economic agenda. He reassured them that ‘in assuming this burden we have not 
lost sight of the economic problems of the Western Hemisphere.’ After the efforts 
required in selling the ERP to Congress however, Marshall anticipated little chance of 
appropriations for an assistance program in a region far away from the dangers of the 
Cold War. He used his address and personal visits to delegations instead to explain the 
importance of European recovery to the Americas.14 The Marshall Plan would firstly be 
in Latin American interests; the threat of European markets being closed to their 
surpluses endangered future development.15 Marshall also highlighted the dangers of 
expansive Communism, comparing it to a fire, from which the Western Hemisphere 
received sparks, but should be stamped out at its source – in Western Europe.16  
 
President Truman reinforced this message back in Washington during a press 
conference held to celebrate Victory in Japan Day. He dismissed any economic 
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assistance for Latin America: ‘There has been a Marshall Plan for the Western 
Hemisphere for a century and a half,’ he suggested; it was ‘known as the Monroe 
Doctrine.’17 Truman made his position clearer after flying into Rio de Janeiro in his new 
Presidential DC-6, Independence, to make the closing address to the conference. ‘We 
intend to do our best to provide economic help to those who are prepared to help 
themselves and each other,’ he declared. ‘But our resources are not unlimited. We must 
apply them where they can serve most effectively to bring production, freedom, and 
confidence back to the world.’18 In an address to a joint session of the Brazilian 
Congress after the conclusion of the Rio Conference, Truman reassured the region that 
the US remained committed to action that would secure the solidarity of the Western 
Hemisphere: ‘I’m here to say that we don’t forget our friends when they have been 
friends in need.’19 Latin American leaders would just have to accept that the principle of 
reciprocity did not extend to a commitment to economic development. 
 
Economic Drift 
The prioritisation of limited resources into the ERP left Marshall and the State 
Department without serious means to maintain the principle of reciprocity within the 
Western Hemisphere. Although Marshall celebrated the conclusion of the Rio Treaty as 
a significant victory in the psychological battle with the Soviet Union, the failure to 
translate the commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy into an effective solution for 
the economic problems faced in Latin America exposed the fragility of his symbolic 
example of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. The inadequate means available to 
the State Department to deal with subsequent economic crises that threatened much of 
Latin America only undermined the authenticity of the Good Neighbour relationship. 
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The State Department could not respond to the systemic food and fuel crises that 
endangered the extended US orbit with a comprehensive solution; the prioritisation of 
European reconstruction had already established a division in economic planning along 
regional lines. The drift in planning for inter-American economic cooperation only made 
the integration of a global response more problematic. 
 
Latin American leaders expected the State Department to make at least comparable 
efforts to address the economic crises that imperilled both Western Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere. The continued prioritisation of the needs of Western Europe over 
those of Latin America appeared evident in the divergent responses from the State 
Department to the critical food shortages experienced. The State Department received 
urgent appeals for emergency economic assistance from Latin American leaders fearing 
that the public reaction to food shortages threatened the survival of their governments. 
The US Ambassador in Lima, Prentice W. Cooper Jr., informed Marshall that the 
Peruvian government of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero faced particularly acute cases of 
starvation and reported on the ongoing riots in the capital. Peruvian officials warned 
the State Department that the social unrest had reached proportions dangerous enough 
to extend beyond their borders and destabilise the hemisphere.20 After failing to secure 
assistance during several trips to Washington, the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Enrique 
García-Sayán, desperately used his address to the Rio Conference to make appeals for 
economic aid; he likened his country ‘to a drowning man asking for immediate help.’  
 
Although he recognised the ‘tremendous gravity’ of the crisis in Latin America, Marshall 
shared the view of many prominent administration officials that the economic crisis in 
Western Europe should take precedence over any other issue.21 The inter-departmental 
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committee on the Marshall Plan warned that the future of cooperation of Western 
Europe depended upon providing vital food supplies throughout the winter.22 Marshall 
focused resources on alleviating the acute crises confronting the US in the strategic 
priorities of France and Italy. He feared imminent economic collapse in Europe before 
Congressional authorisation of the ERP however.  
 
Marshall recommended that Truman request an interim $600 million aid package from 
Congress to provide support for the independent efforts of the Friendship Train in 
gathering vital food parcels for these countries. This prioritisation of the limited 
resources available to the State Department restricted any commitment that Marshall 
could offer to Latin American countries facing shortages. Despite help from former 
President Herbert Hoover, Marshall endured tough Congressional hearings even over 
this emergency assistance and feared that further financial commitments would be 
impossible.23 
 
Latin American governments appealed to the State Department for a more coherent 
response to the economic crisis that would also address the challenges that they faced. 
The economic stabilisation of the US sphere did not solely determine the approach 
sanctioned by Marshall however. The symbolic significance of Western Europe as a site 
for the demonstration of the US commitment and capability to guarantee standards of 
living had already been established. Latin American specialists attempted to evoke 
similar psychological implications in their appeals to Marshall to reconsider the 
provision of emergency assistance for Peru. Cooper and officials within the Office of 
American Republic Affairs advised Marshall of the necessity to offer aid to the 
Bustamante government as both reciprocal reward for historic cooperation and the 
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symbolic demonstration of concern and provision of moral support for a struggling 
friend.24 Although he had pursued his symbolic example of hemispheric solidarity at the 
Rio Conference through a commitment to non-intervention and cooperation in regional 
security, Marshall received advice that economic assistance had become integral to the 
credibility of the image of the US as Good Neighbour.  
 
The incoherence of strategic approach towards Latin America once again became clear 
as Marshall rejected recommendations to offer a program of economic assistance in 
order to ensure the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The absence of a 
comprehensive solution to the food crisis and the prioritisation of funds to Europe 
meant that the Office of American Republic Affairs struggled to formulate an effective 
response to tackle the acute shortages in Peru. The State Department consistently 
denied any long-term commitment to satisfy the appeals of the Bustamante government 
for emergency shipments and increased monthly quotas of wheat needed to alleviate 
the growing hunger in Peru. Marshall notified the Embassy in Lima that declining 
domestic wheat crops meant that the US would struggle to meet even the increasing 
demand in Europe.25 Even the aid that the State Department promised to provide from 
‘time to time’ in response to grave crises was severely inadequate.26 The need to 
consider the primary European demand for wheat meant that a request from the 
Peruvian government for an emergency shipment of 15,000 tons of wheat and a new 
monthly quota of 12,000 tons, was met only with a measure to permit the purchase of 
10,000 tons of flour – a measure that the Office of American Republic Affairs had 
previously condemned as damaging to the sustainability of the Peruvian milling 
industry.27 
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The failure to formulate a coherent economic approach to be integrated into the Good 
Neighbour Policy became exposed further in the State Department efforts to address a 
serious fuel crisis in Chile. The US Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, reported 
that the exacerbation of coal shortages in Chile by ongoing miner strikes had begun to 
paralyse industrial life and seriously endangered the stability of the country.28 The 
Chilean Foreign Minister, Germán Vergara Donoso, appealed to the State Department 
for emergency coal supplies that would prevent many Chilean people suffering cold and 
hunger.29 Bowers recommended that Marshall meet these appeals in order to lend 
moral support for the government of President Gabriel González Vileda and show that 
the US was not indifferent to the economic struggles in Chile.30 The Office of American 
Republic Affairs also proposed aid to Chile as the situation worsened.31 Deputy Director 
Robert F. Woodward complained that Europe already received the vast majority of US 
exports of coal and recommended redistributing some of these supplies in an 
emergency allocation to Chile. 
 
The needs of Latin America lost out once again as the State Department prioritised the 
demands from Western Europe. Robert Lovett insisted that the failure to increase 
German coal production and slowing domestic output meant that meeting critical 
requirements in Western Europe would be difficult enough and, as a result, Chile would 
continue to receive only a small fraction of the stockpile.32 The State Department failed 
to provide an effective solution to the Chilean crisis. As the only government able to 
provide the coal necessary to avoid economic collapse, the Truman administration did 
eventually agree to increase quotas available to Chile. But Bowers swiftly warned 
Marshall that the provisions were not enough to end the crisis and restore stability.33 
More significantly however, the Chilean Ambassador, Felix Nieto del Rio, informed 
 146 
Lovett that his government would struggle to find means of payment for an emergency 
shipment.34 Although he recognised the need to offer direct aid to Western Europe in 
order to address the severe dollar gap that denied countries the means to purchase 
essential fuel supplies, Marshall assured Congressional leaders that appropriations 
would be unnecessary for Latin America.35  
 
The incoherence of strategy in the Western Hemisphere did not represent a simple 
tension between ends and means however. The solution for providing capital needed in 
Latin America that Marshall presented revealed a significant lack of appreciation for the 
unique problems that countries like Chile faced. Robert H. Patchin - the Vice-President 
of W. R. Grace and Co. and honorary Vice-President of the Pan-American Society – 
challenged the claims that Latin American governments would be able to earn vital 
dollars in the European markets restored by the Marshall Plan when they were 
presented again in a dinner address by Norman Armour.36 Despite assurances that 
dollars given in aid to Europe would be spent on goods from across the Western 
Hemisphere, the Latin American countries most in need, like Chile, would not accrue 
any benefits as only Argentina possessed any significant quantity of supplies needed in 
Europe.37 Patchin expressed Latin American concerns that the ERP would actually have 
a negative effect on their economies. They feared that the prioritisation of US capital 
goods to Europe would allow recipient countries to build up export sectors threatening 
nascent Latin American industries.  
 
Marshall suggested that credit from the Export-Import Bank would provide Latin 
American countries with the finance capital for purchasing vital supplies and 
developing domestic industries. Lovett recommended that the Chilean government seek 
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a loan to make payment on increased quotas of coal.38 The fundamental tension in this 
approach was evident however, in his acknowledgement of the slim chances of success 
for any Chilean application to the EXIM Bank for a line of credit. The State Department 
reliance on the likes of the EXIM Bank and the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development to provide capital foods for Latin American countries was undermined by 
the support for their restrictive criteria for lending.39 The State Department could have 
supported an initial Chilean application for credit that the International Bank 
considered as a test case of whether loans should be approved on the traditional basis 
of security of repayment or on the immediate needs of weak and unbalanced economies. 
State Department officials provided no support for Latin American specialists within the 
IBRD arguing against the decision of President John J. McCloy to reject the application 
on the grounds of significant financial risk.40 McCloy ignored arguments that the 
primary mandate of the IBRD should be to provide credit to those Latin American 
countries struggling to meet conditions such as foreign debt settlement.41 
 
The State Department acknowledged the vicious circle created by rejections of credit 
necessary for economic recovery on the basis of poor economic structure, but it 
provided no solution. No support was offered to Chilean representatives as they lodged 
complaints that European countries, such as France, would not be forced into 
impossible debt repayment increases of $10-15 million per year in order to secure a $40 
million credit.42 McCloy insisted that the IBRD maintained uniform standards, but his 
acknowledgement that no Latin American country had managed a successful application 
highlighted the penalty imposed on poorer economies. The French government faced 
fuel strikes similar to those in Chile, but the need to secure the cooperation of President 
Vincent Auriol in the ERP led Marshall to guarantee adequate supplies. The Chilean 
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government received no such direct assistance from the State Department and was 
offered only suggestions to assume responsibility for breaking the vicious circle they 
found themselves in. The State Department even provided little help once the Chilean 
government attempted to settle these debt problems; officials only issued warning that 
actions would still not guarantee necessary credit.43 Similar insensitivities had been 
evident when State Department officials not only rejected earlier Peruvian offers to 
compromise on similar commercial debt problems with guarantees to repay the 
maximum that could be sacrificed, but also made further demands for settlement of 
wartime Lend-Lease aid.44  
 
The Truman administration faced a serious threat to regional stability after the EXIM 
Bank also rejected an application for credit from Chile. The drift in strategic planning for 
inter-American economic cooperation meant that the State Department had to rely on a 
temporary solution for finding the necessary financial capital for Chilean fuel purchases. 
An interim agreement for the EXIM Bank to advance funds for another development 
project would provide González Vileda with enough credibility to maintain provisional 
stability in Chile.45 Bowers reported that the measure had almost brought the Chilean 
President to tears as he pledged his loyalty to the US.46 But State Department reliance 
on such nominal assistance could guarantee no more than superficial cooperation. The 
Chilean government shared the fears of other Latin American leaders that the Truman 
administration held no interest in hemispheric development.47 The prioritisation of 
European economic problems and Marshall’s reluctance to translate Good Neighbour 
relations into a commitment to inter-American economic cooperation only endangered 
Latin American integration into a wider US sphere of influence. 
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Economic Vacuum 
After the disappointment of the Rio Conference and the ongoing drift in State 
Department planning for inter-American economic cooperation, Latin American 
governments finally found a platform to voice their frustrations at the UN Conference on 
Trade and Employment held in Havana. The Cuban President, Ramón Grau San Martín, 
used his opening address as host to appeal to the delegations to ‘not be indifferent’ to 
the specific needs of the underdeveloped countries in the Western Hemisphere.48 The 
US representatives soon discovered the full extent of Latin American discontent 
however; the Latin Americans offered the ‘most consistent and difficult opposition’ to 
the creation of a new International Trade Organization to accompany the International 
Monetary Fund and International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Latin 
American delegates refused to be confined to their traditional role of supplying the 
industrialised core with their raw materials and accused the Truman administration of 
proposing measures to win Western European support for the hierarchical integration 
of a global economy.49 ‘An error has been committed in trying to solve the problems of 
European industrial reconstruction independently and in ignorance of the needs of 
Latin America’s economy,’ the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Enrique García-Sayán, 
complained.50  
 
The ongoing neglect of the Latin American economic agenda at the Havana Conference 
created an ideal stage for Perón to announce $5 billion in graduated and compensated 
credits for the region.51 The absence of a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere had 
left a vacuum in the Good Neighbour Policy that Perón was ready to fill. The relative 
economic strength that Argentina emerged from the war with provided Perón with 
some means to shape a challenge to US leadership in the region. The State Department 
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remained cautious of Argentine intentions even after the restoration of diplomatic 
relations.52 ‘The threat which gives us the worst case of cold shivers,’ one official noted, 
‘is that of a southern bloc dominated by Argentina.’53 The US delegation at Havana paid 
close attention to efforts made by their Argentine counterparts to direct neighbouring 
Latin American countries towards state-directed development as a way of ‘equalising all 
economies.’54 The Perón regime had long warned of the dangers of both capitalist and 
communist development and encouraged Latin America to adopt the tercera posición 
adopted by Argentina.55 Perón promised that his Instituto Argentino para la Promoción 
del Intercambio would prove a successful alternative to the liberal economic policies 
pursued by the US.56 Although the economic means available to Argentina allowed 
Perón to demonstrate the credibility of this model of development to the rest of Latin 
America, the US preoccupation with the economic reconstruction of Western Europe 
remained ‘the strongest force presently tending to magnify Argentina’s stature vis-à-vis 
the other American Republics.’57  
 
The Truman administration struggled to find agreement on the significance and the 
most suitable response to the Argentine challenge to the US position in the Western 
Hemisphere. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires emphasised the continuing pledges from 
Perón to cooperate with the State Department and advised Marshall to dismiss any 
threat from Argentina. The CIA disagreed that Perón only promoted his tercera posición 
for domestic consumption in order to balance opposing factions however.58 They also 
warned that the cooperation of Perón remained dependent upon him maintaining a 
majority of support in upcoming congressional elections as the opposition rejected any 
collaboration with the US.59 State Department intelligence reports even questioned the 
assumption that all of the Perónistas were pro-American. Perhaps more importantly 
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however, the active promotion of the tercera posición could attract the attention of Latin 
America. Marshall received numerous warnings that mounting domestic pressure might 
force the neighbours of Argentina to accept the concessions demanded by Perón in 
return for the capital and supplies needed to alleviate their economic crises.60 
 
Marshall dismissed the need for a more effective commitment to economic assistance in 
response to the Argentine challenge however. He remained confident that suspicions of 
Perón’s designs for expansion ensured that Argentina’s neighbours would not isolate 
themselves from the US. Armour highlighted the resistance amongst many Latin 
American governments to the demands made by Perón for commercial concessions as a 
condition for economic assistance.61 The Chilean President, González Vileda, conveyed a 
similar alertness as the Peruvian and Uruguayan leadership to the pressure exerted by 
Argentina in negotiations for commercial agreements.62 He reassured the State 
Department that he would prevent his country from becoming ‘a cat’s paw of Perón.63 It 
became evident that Marshall held no concern for the Argentine threat when he rejected 
Latin American appeals for assistance in exchange for guarantees to suspend any 
negotiations with Perón.64 He received warnings that Argentina would be identified as a 
‘bogey man’ in order to solicit a program of economic assistance from the US.65 
 
Marshall remained more reluctant to undermine his commitment to the Good 
Neighbour Policy. As a democratically elected leader enjoying considerable popular 
support for his success in improving standards of living and renewing a sense of 
national pride, Perón would escape unilateral condemnation from the US.66 Although 
some State Department officials feared that this approach damaged the US image, 
Marshall remained content to accept the assurances from Argentina’s neighbours that 
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they opposed the tercera posición and would maintain their friendship with the US.67 A 
symbolic example of US assistance in economic development had been established in 
Western Europe and Marshall focused on the Western Hemisphere primarily as a site to 
demonstrate to the world the US commitment to cooperation and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours. He prioritised only enough action to 
prevent any serious alternative to US constructions of solidarity in the Western 
Hemisphere; a minimal amount of support would be offered to Latin American leaders 
to improve their bargaining position with Argentina.68  
 
Marshall only became concerned once Latin American leaders began to unite their 
efforts to fill the vacuum in inter-American economic planning. Regional leaders 
planned preliminary meetings to finalise their own details for a Marshall Plan for the 
Western Hemisphere.69 Once the Economic and Social Council of the Pan American 
Union presented the State Department with a draft agreement for an inter-American 
development organisation and demand for a program of economic assistance, Marshall 
acknowledged that his focus on Europe had caused a ‘serious and rapid decline in our 
relations with the countries of Latin America.’70 He was not necessarily concerned about 
Latin American criticism that the US had passed them by when they called for aid; the 
US had already established a positive image through economic cooperation in Western 
Europe. Marshall feared that the US would be identified as the robber that had stripped 
them and left them for dead in the first place.71 As Latin American leaders now 
considered economic assistance for the litmus test for the authenticity of the Good 
Neighbour Policy, Marshall anticipated criticism of the US as the obstacle to solidarity in 
the Western Hemisphere if he arrived at the Bogotá Conference without a commitment 
to their development agenda.  
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Economic Development 
Marshall arrived at the Bogotá Conference eager to demonstrate that he took the Latin 
American agenda of economic development seriously. The US delegation comprised a 
number of economic specialists – including Commerce Secretary W. Averell Harriman, 
Treasury Secretary John Snyder, Export-Import Bank Chairman William McChesney 
Martin Jr. The International Bank President, John J. McCloy, also joined the US 
delegation as an unofficial representative. In gathering to make their final preparations 
however, the US representatives undoubtedly recognised that the Latin Americans 
would demand more than a parade and they readied themselves for the inevitable 
criticism.72 The US would not be able to avoid the issue of economic development. The 
Colombian President Mariano Ospina Perez and his Foreign Minister Laureano Gomez 
raised this agenda immediately in their opening addresses to the conference.  
 
Latin American delegates evidently ‘tense with excitement’ filled the Capitolio Building 
in Bogotá the next day as they awaited a speech from Marshall to open the second 
plenary session. The eventual speech from Marshall marked a turning point in inter-
American relations. Despite a commitment to inter-American cooperation, his direct 
rejection of a Marshall Plan for Latin America came as a bombshell to the entire group; a 
stony silence met the end of Marshall’s address.73 Latin American leaders had expected 
difficult negotiations with the US delegation, but not such an unequivocal dismissal of 
their economic agenda. ‘For me,’ one Latin American delegate stated the next day, ‘the 
conference ended yesterday.’74 
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The fate of inter-American economic relations had been sealed when Marshall 
requested recommendations for an approach to be pursued at the Bogotá Conference 
from the Office of Financial and Development Policy. In presenting the conclusions of 
this study, the Director of the OFP, Norman T. Ness, acknowledged the strategic 
importance of Latin America and emphasised the importance of solidarity in the 
Western Hemisphere.75 The OFP also recognised economic development as the 
foremost objective of Latin American countries and highlighted their dissatisfaction 
with the ‘disappointing’ performance of US assistance in realising this goal. Ness still 
insisted that the demands of the ERP on limited resources meant that no comparable 
program could be undertaken in the Western Hemisphere however.  
 
The OFP advised Marshall of the need for some concessions to Latin American demands 
to ensure the successful conclusion of an agreement at Bogotá. ‘What is needed is not so 
much a new policy,’ Ness concluded however; rather a ‘more effective and integrated 
implementation of existing economic policy.’76 The OFP recommended a series of 
measures that Marshall could announce as a “Positive Program of US Assistance for 
Latin America” without creating too heavy burden on already limited US resources. It 
would be left to Marshall to lead the State Department in a public relations campaign to 
promote these current development projects that had received less attention than 
would come from ‘a unified program presented as this country’s contribution to the 
development of the Latin American economy.’ 
 
Marshall anticipated that the measures in this program ‘would accomplish the objective 
of the US at Bogotá without laying on this country any heavy new burden’ and 
demonstrate that Latin America had not been abandoned.77 The US delegation accepted 
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a proposal from the Ecuadoran representatives to prevent severe fluctuations in the 
differences between prices of raw materials and manufactured goods.78 Marshall also 
guaranteed Latin America a fair allocation of US exports and technical expertise to assist 
in their industrialisation efforts. Although these measures did not address the 
immediate need to meet the demand for development finance capital, Marshall believed 
that an increase in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank would dampen the 
disappointment in the absence of an assistance program.  
 
As the centrepiece of the US demonstration of support for Latin American economic 
development at the Bogotá Conference, a considerable effort had been made to gain 
Congressional appropriations. The fact that Truman needed to convey a special message 
to Congress on ‘Economic Aid to Latin America’ to even secure the additional $500 
million for the EXIM Bank budget illustrated the serious tensions between US 
commitments and resources.79 The limited nature of even these appropriations became 
evident as soon as William McChesney Martin Jr. announced the conditions of the new 
budget of the EXIM Bank however. Martin announced that credit would be authorised 
only for applications not met by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Although John J. McCloy had already announced that the IBRD was ready 
to consider loans to Latin America, the limited funds left by European demands meant 
that the increased budget of the EXIM Bank would not fill the gap in development 
finance.80 The increased capacity of the EXIM Bank also provided no opportunities for 
the Latin American governments that had experienced difficulties in meeting the strict 
criteria for successful loan applications. Although the OFP had recommended some 
liberalisation of the purpose of the lending programme, Martin made it clear that credit 
would continue to be provided only for specific projects with guarantees of 
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repayment.81 Martin showed little sympathy for Latin American complaints and their 
alternative proposals for public funding programmes through a regional bank or 
technical development corporation.82 As the main author of Marshall’s speech he felt 
that Latin American delegates had simply been told that they could no longer expect 
‘something for nothing’: ‘Santa Claus was dead and he didn’t intend to unbury him.’83 
 
Such revelation meant that Marshall lost the confidence of the Latin Americans at the 
Bogotá Conference. The New York Times highlighted the noticeable difference between 
receptions offered Marshall at Petrópolis and Bogotá.84 Latin American cooperation 
with the US prioritisation of European reconstruction at Petrópolis rested upon the 
reassurances of Marshall to honour earlier commitments to assist in economic 
development. Marshall insisted once again at Bogotá that his Latin American 
counterparts continue to show some ‘understanding and cooperation’ whilst the US 
shoulder the ‘heavy responsibilities’ of European economic recovery. He could no 
longer rely on his personal credibility to maintain Latin American patience however. 
The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres Bodet, summarised Latin American 
frustrations: ‘Of course reconstruction is urgent, but is development less urgent when 
the peoples who seek it live as miserably as most of those who clamor for 
reconstruction?’85 Marshall spent much of the rest of the conference attempting to 
reassure Latin American governments that their interests had received ‘careful 
consideration’ in the planning of the ERP.86 He emphasised the benefits to be shared in 
the Western Hemisphere from US efforts through the Marshall Plan to restore the 
triangular links of transatlantic trade and close the dollar gap. 
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Latin American leaders left the Bogotá Conference doubting the sincerity of such claims. 
Some officials within the State Department agreed that the Marshall Plan would not 
provide Latin America with enough dollars to address their economic problems.87 The 
National Foreign Trade Council later also argued that the Latin American countries most 
in need of dollars would not benefit from the ERP.88 The US Embassy in Buenos Aires 
warned that the Argentine regime would be amongst several Latin American 
governments that would blame the US if dollar purchases failed to materialise and 
economic conditions deteriorated.89  
 
Marshall did not expect any further financial support for the Marshall Plan from 
Congress however. He came to understand the difficulty of securing appropriations as 
he served as the point contact for the Truman administration during Congressional 
hearings on the Marshall Plan. Senator Taft continued to obstruct even the original $6.8 
billion requested despite a demand from the President for ‘all or nothing’ of the full 
amount.90 The CIA warned that this Congressional reluctance for financial commitments 
meant that ‘the prospects of effective remedial attack on the basic causes of economic 
instability continue[d] to be poor.’91 
 
The incoherence in US strategy caused by this tension between commitment and 
resources only became more prominent after a 19-member Select Committee of the 
House of Representatives presented its final report on a study of foreign aid. Despite his 
acknowledgement that most Latin American countries suffered from serious difficulties 
in balance-of-payments and depleted gold and dollar reserves, the Select Committee 
Chairman, Charles Easton, declared it imperative ‘that no program for Latin America 
relief as such be included as a part of the European Recovery Program.’92 Although 
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Marshall had attempted to present the measures made through the ERP as part of a 
comprehensive program of economic assistance for Latin America, the House Select 
Committee insisted that even offshore purchases should not be confused as such: 
‘In other words, ECA financing in Latin America must be evaluated 
in terms of its contribution to European recovery; Latin America's 
special needs must be considered separately on their own merits 
and in relation to total demands upon the financial and industrial 
resources of the US.’ 
The House Select Committee even declared that some Latin American nations actually 
benefited too much from the ERP already and called on the State Department to ‘correct 
this unequal competitive situation.’93 Despite the deterioration of the economic 
situation in the Western Hemisphere, the House Select Committee accused the Latin 
American countries of failing to pull their weight in providing aid to Europe.94 The fates 
of a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere and the effective working of the 
principle of reciprocity in the Good Neighbour Policy appeared to be sealed when the 
Select Committee concluded that the Truman administration should ask: ‘What more 
can Latin America do to assist in European recovery?’ 
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Marshall had also expressed his faith in the trade opportunities presented by the ERP. 
Whilst he stated that he had economic development in Latin America ‘very much in 
mind,’ he stressed the heavy demands on the US and suggested that, ‘…the Department 
of State was the one that was in the middle and being pressed from all directions.’ 
87 823.50/5-2848: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by 
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(FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 
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91 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Review of the World Situation,’ 16.09.1948 (DDRS) 
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on Foreign Aid of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Washington: United States 
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93 The report accused Argentina, in particular, of overcharging Europe on goods. Ibid. 
94 The report declared: ‘The Administration estimate that the Western Hemisphere 
countries, outside of the United States, should be expected to finance $700 million of aid 
to Europe in the period April 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, seems unduly conservative, 
particularly in view of the fact that it is also contemplated that of the offshore 
procurement program of $2.6 billion, more than $1.7 billion is to be expended in Latin 
American countries.’ Ibid. 
6. ECONOMIC RECIPROCITY 
 
Marshall sought to project a symbolic example of unity in the Western Hemisphere into 
the Cold War. The prioritisation of the economic reconstruction of Western Europe in 
the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union undermined this objective however. 
The expansion of commitments in Western Europe limited the resources available to 
Marshall to guarantee Latin American cooperation. Despite their clear demands to 
restore the hemispheric solidarity of the Good Neighbour era, senior Congressional 
leaders refused to extend Marshall the means to engage the Latin America agenda of 
economic development. As a result Marshall struggled to maintain the complex role for 
the State Department as a mediator between the divergent interests of Latin American 
governments and the private sector in the US. His response once more demonstrated a 
lack of awareness of the problems previously experienced in inter-American relations. 
 
Marshall struggled to persuade Latin American leaders that the solution to their 
development problems could be found in the creation of favourable conditions to attract 
private investment. Their experience of US actions at the end of the Second World War 
made them reluctant to relinquish further autonomy over their struggling economies. 
This left Marshall in a catch-22 situation. He could not offer the financial assistance 
needed to convince Latin American leaders to eschew economic nationalism. Yet 
Marshall could not even deliver on his guarantees of private investment either. US 
businesses had showed unwilling to risk investments in countries equally unwilling to 
respect private property. Private sector leaders repeatedly expressed their concerns 
that the Good Neighbour Policy did not provide them with the adequate protection of 
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their interests. This left Marshall with a dilemma of whether to maintain the principle of 
non-intervention or provide more direct support for private enterprise in Latin 
America. 
 
Economic Interests 
It appeared that Marshall abandoned the intricate mediation of the principle of 
reciprocity in favour of more direct protection of the interests of US private enterprise 
in the Western Hemisphere. He focused on promoting the ‘self-help, cooperation and 
internal stabilisation measures’ that would support these interests. Acknowledgement 
of overstretched resources even shifted the authority for ongoing negotiations over the 
Marshall Plan from economic planners to economic liberals.1 US representatives 
emphasised that European leaders must accept the “American essentials” of private 
enterprise and self-help to assure Congressional authorisation. Within days of being 
sent to Paris by Marshall to conclude negotiations on the European Recovery Program, 
Kennan decided that it would be impossible for the US to agree to genuine cooperation 
with European leaders in reconstructing their economies. He wrote to Marshall 
informing the Secretary that ‘this would mean that we listen to all that the Europeans 
had to say, but in the end we would not ask them, we would just tell them what they 
would get.’2 US investment in European stabilisation gave it the right, even the duty, to 
unilaterally demand internal adjustments. 
 
The influence of economic liberals became more evident in US economic planning in the 
Western Hemisphere. Marshall certainly considered the only important questions left in 
inter-American relations to be those of business.3 This belief also pervaded amongst 
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many of the officials within the higher echelons of the State Department and Foreign 
Service; a faith in the role of private enterprise ensured active recruitment from the 
business sector.4 Marshall had selected William Pawley - the Ambassador in Rio de 
Janeiro and widely renowned as a staunch defender of narrow US private interests – to 
shape the State Department approach on issues of inter-American economic 
cooperation at Bogotá.5 In making his preparations for Bogotá, Pawley consulted with 
US companies and trade councils operating within Latin America.6 One Brazilian 
academic criticised him for not knowing ‘a single man of letters, only businessmen;’ 
these same business contacts regarded the Ambassador as ‘the best we’ve ever had.’7 
Pawley adopted a particularly tough position at the Bogotá Conference during 
negotiations over a new inter-American economic agreement. He pushed the Latin 
Americans to end restrictions and taxation on the profitable ventures of US private 
investors. Pawley also threatened to completely withdraw the US from negotiations if 
the Latin American delegates refused to include a clause in the agreement that 
demanded ‘any expropriation shall be accompanied by payment of fair compensation in 
a prompt, adequate, and effective manner.’  
 
It is not evident that Marshall rejected a more comprehensive economic approach in the 
Western Hemisphere on principle alone however. The reluctance of Congress to 
appropriate funds for any government-sponsored assistance programs left the 
consolidation of private enterprise as the only solution for Marshall to support Latin 
American economic development.8 Truman had even needed to emphasise the primary 
role of private finance capital to secure the additional budget for the Export-Import 
Bank.9 Marshall attempted to persuade Latin American delegates at both Rio de Janeiro 
and Bogotá to restructure their economies in order to create more favourable climates 
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that could attract private investment in the knowledge that it remained the best means 
to fill the gap in necessary finance capital.10 ‘Foreign capital will naturally gravitate most 
readily to countries where it is accorded fair and equitable treatment,’ he told the 
delegates at the Bogotá Conference. Marshall even ventured so far as to suggest that 
such measures had been agreed upon as the natural path for economic development in 
the Economic Charter of the Americas signed at the Chapultepec Conference in 1945. 
 
Despite these efforts to support US private interests the US representatives negotiating 
over a new Economic Agreement showed willing to offer concessions to their Latin 
American counterparts where possible. They agreed to measures that would prevent 
severe fluctuations in the prices of raw materials and establish restrictions on private 
enterprise to avoid the most flagrant abuses by US corporations.11 Latin American 
delegates also managed to extract guarantees that foreign private investment would be 
made in the objective of the development and welfare of the recipient country as well as 
profit. They even managed to secure assurances from the US delegation that a more 
comprehensive Economic Charter would be finalised in a later conference to be held in 
Buenos Aires. 
 
The dissatisfaction directed against even these limited concessions from Congressional 
leaders demonstrated the pressure exerted on Marshall and the State Department. In 
his understanding that ‘[n]o policy, whether foreign or domestic, has the slightest 
chance of being effective unless it enjoys popular support,’ Marshall agreed to the 
demands made by Congress to readdress each of the concessions made at Bogotá.12 The 
State Department consequently filed a memorandum to the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council outlining all of their reservations on the Economic Agreement.13 
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Although these initial steps still failed to appease Congress, they ultimately ensured that 
‘the political achievements of the Good Neighbour Policy were not matched in the 
economic field.’14 These measures caused further frustration for Latin American leaders 
at a time that an ongoing decline in dollar balances only threatened destabilisation of 
the region. The CIA warned that the deteriorating economic situation left the region 
teetering ever closer to the brink of revolution.15  
 
Economic Sovereignty 
The absence of a program of economic development undermined the principle of 
reciprocity and left Latin American governments critical of the US commitment to the 
Good Neighbour Policy. The State Department only compounded this as they struggled 
to make a clear distinction between promoting shared values of private enterprise and 
appearing to support the interests of specific businesses. The pervasive influence of 
foreign businesses in the political and social life of many Latin American countries that 
continued to suffer from dismal economic conditions led regional leaders increasingly 
to identify this as a clear violation of their national sovereignty. The Guatemalan 
government lodged complaints against the US Ambassador, Richard C. Patterson, after 
he began to lobby in support of the United Fruit Company almost immediately after his 
appointment.  The Cuban government laid out more similar accusations against the new 
US Ambassador in Havana following his defence of US sugar companies operating in the 
country. At the Rio Conference the Cuban representatives of the administration of Dr. 
Ramón Grau San Martín had gone so far as to accuse the US of using the Good Neighbour 
Policy to pursue economic colonialism. In what Marshall described as ‘a very aggressive 
speech,’ the head of the delegation, Guillermo Belt, proposed that the Rio Treaty include 
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provisions against the economic intervention being practiced by the US.16 He argued 
that unilateral economic measures undermined the sovereignty of Latin American 
Republics and constituted a threat to the stability of the region. The Cubans continued 
to argue that economic intervention remained an enduring feature of the Good 
Neighbour Policy.17 
 
The commitment to non-intervention and sovereignty certainly appeared not to 
preclude the State Department from intervening on behalf of private economic 
interests. The long-standing refusal of the Cuban government to honour debts or 
protect the interests of US businesses led to escalating coercive measures from the State 
Department.18 The inclusion of Section 202(e) in the US Sugar Act of 1948 invited 
protests from Belt as the Cuban Ambassador in Washington that the US sought to use its 
economic power to undermine their national sovereignty. The section threatened to 
withhold vital quota allocations from Cuba if the government continued to deny ‘fair 
and equitable treatment to the nationals of the US, its commerce, navigation or 
industry.’ Belt claimed that this constituted economic intervention that violated the Act 
of Chapultepec and represented a new Platt Amendment.19 Marshall defended Section 
202(e) in a letter assuring Truman that the clause represented neither a purposeful 
design for economic aggression undermining Cuban sovereignty nor any shift in US 
policy.20 Numerous officials across Washington did not share his conviction however. 
Planners for the Havana Conference regarded Section 202(e) to be in violation of the 
principles to be established in the International Trade Organisation. Senators Connally 
and Vandenberg also expressed concerns that the Sugar Act had turned Congress into a 
collection agency for American creditors and ushered a return to gunboat diplomacy. 
Senator Dionisio Chávez (D-NM), the first Hispanic in the US Senate, complained that 
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Section 202(e) would ‘undermine any conference, be it held in Buenos Aires, be it held 
in Rio.’  
 
The lack of cohesion within Washington made it difficult to respond to Cuban 
accusations that economic intervention remained an endemic feature of the Good 
Neighbour Policy. The mounting criticism from the Latin American media could not be 
ignored and ultimately Marshall decided to reverse his position on the Sugar Act. 
Although Latin American delegations eventually decided to reject the Cuban proposal 
for economic sovereignty at the Rio Conference by 15 votes to 5, the shift in US position 
had not prevented statements of support.21 The Latin American delegates identified the 
economic threat to their sovereignty, but representatives like Jaime Torres Bodet 
acknowledged that ‘it was difficult enough to define political aggression’ and that ‘it 
would be impossible to define satisfactorily economic aggression.’22 Many of the Latin 
American delegates also considered it necessary to reject the radicalism of the Cuban 
proposal in the hope that it would encourage more constructive engagement with the 
Truman administration. It soon became evident that their optimism had no sound 
foundation. 
 
The State Department continued to push Cuba to protect US private interests operating 
in the country. Officials did recognise the need for a cautious approach as much of the 
region regarded US relations with Cuba as a barometer of the Good Neighbour Policy 
and economic aggression would be condemned as symbolic of a disregard for all Latin 
American welfare. This made it difficult for Marshall to find a suitable response as Cuba 
became more aggressive in asserting authority over its economy. After Butler 
encouraged an immediate response from the State Department to the authorisation by 
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the Cuban government for the seizure of the US-owned Tanamo Sugar Mill, Marshall 
refused to force a resolution on commercial disagreements.23 ‘This coercion would give 
rise to unfavourable repercussions in Cuba and the other America Republics,’ added 
Armour.24 A memorandum prepared in the State Department however, warned that the 
Grau administration sought to take advantage of principle of non-intervention in the 
Good Neighbour Policy in order to leave commercial commitments unfulfilled and 
discriminate against US businesses.25 Although Marshall continued to assert his own 
commitment to Cuban national sovereignty, he wasted no time in appealing to Grau to 
reverse the seizure decision.26 
 
The Cuban government felt that the actions taken by Marshall represented less the 
promotion of the general principles of private enterprise than intervention in support of 
the interests of a specific US company. The State Department decision to deny any 
increase in quotas or support of credit applications ultimately forced the Cuban 
government to overturn their original position. The new Cuban President, Carlos Prío 
Socarrás, immediately promised security for US private investment.27 The President and 
Counsel of Tanamo Sugar also sent Marshall their ‘warm appreciation’ for his efforts on 
their behalf, which they regarded as ‘responsible in large measure for the satisfactory 
solution which has been reached.’28  
 
The Foreign Policy Association warned the State Department at the start of the year 
against continuing this economic approach as it would push more Latin American 
leaders to find their own solutions to the problems in the region.29 The fears became 
reality after the disappointment on the issue of financial assistance at the Bogotá 
Conference and the persistence of US economic intervention prompted a number of 
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Latin American to develop their own theoretical explanation on economic development. 
A few months after the UN authorised a Chilean proposal to establish an agency to 
establish new approaches to Latin American economic problems, the Comisión 
Económica para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America - ECLA) held 
its first session in Santiago. The economists at the session identified the US as the major 
impediment to Latin American economic development. They targeted the classical US 
explanations of development from the likes of Talcott Parsons that argued for the 
penetration of US capital into primary export sectors to promote economic growth. The 
economist Raúl Prebisch led criticisms of the US model of stages of progress in 
modernisation and argued that Latin American dependency on exporting one or two 
principal commodities prohibited development.30 He advocated instead a significant 
increase in the role of the State in asserting authority over the economy in order to 
promote industrialisation that could substitute manufactured imports from the US.  
 
Although the ECLA deferred a comprehensive solution until the second session 
scheduled for Havana in early 1949, it recommended further discussion of the problems 
at the forthcoming inter-American economic conference at Buenos Aires.31 The State 
Department could not find a coherent response to this challenge. As Latin American 
leaders increasingly considered assuming more authority over their economies in order 
to address their persistent problems, Marshall could only continue to extol the virtues 
of private enterprise. The State Department could only consider supporting the 
cancellation, or at least postponement, of the Buenos Aires Conference as economic 
relations continued to deteriorate.32  
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Economic Intervention 
Some prominent leaders from the private sector in the US felt that regaining Latin 
American cooperation in the principle of reciprocity required more than the ‘wearisome 
repetition of our goodwill intentions.’33 Several progressive businessmen felt it 
necessary to sell the benefits of private enterprise before Latin American leaders 
rejected them altogether. The failure of the State Department to undertake this task led 
many of them to establish their own direct links with Latin American governments.34 
Those former architects of the Good Neighbour Policy that had moved into the private 
sector led efforts to promote capitalism in the Western Hemisphere. Adolf A. Berle Jr. 
warned that the US had ‘simply forgotten about Latin America.’35 He used his position 
on the board of directors for the American Molasses Company, which was prominent in 
the Caribbean sugar trade, to arrange credits from private US banks for several Latin 
American countries. In doing so he continued to highlight the contributions made by US 
corporations in Latin American social progress.36 As a consultant to a number of 
businesses dealing in Latin America, Spruille Braden also diverted his attention to 
promoting the free enterprise system.37 
 
Nelson Rockefeller emerged as the pioneer of private entrepreneurship in Latin 
American economic development however. He had recognised the importance of 
recruiting influential US companies for selling the American way of life during his time 
as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and then later as Assistant Secretary as 
Chairman of the Inter-American Development Commission and Corporation. Despite his 
personal ties with a number of corporate leaders through the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Rockefeller often failed in persuading them to set aside their narrow interests 
to build a deeper relationship with Latin America. But the importance of inter-American 
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economic cooperation meant that he continued this work begun in Washington after 
moving back into the private sphere. Although they questioned the motives of “Johnny 
Ten Cents” Rockefeller, many Latin Americans considered his proposals for an 
investment “experiment” to be more appealing as the Truman administration continued 
to neglect their economic problems.38 Rockefeller secured agreements with Latin 
American governments to establish subsidiaries of his International Basic Economy 
Corporation to invest in local production enterprises.39 He expressed confidence that 
the likes of his Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation would cooperate with the State-
run Corporación Venezolano de Fomento as a first of many bridges to be rebuilt between 
the US and Latin America. 
 
The limited nature of these initiatives meant that the State Department faced significant 
criticism from the rest of the private sector dealing with the rise of economic 
nationalism across Latin America. Many business leaders in the US considered the 
pursuit of their economic interests to be seriously hindered by the commitment to non-
intervention made by Marshall. Regular discussions between businessmen at the 
Council on Foreign Relations revealed the animosity towards State Department 
reluctance to intervene on behalf of the interests of private enterprise for the fear of 
undermining the Good Neighbour Policy.40 In many cases the State Department 
regarded the protection of specific business interests to be an internal matter for each 
Latin American country and left the business leaders to undertake their own 
negotiations.41  
 
Despite facing accusations of economic intervention from the Cuban government, the 
State Department also faced conflicting criticism for the failure to offer enough 
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protection to private enterprise from the harsh treatment mete out from the likes of the 
Cuban government. US businessmen considered coercive economic measures to be 
justifiable against governments, like Cuba, that enacted punitive policies towards 
private US enterprise.  The recent experience of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala 
also highlighted the frustrations with the State Department. Although officials from the 
US Embassy protested against the restrictions on private enterprise in Guatemalan 
reforms like the new Labour Code, the State Department refused to act on the appeals of 
the United Fruit Company for direct intervention.42 The State Department continued in 
struggling to reconcile the interests of private enterprise with its wider strategic 
objectives in the Good Neighbour Policy. 
 
The objections to Latin American governments demanding assistance through the 
principle of reciprocity whilst discriminating against US companies soon began to 
extend beyond the private sector however. Sol Bloom complained that US private 
enterprise remained vulnerable to Latin American governments exploiting the State 
Department commitment to non-intervention by refusing to reciprocate the Good 
Neighbour Policy. ‘How could we hope to build a solid structure until we had assurance 
that the ground itself was firm?’43 A State Department official writing in the New York 
Times under the pseudonym “Americus” also criticised the Good Neighbour Policy for 
undermining economic interests: 
‘It is extremely questionable whether very many [Latin American 
nations] have ever believed in our sincerity and altruism in 
proclaiming such a policy as the keystone of our official 
relationship with Latin America, but they have not been backward 
in taking advantage of it and making it mostly a “one-way street” 
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financially and economically. It is all too easy for the Latin 
Americans to accuse us of violating the principles of the Good 
Neighbour Policy when we refuse to grant their requests, but it 
bears little or no weight when the US asks a favour of them. The 
Good Neighbour Policy should not be considered as an end itself 
and should be replaced by the era of “Economic Inter-
Dependability”.’44 
The State Department official considered it necessary to redefine the Good Neighbour 
Policy in terms of intelligent self-interest rather than philanthropy and sentiment. The 
US commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy should be dependent upon quid pro quo 
for Latin American openings to private investment and sound economic methods. A 
demonstration of reciprocity from Latin America would not need a commitment from 
the US to their agenda of economic development however. 
 
The belief that the private sector in the US could better solve the economic problems of 
the Western Hemisphere than the Latin American government proved widespread. The 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin Jr, encapsulated this 
sentiment: 
‘Businessmen approach their problems in a more practical way. 
They patch up the bad holes in the road and get traffic moving. 
Government programs too often abandon the old road and the 
people are left with no thoroughfare whatever while a new one is 
being debated and designed.’45 
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The Chairman of the Electric Bond and Share Company, Curtis E. Calder, also criticised 
Latin American arguments that their underdevelopment required a larger amount of 
government intervention: 
 ‘It is right that government should be concerned about the 
welfare of the citizen. It is not right for government to squander 
the national patrimony on uneconomic projects, or projects which 
can be carried on to better advantage by private enterprise.’46 
The private sector continued to implore the State Department to address the growing 
“misguided nationalism” that barriers to the flow of their capital investment in Latin 
America. 
 
The lack of means available to mediate the competing interests of Latin American 
governments and private enterprise left the State Department as simply an observer of 
many developments in the Western Hemisphere. The incoherence of the strategic 
approach pursued by Marshall appeared in his failure to secure the cooperation of 
private investors in providing the capital necessary for Latin American development. 
Spruille Braden had previously acknowledged the importance of maintaining the 
cooperation of the private sector for US strategic objectives in the Western 
Hemisphere.47 Although he assured business leaders that reciprocity remained at the 
core of the Good Neighbour Policy, even Braden failed to convince them that the 
administration would protect their interests.48  
 
Braden had made it clear that the Truman administration could not return to the 
previous interventionism to support narrow economic interests. He hoped that the 
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private sector would respond to appeals for invest in Latin American development 
framed in terms of defending civilisation:  
‘The job must be done. It should be done primarily by private 
enterprise with all the driving force of competitive democratic 
capitalism rather than by government. But if there is not a 
conscious, coordinated, and effective performance by private 
enterprise, government may be compelled to fill the breach. If we 
are to preserve the “American way of life,” this unhappy 
alternative must be avoided.’49 
Latin America still provided half the return on US foreign private investment after 
Marshall arrived at the State Department. The majority of this outlay had been made 
before the private sector began to perceive Latin America as a poor prospect for new 
ventures.50 Latin American enthusiasm for the principle of reciprocity faded as it 
became clearer that Marshall would not engage their agenda of economic development. 
As Latin American governments increasingly turned to simultaneously extending duties 
and reducing rights of foreign private investors in order to resolve their economic 
problems brought warnings from the National Foreign Trade Council that the emerging 
situation threatened to ‘weaken the business structure of the Western Hemisphere.’51 
Marshall could only restrain this behaviour with appeals to Latin American leaders to 
invite private investment. This relied on guarantees that private investment would be 
forthcoming however. The reaffirmation of the commitment to the principle of non-
intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy from the State Department only meant that 
business leaders became more cautious in their investments. This abject failure of the 
principle of reciprocity ensured that US strategy in the Western Hemisphere under 
Marshall would remain incoherent. 
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Republics ‘may do anything that suits their convenience.’ The conservative feeling of 
some of the business members at Council meetings led to the invitation of Sumner 
Welles to speak and try to make them reconsider the Good Neighbour Policy. See 
Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Study Group on Trends in our Recent Relations with 
Latin America, 08.05.1935, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche  58.  Many 
remained unconvinced. The Council’s various Latin America groups continued to 
consider hemispheric economic relations in the Good Neighbour Policy in some detail. 
Shortly before the Council ended studies in 1947 however, members of the business 
community used a forum on Latin American industrialisation to complain that the 
Truman administration still did not support them in Latin America.  See Minutes of the 
5th Meeting of the Study Group on Industrialisation in Latin America, 14.04.1947, 
Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 143. UFCo’s experience in Guatemala was 
not isolated. The Brazilian seizure of bonds for the Brazilian Railway Company also had 
a damaging effect on the American Chase National Bank that was the trustee of the 
securities. The Bank’s legal representative, Edward G. Miller of the law firm Sullivan and 
Cromwell, requested US government intervention. The State Department suggested 
however, that although it would support a demand for the return of securities, it could 
not be expected to intervene in support of the stability of US investments. See 823.51/6-
1247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs to 
the Ambassador in Brazil,” 17.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)  
41 One clear example is the decision of the State Department not to actively lobby the 
Uruguayan government of Luis Batlle Berres when its proposed monopolisation by the 
state petroleum corporation, ANCAP, threatened the position of American petroleum 
companies. See Division of Research for the American Republics, Office of Intelligence 
Research, Department of State, “Relations of the Uruguayan Government Petroleum 
Corporation with the Foreign Oil Companies,” 31.01.1948 (DDRS) 
 187 
                                                                                                                                                                            
42 Eugenio Silva Peña, who Acevedo was standing in for, had been visited a month 
earlier by Robert Newbegin, for a discussion on the new Labor Code. Newbegin 
highlighted discriminatory practices in the new laws against the United Fruit Company 
(UFCo). He pointed out the contributions that UFCo made to the Guatemalan economy 
and suggested that the treatment it was receiving might not only force it to withdraw 
from the country, but may also make other US investors apprehensive about 
approaching Guatemala. See 814.504/8-447, Department of State, “Memorandum of 
Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs 
(Newbegin),” 30.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII).   When Arévalo refused to retract 
the discriminatory articles in the Labor Code, it prompted Lovett, as Acting Secretary, to 
order the US Embassy to remind the Guatemalan leader that they would have a general 
adverse effect on US business interests and could damage relations between the two 
countries.42 814.6156/11-2247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary 
of State to the Embassy in Guatemala,” 22.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). This was 
not a return to the days of automatic government protection for corporate interests. 
UFCo urged further intervention from the State Department, but the Office of American 
Republic Affairs would only formally hear their complaints as they recognised similar 
principles of discrimination were being used in the US See Gleijeses, Piero, Shattered 
Hope (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1991) p. 95.  Newbegin declined to act any 
further on UFCo’s behalf and left it to state its own case to the Guatemalan President. 
814.504/8-447, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of 
Central America and Panama, Affairs,” 04.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The 
divisions between the State Department and UFCo were not  a new development 
however. The US Embassy in Guatemala had even been highly critical of UFCo’s 
monopolistic practices during the inter-war years.42 See Dosal, Paul J., Doing Business 
with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit, 1899-1944 (London: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1993) p. 206 
43 It seemed that the charge of 40 cents for milk added to free coffee at the Rio 
Conference appeared to be the final straw for Bloom. ‘This is too brazen,’ he fumed at 
symbolic example of Latin American attempts to take advantage of the US ‘When I am 
gypped, I want to be gypped by experts, not robbers! He recalled an old saying: ‘It was 
fun to be a sucker if you could afford it.’ The Congressman believed that the US could not 
afford to be misused. Time, 25.08.1947; Bloom, Sol, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1948) p. 285 
44 New York Times, 28.03.1948 
45 New York Times, 23.09.1948 
46 New York Times, 22.09.1948 
47 Braden told the National Foreign Trade Convention that although the American 
economy was suffering from the large debts amassed during the war, the suffering of 
the Latin American economies must not be ignored. He warned against the ‘selfish 
interests’ that would come to the fore as the unanimity of purpose prevailing during the 
war disappeared. ‘Rising standards of living are a powerful bulwark to the institutions 
of freedom and popular government,’ he told them, ‘and these institutions, as we know 
too well, are stones in the arch of peace.’ Cooperation from the Latin Americans would 
be guaranteed with swift action in the post-war honeymoon period. ‘We start today not 
with a clean slate,’ Braden said, ‘but with a slate cleaner than it may be again for a long 
time.’ See Address by Assistant Secretary Braden, “Foreign Trade Reconstruction - The 
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Americas,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XIII, No.334, November 18th 1945) p. 
793 
48 Braden publicly announced that the US ‘should do everything in [its] power to help 
[its] American neighbours to increase industrialisation along sound lines and to achieve 
higher standards of living.’ But reassured business leaders however, that economic 
strategy would be based upon ‘first self-respect and then mutual respect among 
American Republics.’ In summary: ‘We offer our friendship and cooperation on a 
reciprocal basis.’  See Radio Broadcast with Assistant Secretary Braden, Director of the 
Office of American Republic Affairs, Ellis O. Briggs, and the Director of NBC University of 
the Air, Sterling Fisher, “What is Our Inter-American Policy?” State Department Bulletin 
(Volume XIV, No.341, January 6th 1946) p. 26 
49 Braden’s desperation to recruit the private sector was more evident in an address to 
the Executives’ Club of Chicago. ‘The selective processes of society's evolution through 
the ages,’ he declared, ‘have proved the institution of private property ranks with those 
of religion and the family as a bulwark of civilization.’ He drew economic strategy into a 
discourse of bipolar struggle as he told of the gross inefficiencies of totalitarian 
economic state management that had ‘left the single man weak and subjected to such 
barbaric conditions as have shocked all civilized peoples.’ He warned that if the US did 
not act to improve living conditions in Latin America, ‘proponents of extremist “isms” 
will fill the vacuum with their specious promises, which aim to create such confusion 
and upheaval as will destroy both private enterprise and the human rights and civil 
liberties we hold so dear.’ See Address by Assistant Secretary Braden, “Private 
Enterprise in the Development of the Americas,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XV, 
No.377, September 22nd 1946) p. 539 
50 The State Department had prepared, in particular, for private investment to stimulate 
Latin American production of raw materials and crops. See Siekmeier, James F., Aid, 
Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (New York: Edwin Meller Press, 1999) p. 70 
51 Time, 12.01.1948; New York Times, 22.03.1948 
III. (RE)PRESENTATIONS of THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
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7. (RE)PRESENTATIONS OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
In shaping his strategy of containment Marshall sought to project the Western 
Hemisphere as a unique and coherent space that demonstrated the solidarity within the 
US sphere of influence. In doing so he presented the Western Hemisphere as ‘a 
sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time.’1 
Marshall identified the inter-American conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá as integral 
to establishing the credibility of this symbolic representation of the Western 
Hemisphere. They would continue a process of integration that moved beyond the 
nation-state towards a conceptualisation of a sovereign space in the Western 
Hemisphere. Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guaranteed the right to 
construct a sovereign sphere of influence in the region, Marshall understood that this 
remained dependent upon the formalisation of inter-American machinery for 
governance. He hoped that successful agreements of the Rio Treaty and the Organic Pact 
of the Inter-American System would together finally establish ‘a harmonious whole 
guaranteeing the social, cultural, and economic progress of the Americas.’ 
 
The significant tensions that emerged during negotiations at Petrópolis and Bogotá 
revealed the lack of harmony in the Western Hemisphere however. As he took office 
Marshall received warning from George H. Butler of the magnitude of the task of 
building a coherent inter-American system: 
 ‘If the American Republics wish to handle their affairs under a 
mutually satisfactory arrangement with the United Nations, then 
they must make the inter-American system a live force devoted to 
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the attainment of the general welfare, peace and security of the 
peoples of the Americas. Problems of armament and hemisphere 
defense, of the duties as well as the rights of states, of the 
protection of individual rights and civil liberties, and of real 
freedom of information in all countries must be faced and 
workable solutions found which will be genuinely supported by a 
substantial majority of the American nations.’2 
It is perhaps notable that Marshall left Braden to respond. Braden agreed that ‘the 
difficulty at present would be to obtain the requisite support of a substantial majority of 
the American nations.’ As he travelled to the inter-American conferences the problem 
that Marshall faced was that he could only imagine an organic and coherent Western 
Hemisphere. In order to project this imaginary into the minds of others in the region 
and outside however, Marshall depended on representations and re-presentations of 
the Western Hemisphere and the dangers confronting it. 
 
Writing and Performing the Western Hemisphere 
An imagined community in the Western Hemisphere united around common interests 
and a shared identity relied foremost on the enduring myth of a separate and sovereign 
geographical space.3 Although political leaders from Thomas Jefferson through to 
Marshall had claimed the Western Hemisphere to be a ‘separate division of the globe,’ a 
State Department cartographer, Sam Whittemore Boggs, writing at the end of the war, 
claimed that it is ‘inadvisably called “western” and does not deserve the appellation 
“hemisphere.”’4 The late discovery of the Americas by the European powers and the 
Atlantic Ocean separating the Old and New Worlds ensured some persistence of a 
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distinct geographical space in the Western Hemisphere, but the frontiers were not 
necessary ones. He pointed out that the US could as easily redraw boundaries to find 
itself within the same hemisphere as Europe or even Asia. Despite the clear importance 
of spatial constructions in the Monroe Doctrine’s declaration of spheres of influence, 
Boggs noted that the concept of a Western Hemisphere had not featured. The 
multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Rio Treaty identified this sphere of 
influence within the Western Hemisphere, but the disputed and irregular boundaries 
drawn up only illustrated the abstract and unstable nature of this space.  
 
The State Department continued to acknowledge the important sense of community 
provided by geographic space during the development of the inter-American system; 
but officials also recognised the overdetermination of the borders of their “land”. The 
absence of a corresponding and relevant Eastern Hemisphere meant that the ideological 
construction of a Western Hemisphere in opposition to Europe was not sufficient 
condition for creating a regional organisation.5 A common hemispheric identity could be 
found however, in the development of a shared way of life. President Truman closed the 
Rio Conference declaring that hemispheric exceptionalism was founded not upon 
geographical proximity, but on the ‘common interests, common principles, and common 
ideals’ of the peoples of the Americas.6 The differences within the region that became 
evident during the inter-American conferences however, only revealed this 
representation of a clear boundary demarcating a distinct way of life and identity within 
the Western Hemisphere as an object of a historical “forcing”.7  
 
In the absence of a natural community, the Rio and Bogotá Conferences became 
essential elements in the function of the myth of an essential and shared hemispheric 
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identity. The written agreements continued to articulate the declaration in the Act of 
Chapultepec that the ‘unity of the people of the Americas is indivisible.’8 The statement 
made by the US Ambassador to the UN, Warren R. Austin, after the signing of the Rio 
Treaty encapsulated this writing of hemispheric identity: Pan American solidarity is not 
created by this treaty,’ he noted. It was after all, ‘a living spirit that animates the peoples 
and governments of this Hemisphere and holds them together in bonds of interest and 
human aspiration.’ But the Rio Treaty was significant as ‘a step forwards,’ he added. ‘It 
formalises the spirit.’9 Senator Vandenberg similarly welcomed the inter-American 
agreements for their transformation of hemispheric solidarity ‘from an ideal into a 
reality.’10 But the written declaration, in fact, remained only a symbolic representation 
of a myth, rather than a genuine construction of hemispheric solidarity. 
 
The inter-American conferences not only continued to write the myth of a common 
hemispheric spirit, but also consolidated a shared identity through the performativity of 
this imagined regional community. An identification of common hemispheric interests 
and ideals emerged less as a representation of the inner convictions of regional leaders 
than their performances at the “ritual carnivals” of the regular Pan-American 
Conferences.11 In meeting together at Petrópolis and Bogotá and acting in the name of 
hemispheric spirit, delegates did not simply imagine the Western Hemisphere – they 
invented it as a perennial community.12 The objectification of hemispheric solidarity in 
the inter-American meetings replaced the need for any genuine belief from the regional 
leaders.13 
 
The ritual annual celebration of Pan-American Day on April 1st further performed this 
hemispheric commonality between the intermittent inter-American meetings. President 
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Hoover had issued a Proclamation in 1930 recommending American citizens to observe 
the day with ‘appropriate ceremonies’ that would give, 
‘expression to the spirit of continental solidarity and to the 
sentiments of cordiality and friendly feeling which the 
Government and people of the US entertain toward the peoples 
and Governments of the other republics of the American 
Continent.’14 
Whilst Marshall led the US delegation at Bogotá, the Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs, George V. Allen, declared Pan-American Day to be an enduring symbol of the 
solidarity within the Western Hemisphere.15 He also emphasised the “fact” of inter-
American friendship self-evident in the Pan-American agreements.  
 
The negotiations and ultimate conclusions of the inter-American conferences created an 
illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than emerging as the result of 
a coherent regional identity, the conferences at Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá actually 
contributed in performing and writing this identity. The Rio Treaty and Organic Pact of 
Bogotá would stand in for an absent regional solidarity and maintain the myth of a 
sovereign Western Hemisphere. 
  
 Sacrificing the Western Hemisphere 
Marshall attempted to persuade Latin American delegates at Bogotá once again that the 
US could not be expected to honour earlier commitments to economic assistance. He 
requested that his regional counterparts show some ‘understanding and cooperation,’ 
whilst the US shoulder the ‘heavy responsibilities’ of confronting the ‘determined and 
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open opposition’ of the Soviet Union in Western Europe. He insisted that Latin America 
should hold the Soviet Union responsible for the prolongation of their 
underdevelopment. President Truman reaffirmed this message on signing the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1948 a few days later – he announced the commitment of further 
funds for European reconstruction as ‘America’s answer to the challenge to the free 
world.’16 The US Ambassador in Bogotá, Willard L. Beaulac, also suggested in a 
newspaper interview that the defence of civilisation and the free way of life in Western 
Europe through the Marshall Plan provided evidence of US altruism and a guarantee of 
future Latin American economic development.17 Although the evocation of this Cold 
War discourse intended to be served as a reminder to Latin American leaders of their 
shared interest in the defence of a Free World, it only fuelled expectations that the 
reconstruction of Western Europe could no longer receive priority over the economic 
needs and standards of living of the Western Hemisphere.  
 
Marshall had also constructed his Good Neighbour Policy in inter-American relations, in 
large part, upon the image of the US as an equal and cooperative American Republic 
within the particularity of the New World. In confronting the threat of the Soviet Union 
however, he projected the US as the leader, defender, and liberator of the Free World.  
 
The reference to the exceptional role of the US established a subordinate place for Latin 
America in its identification with both the Free World and New World. This became 
more problematic when the idea that the US occupied a privileged position in protecting 
the interests of the Western Hemisphere extended from the security sphere to the 
economic sphere. Some considered assistance for Latin American economic 
development to be less a project of inter-American cooperation than a benevolent 
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contribution from the US protector. After their experience at the Havana Conference, 
Latin American leaders only considered Marshall’s speech at Bogotá to be further 
evidence of the Truman administration’s economic approach that had determined their 
“place in the larger community of the Western world” to be one on the economic 
periphery. Walter Lippmann cautioned Latin America that it needed to learn to ‘take its 
place in the larger community of the Western world.’18  
 
Marshall considered the successful conclusions of the inter-American conferences at 
Petrópolis and Bogotá to be ‘the most encouraging, the most stimulating action since the 
close of hostilities.’19 He did not simply seek the naturalisation of the Western 
Hemisphere however. Marshall considered the integration of the region into a coherent 
political space primarily as an effective measure in the broader global struggle against 
the Soviet Union. He sought to project the symbolic example of a coherent hemispheric 
community in his strategy of containment. On signing the Rio Treaty he declared:  
‘Today, at Rio de Janeiro our concern is with mutual defense and 
security; tomorrow at Bogotá, we shall go on to reorganize and 
strengthen our inter-American system and to make it a more 
effective agency of cooperation in the pursuit of our common 
interests. With good will and mutual respect for one another, both 
of the objectives will be attained. And the world will learn, I hope, 
a great lesson.’  
Together with the OAS Charter, the Rio Treaty ‘set an example to a distracted world in 
the maintenance of peace among neighbour states under an accepted system of law that 
assures justice and equality to all nations, large and small.’ Marshall found reassurance 
that unanimous agreement on a model of international cooperation would have an 
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important effect on the rest of the world during the psychological battle of the Cold 
War.20 A successful demonstration that ‘nations who really want peace can have peace’ 
assisted in the ‘projection of American political, social and cultural values as 
universal.’21 
 
In his efforts to project a shining example of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, 
Marshall came to rely on a discourse of exceptionalism. Other members of the US 
delegations to Petrópolis and Bogotá shared this emphasis on an exceptional example 
provided in the region. Vandenberg conferred similar praise for the conclusion of a 
‘tremendously significant and progressive pattern for others to follow.’22 He would 
ensure the swift ratification of agreements that provided an ‘example worthy of high 
emulation’ and represented ‘sunlight in a dark world.’23 In his address to the closing 
session in Petrópolis, Truman also declared the successful realisation of a symbolic 
model. ‘Our nations,’ he announced, ‘have provided an example of good neighbourliness 
and international amity to the rest of the world.’24 
 
Despite the clear differences with the US delegation that emerged at Petrópolis and 
Bogotá, Latin American leaders still shared the commitment to establish a symbolic 
example in the inter-American system.25 Latin American delegates at the inter-
American conferences even acknowledged the duty to the rest of the civilised world that 
remained a central feature of the discourse of exceptionalism. Opening the Rio 
Conference, the Brazilian President, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, appealed to delegates to 
cooperate in building a universal example of solidarity.26 Oswaldo Aranha, the head of 
the Brazilian delegation and the outgoing President of the United Nations General 
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Assembly, identified the Bogotá Conference as an important step in formalising the 
region’s shining example to the rest of the world: 
‘The contribution of the Americas in the field of international 
organization cannot be disregarded by those who aim to build a 
durable peace structure for the world. Indeed, the statesmen who 
are endeavoring to develop our present world organization have a 
great deal to learn from the American experience. For the 
Americas have anticipated the international organization of the 
future.’27 
Even the Cuban Ambassador, Guillermo Belt, described by one US official as a left-wing 
opponent of the Rio Conference, noted their success in providing a ‘democratic example 
to Europe.’28 
 
This shared identification of an exceptional community and the commitment to building 
a shining example for the rest of the world did not establish a coherent idea of the 
Western Hemisphere however. Differing interpretations between the US and Latin 
American delegations on the meaning of the Western Hemisphere in the world revealed 
a significant paradox in the discourse of exceptionalism. 
 
Marshall and the US delegates imagined the model of the Western Hemisphere as 
boundless; the consolidation of solidarity in the region only provided a solid foundation 
from which to build bridges to Europe that could be used to spread the values of a 
shared American way of life.  The “chosen people” of the Western Hemisphere had a 
responsibility to safeguard civilisation at the European frontier. ‘Crimes against peace 
and justice cannot be confined within latitudes and longitudes,’ Vandenberg declared; 
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the ‘creation of our “region” should imply no lack of interest in world peace outside that 
“region” nor condone war crimes against humanity wherever they occur.’29 Although 
the Monroe Doctrine had initially declared a lack of interest in action outside the 
Western Hemisphere, a State Department specialist in international organisation, 
William Sanders, noted that the US had long discarded this self-restraining injunction to 
seek involvement with conflicts abroad. The multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine 
meant that the entire region had an obligation to contain extra-hemispheric threats. 
Both Marshall and Truman appealed to the Latin American delegates to accept this duty 
in securing the peace in Europe.  
 
Although they shared the concept of the Western Hemisphere as both sovereign and 
exceptional imagined by Marshall, the Latin American delegates also imagined the 
meaning of this community and the obligations of the Monroe Doctrine as limited. Such 
different interpretations revealed a significant paradox in the discourse of hemispheric 
exceptionalism. On the one hand, the Latin American delegates recognised their duty to 
construct a “citty upon the hill” for Europe and the rest of the world to imitate; but on 
the other hand, they simultaneously identified the European Other as an impediment to 
the universal values shared in a common American way of life.30 One Latin American 
delegate typified this attitude:  
‘If all those Europeans conferences had succeeded, this one 
wouldn't amount to much. Indeed, many of the delegates pinned 
hopes of success in developing a model of cooperation where 
Europeans had previously failed.  Maybe you think this conference 
won't be exciting, but it will be-it's almost our last hope.’31 
 200 
The deterioration of the prospects for peace elsewhere in the world only galvanised 
identification with the affirmation in the OAS Charter of ‘the historic mission of America 
is to offer to man a land of liberty [emphasis added].’ 
 
The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres Bodet, underlined their shared ‘duty to 
mankind to ensure that the inter-American system served as a bridge of world 
conciliation and hope.’32 The Latin American willingness to build a bridge to the Old 
World would be limited to those seeking the ideals of freedom to cross to the New 
World. The Chilean Foreign Minister, Dr. Juvenal Hernández, declared the importance of 
the inter-American system as a refuge for all those on the side of democracy and liberty 
in the bipolar conflict.33 Their priority at Petrópolis and Bogotá was to protect universal 
values through the strengthening of an exceptional hemispheric particularity. 
 
The Truman administration sought to persuade Latin Americans to defer their own 
economic development in order for the US to assist Europe however. Truman described 
Latin American problems of development as ‘small in contrast with the struggle for life 
itself that engrosses the people of Europe’ and even hoped that they would assist in the 
rehabilitation of war torn Europe.34 He appealed to Latin American delegates to identify 
their exceptional hemispheric community with a sense of Messianic Duty through the 
evocation of themes of sacrifice and challenge common to the idea of salvation: 
‘The Old World is exhausted, its civilization imperilled. Its people 
are suffering. They are confused and filled with fears for the 
future. Their hope must lie in this New World of ours. It is for us, 
the young and the strong, to erect the bulwarks which will protect 
mankind from the horrors of war-forever. The US seeks world 
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peace - the peace of free men. I know that you stand with us. 
United, we can constitute the greatest single force in the world for 
the good of humanity. We approach our task with resolution and 
courage, firm in the faith of our Lord whose will it is that there 
shall be Peace on Earth. We cannot be dissuaded, and we shall not 
be diverted, from our efforts to achieve His will.’35 
The Truman administration effectively sought to inspire in the Latin Americans a 
similar “commitment to a commitment” that Kennan asked of the American people in 
his X article. Although Latin American delegates responded to appeals to hemispheric 
exceptionalism they continued to interpret this in terms of an exemplar region rather 
than accepting the US themes of sacrifice and Mission. The conflicting interpretations of 
hemispheric exceptionalism simply rationalised the divergent priorities of the US and 
Latin American delegations at Petrópolis and Bogotá. 
 
(Re)inventing the Western Hemisphere 
Despite the evident asymmetry of their relationship with the US, the Latin American 
leaders recognised the imaginary of geographic space – an exceptional land of liberty – 
as a shared site of struggle to shape their own agenda. The inter-American conferences 
at Petrópolis and Bogotá provided a forum to find not only ‘the best means for achieving 
[a] common goal,’ but also to struggle over certain names – the meanings of America, 
the New World, the Western Hemisphere and the “founding myth” of the Monroe 
Doctrine.36 The rearticulation of these names provided ideological legitimacy for the 
different agendas of the US and Latin American delegations.  
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The Truman administration sought to re-articulate these meanings to simultaneously 
project a positive image of the US relationship with its neighbours and mobilise Latin 
America in a commitment to action in Europe. The multilateralisation of the Monroe 
Doctrine would maintain the imaginary of an exceptional community in the New World. 
‘This Western Hemisphere of ours is usually referred to as the New World,’ Truman 
announced; ‘that it is the New World is clearer today than ever before.’37 This would 
provide a demonstration of the benign intentions of the US in the world. ‘Everything we 
do here,’ Vandenberg declared at Petrópolis, ‘is devoid of the remotest thought of 
conquest or imperialism and is dedicated solely to the orderly pursuit of international 
justice and security.’38 The Truman administration also hoped that the shining example 
of sovereignty and cooperation would also awaken a Messianic Duty in Latin America. 
‘The Western Hemisphere cannot alone assure world peace,’ Truman reminded his 
Latin American counterparts, ‘but without the Western Hemisphere no peace is 
possible.’39 
 
Such names were not devoid of established meanings and assumptions however.40 The 
use of an established discourse of the Western Hemisphere relied on an enduring 
dichotomy of a New World constituted in common negation to an Old World in Europe 
characterised by conflict, imperialism, and an inability to identify with the ideals of 
peace and cooperation. The integration of Europe into the US sphere of influence 
created the need to redefine this antagonistic relationship between the New and Old 
Worlds.41  
 
In order to maintain the imaginary of a separate community in the Western Hemisphere 
the Truman administration sought to re-articulate the dichotomous construction 
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between the New and Old Worlds as a new agonistic relationship rather than 
abandoning it altogether. The task would not be easy however. The Roosevelt 
administration had previously struggled to identify and unite ‘democratically oriented 
nations of the Western Hemisphere’ in a commitment for support for the Allied forces in 
the Second World War without the construction of a monolithic barbarism in Europe.42 
The Truman administration took its cues instead from Spruille Braden who had 
managed to conceal the lack of a homogenous European identity with the use of a 
metaphor of sickness.43 In contrast to the “health” of the Americas, Braden suggested 
that all of Europe was ‘sick unto death.’44 Whilst the fascist elements in Europe ‘suffered 
from the gangrene of its immoral ideology and of its barbarous instruments of 
aggression,’ the non-fascists elements still ‘suffered from the sad ailment called 
“appeasement,” an ailment whose cause is none other than the lack of moral integrity, 
and the prevalence of scepticism and inertia.’ Although Braden adopted this metaphor 
of illness to maintain a separation between the Western Hemisphere and Europe the 
Truman administration could re-articulate it to suggest the need to help their European 
friends that now sought an American remedy for the terminal illness that they finally 
acknowledged. 
 
Although they remained unconvinced by the appeals for assistance to Europe, the Latin 
Americans regarded their commitment to the inter-American system as necessary to 
prevent the US and even other regional adversaries from appropriating the significant 
meanings and names of the Western Hemisphere. Truman’s declaration that ‘the 
Western Hemisphere cannot alone provide world prosperity, but without the Western 
Hemisphere no world prosperity is possible,’ only provoked Latin American fears of a 
return to Atlantic colonialism and economic dependency. A pledge to sovereignty and 
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cooperation in the new OAS also revealed a mutual fear of a worse fate of being cast as 
Other in the “gaze” of the US.45 Despite their clear differences with the US the Latin 
American leaders recognised that negotiations with the Truman administration at 
Petrópolis and Bogotá would draw them back into an engagement with their agenda 
and provide them some influence through demands for the demonstration of the stated 
ideals of the Western Hemisphere.46 They could convey to Marshall the significant 
political, economic and cultural schisms in the region.  
 
The projection of an imaginary of the Western Hemisphere as an established organic 
and stable social community remained a central feature of Marshall’s strategic vision of 
containment. Although the identification of the Western Hemisphere with a discourse of 
exceptionalism could only establish an illusion of coherence, the importance of this 
construction did lead Marshall to dismiss the significance of the regional tensions that 
became more evident between Petrópolis and Bogotá. In order to remain attached to 
this construction however, Marshall would ultimately come to identify the primary 
threat to his strategic objective of regional solidarity as coming from outside the 
imagined community of the Western Hemisphere.  
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8. (RE)PRESENTATIONS OF DANGER 
 
The representation of an exceptional Western Hemisphere could guarantee neither a 
genuine inter-American solidarity nor a larger commitment from Latin America to 
sacrifice its own agenda in order for the US to fight the Cold War. The performative 
nature of the inter-American conferences could not even fix a stable identity of the 
Western Hemisphere. This is perhaps no surprise. Representations of a danger 
emanating from Europe had been a more important impetus for regional integration in 
the past. The reinvention of the relationship with Europe had removed much of the 
urgency for securing the region from external threats however. The imperative for 
collective security could be fully invoked even with the identification of the new threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. The danger to the Western Hemisphere simply did not 
appear credible.  
 
A gradual shift in the representations of danger between the inter-American 
conferences allowed Marshall to re-present an imaginary of the Western Hemisphere 
however. A growing realisation of the possibilities for a shift from psychological Cold 
War to a militarised hot war provoked new fears of the Soviet Union. The US would 
need to mobilise the resources of the Western Hemisphere for the containment of this 
external threat. At the same time however the focus on securing the Western 
Hemisphere moved increasingly towards the neutralisation of the internal threat of 
local Communism.1 Alarm at the growing presence of Communism within the region 
was certainly nothing new. Even as Marshall assumed his post as Secretary of State the 
New York Times reported that ‘Communists had made more progress in Latin America 
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than did the pre-war Fascists and Nazis loyal to Berlin, Rome and Madrid.’2 Time 
magazine similarly reported that ‘there were few Latin American countries in which 
Communists could not point to gains.’3 A rising tide of social unrest established new 
links between Communist subversion and exploitation by the Soviet Union. 
 
Imagining Danger in the Western Hemisphere 
The Truman administration did not perceive any serious Cold War danger in the 
Western Hemisphere in the aftermath of the Rio Conference. After the announcement of 
the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and the finalisation of the Rio Treaty in the 
Western Hemisphere the Policy Planning Staff reported back to Marshall the initial 
success of containment and the increasingly weakened position of the Soviet Union.4 
This success meant that the Policy Planning Staff neglected any serious calculations of 
Soviet objectives in the Western Hemisphere. The Kremlin demonstrated neither the 
intentions nor the capabilities to establish a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. The 
new Central Intelligence Agency sought to fill this vacuum however. Despite sharing the 
general assessments of the Policy Planning Staff, it warned that the Soviet leadership 
still sought to undermine the solidarity of the region.5 The Chargé in Moscow, Edridge 
Durbrow, similarly warned that the successful containment of the Soviet Union in 
Western Europe could lead the Kremlin to turn its attention to the periphery.6 
 
Kennan felt that even if the Soviet leadership did adapt their “design” to turn their focus 
to the periphery their immediate priority would be Asia rather than the Western 
Hemisphere. The rest of the intelligence community also dismissed the idea that Latin 
American figured as a priority in Soviet long-term objectives. The State Department 
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Intelligence Organization doubted that the Soviet Union even held the capabilities to 
achieve such objectives. Military intelligence also forecast that the Soviets could pose no 
threat in the next ten years to the solidarity of the region.7 The State Department 
rejected the assessments of the CIA as simply an attempt to shape a role within the 
executive bureaucracy however. It insisted that the mistaken recognition of 
autonomous local Communist activity in Latin America had led to the exaggeration of 
the ‘real or latent danger’ of the Soviet Union.8 
 
The CIA still warned that the Soviet Union would benefit from unrest if it undermined 
the solidarity of the region. Spruille Braden had acknowledged the dangerous influence 
wielded by a small number of Communists that would seek to exploit nationalist or anti-
American sentiment to destabilise the region: 
‘Their whole program is to create chaos at every turn. They are in 
every potential revolution and it does not matter who is behind it. 
It may be started by an ultra-conservative, but nevertheless the 
Communists will join up with it because that is part of their 
system of creating chaos.’9 
Marshall did not see the same level of danger however. He had left been left incensed 
during his post-war mission to China by the propaganda efforts to mislead the world 
into ‘a bitter hatred of Americans.’10 But speaking after the successful completion of the 
Rio Conference Marshall expressed his satisfaction with the absence in Latin America of 
the ‘confusing and disturbing propaganda’ he had seen elsewhere.  
 
In the months following the Rio Conference however, Marshall received a growing 
number of reports on the widespread dissemination of anti-American propaganda by 
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local Communist movements across Latin America looking to undermine the image of 
the US as a Good Neighbour and identify “Yanqui Imperialism” as the most serious 
threat to Latin American development. The National Security Council feared that the 
Soviet Union could even provide a further source of power for these efforts to instigate 
unrest. In authorising a program of propaganda and subversive activities in the Soviet 
sphere, it warned of the possibilities of comparable efforts by the Kremlin in the 
Western Hemisphere.11 
 
The spread of social unrest provoked further fears of growing Communist strength in 
Latin America. The rapid destabilisation of Chile towards the end of 1947 particularly 
added to the perception of danger. The Partido Comunista de Chile continued to gain 
support during the ongoing economic crisis in the region. After good election results 
they called for coal miners to strike in Lota and Coronel in order to place serious 
pressure on Gabriel González Vileda. The Chilean President emphasised the role of 
Communist subversion as he turned to the State Department for assistance. He 
highlighted his expulsion of two Yugoslavian diplomatic representatives for their part 
as external antagonists fomenting the strike. 
 
The US Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, certainly identified the menace of 
Communism behind the unrest in Chile. He adopted similar terms as González Vileda to 
frame the unrest in his warnings to Marshall that the US faced a new battlefront in the 
Cold War.12 ‘It is the common belief here,’ he reported, ‘that the result of test 
international Communism now concentrating on here will have decisive effect 
throughout South America.’13 ‘The issue is clear as crystal,’ he warned: ‘Communism or 
democracy.’14 Bowers reinforced these Manichean constructions with the evocation of 
 214 
key elements found in containment discourse such as symbolic credibility and “rotten 
apple theories”. He warned that the result of US inaction in Chile would signal a 
Communist triumph and lead to the rapid spread of unrest across the region. There was 
‘no possible doubt,’ he finally added, ‘that [the] strike is ordered from outside as a major 
effort of Communism to take over in Chile as first toward the Continent.’ The 
observations of Bowers revealed an implicit link between local Communist movements 
and a larger ideological design for the region that assumed a monolithic nature of the 
threat. 
 
Marshall dismissed the warnings from Bowers. State Department officials informed him 
that González Vileda attempted to amplify the Communist threat in order to gain US 
support and consolidate his own domestic political base. The State Department also 
recognised that opposition forces in Latin American countries with strong leftist 
governments had also begun to inflate the Communist threat. Both domestic 
adversaries and US businesses operating in Guatemala persisted in highlighting the role 
of Communists within the Arévalo government.  
 
The CIA continued to caution against complacency however, as local Communists had 
not demonstrated their full potential in Chile. The New York Times also warned that the 
Communist movement in Chile meant that ‘there must be similar ones being put into 
operation elsewhere.’15 It appeared evident that the State Department did not share 
assessments of the significance of the battle developing for the representation of the US 
and its role in the Western Hemisphere. They anticipated that their solid standing in the 
Cold War would only lead the Kremlin to recognise the ultimate futility of supporting 
local Communist activities in Latin America. 
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Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff once again neglected Latin America in its 
recommendations of PPS/13 to radically improve the machinery to counter anti-
American propaganda and find measures to influence international opinion in favour of 
the US.16 The specific measures to combat anti-American propaganda outlined in the 
State Department ‘Information and Cultural Program in Latin America’ also proved to 
be inadequate in funding and slow in application. The US Embassy in Quito did not even 
receive enough funds necessary to receive wireless bulletins from the State Department 
that could be promoted within the local press.17  
 
The Truman administration finally managed to persuade Congress to support a global 
propaganda campaign when in January it signed the US Information and Educational 
Exchange Act of 1948. The intensification of measures in Western Europe and the Soviet 
orbit only forced serious cutbacks in operations within the Western Hemisphere.18 
Congress threatened even a minimum operating level in Voice of America activities in 
the region after criticising the poor quality of broadcast programmes.19 The Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, admitted that the State Department only 
checked the priority broadcasts to Eastern Europe.20 Resources would not be diverted 
to check broadcasts that few in Latin America listened to. 
 
The journalist Ruby Hart Phillips warned that the vacuum left in Latin America from the 
US failure to advertise the American way of life had been filled by attempts to ‘sell 
communism.’ She highlighted in particular the efforts of the Communist Information 
Bureau to spread anti-American propaganda.21 Senior members of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) also warned that local Communist movements had begun to 
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use this propaganda to recruit and organise labour unions across the region. The 
Truman administration recognised that the World Federation of Trade Unions had 
become a tool of Communist propaganda against the US.22 It became increasingly aware 
that the activities of the regional Confederation of Latin American Labor (Confederación 
de Trabajadores de América Latina - CTAL) established by Vicente Lombardo Toledano 
had also fallen under Communist control.23 
 
The alarms triggered did not seem to translate into a serious response however. The 
State Department demonstrated little enthusiasm for calls to compete with the 
influence of the Cominform with the creation of a Democratic Information Bureau.24 The 
limited ‘informal assistance’ offered to Serafino Romualdi did not make any easier his 
task of establishing an Inter-American Federation of Labor (Confederación 
Interamericana de Trabajadores – CIT) to rival the CTAL. Romualdi struggled to organise 
pro-American unions into the CIT at the Inter-American Labor Conference held in Lima 
at the start of 1948. Although the declaration from the newly elected President for the 
CIT, Chilean Bernardo Ibáñez, that they would be ready for ‘the commies’ who would 
‘use every dirty trick in the bag’ provided some initial encouragement,’ this soon 
disappeared as it became evident that anti-Communist fervour did not translate into 
pro-American sentiment.’25 The CIT executive policy committee produced a long 
declaration condemning the ‘imperialistic aspects of US economic policy in Latin 
America’ and ‘the planned intervention of the US in the industrialization of Latin 
America.’26 The US delegation ultimately refused to sign the declaration.27 
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Evoking Reciprocity 
A series of developments at the start of 1948 transformed the strategic climate in 
Washington. A “bloodless coup” in Czechoslovakia triggered alarms within the Truman 
administration and brought demands from the armed services for military 
preparedness.28 The prospect of an electoral victory for the Italian Communist Party 
also disturbed the likes of Kennan who feared that a symbolic success for the Soviet 
Union so shortly after the “quiet revolution” in Czechoslovakia would embolden the 
Kremlin.29 Observing the events in Europe whilst returning from a trip to Japan, Kennan 
sent urgent warnings to Marshall that the Soviets could be preparing for an armed 
contest. 
 
In his preparations for the Bogotá Conference Marshall continued to make the most of 
the strategic opportunity in the psychological confrontation with the Soviet Union in 
pursuing a symbolic demonstration of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. Strategic 
priorities in the region began to shift as the crises in Europe transformed the climate in 
the Cold War. The imminent danger of direct war with the Soviet Union meant that 
military preparations became the new focus in relations with Latin America.30 The 
Western Hemisphere came to be regarded evermore as a region supplying vital 
strategic resources than simply a unique space to demonstrate a symbolic commitment 
to the solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force 
Coordinating Committee identified adequate supplies in the Western Hemisphere to 
meet the wartime demand of strategic resources if Latin American governments 
matched the measures within the US to increase production.31 
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The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee had advised Marshall to 
negotiate an inter-American agreement on concrete measures to develop and secure 
vital resources. Marshall immediately dismissed the recommendations however; he 
insisted on supporting any means capable of success.32 Marshall worked with the 
military establishment in the rapid mobilisation of strategic resources needed for a war 
effort. He responded immediately to requests from Forrestal for his interest and 
cooperation in safeguarding the ‘availability of all material essential for a war economy’ 
that would be ‘of vital importance to the security of the nation.’33 Marshall also agreed 
to recommendations for an inter-departmental study group on strategic materials in 
advance of the Bogotá Conference. He instructed Daniels to request from the 
International Resources Division a list of the resources that could be procured from the 
Western Hemisphere and any problems that could be faced in production or purchase.34  
 
Forrestal considered in necessary to pursue a specific settlement on petroleum.35 He 
warned Marshall of the danger of being closed off from Middle East oil in the event of 
war and recommended a refocus on the significant reserves identified in the Western 
Hemisphere.36 The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee emphasised the 
magnitude of the problem: 
 ‘[T]he US is expending its non-replaceable petroleum resources at 
a rate vastly greater than that of any other country or any other oil 
producing area in the world.’37 
Marshall understood that the US could not depend upon areas like the Middle East to 
meet increased demand and recognised the importance of securing access to the 
strategic resources of the Western Hemisphere in the event of war.38 Forrestal 
suggested emphasising to Latin American leaders that increased production should be 
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regarded not only as a moral obligation under the Rio Treaty, but also of immense 
commercial benefit to them.39 Although Marshall dismissed a specific agreement on 
petroleum, the State Department worked on a Basic Agreement on Economic 
Cooperation to be presented at the Bogotá Conference as the basis for access to regional 
resources.  
 
A situation emerged similar to that at the start of the Second World War. The urgent 
need to mobilise strategic resources across the region led the State Department to shift 
from the anticipation of reciprocity as the focus of cooperation in the Good Neighbour 
Policy to a more direct evocation of reciprocity that demanded Latin American 
governments act to secure US economic interests.40 This created immediate problems. A 
number of Latin American leaders recognised these demands to develop their 
capabilities in production of strategic resources as an opportunity to renew their 
appeals for economic assistance. The prioritisation of resources for the European 
Recovery Program continued to limit the means available to Marshall to pursue 
essential strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere however. The State 
Department remained unable to support Latin American loan applications to the 
Export-Import Bank even for the development of key strategic industries.41 The Office of 
International Trade Policy would eventually warn against any further demands on Latin 
America to increase production of strategic materials that would invite appeals for 
economic assistance to develop or purchase such materials.42 
 
Marshall had to rely instead on cooperation between private enterprise and Latin 
American governments to develop strategic industries; the lack of resources available to 
the State Department made it difficult to mediate competing interests however. Without 
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any guarantees of assistance for economic development a number of regional leaders 
turned increasingly to nationalist measures that would guarantee them the fair share of 
the returns from their resources that private enterprise failed to offer. This created a 
serious challenge for US strategic objectives as private companies showed reluctant to 
invest in Latin American countries without ‘adequate safeguards against excessive 
national action.’ 
 
The State Department led efforts across the Truman administration to encourage Latin 
American leaders to liberalise their economies and guarantee a sound environment for 
private capital investment.43 The Office of American Republic Affairs requested that the 
National Securities Resources Board work with the private sector to remove remaining 
obstacles to investment in Latin America.44 The Executive Committee on Economic 
Foreign Policy also established a sub-committee on strategic materials to work on 
liberalising or removing discriminatory laws against foreign capital.45 Lt. General 
Ridgway worked with military leaders to push through a resolution in the Inter-
American Defense Board to find immediate measures capable of enhancing reserves of 
important resources.46 Marshall shared the concerns of Forrestal that many Latin 
American leaders continued to show a lack of appreciation for the importance of these 
demands however.47  
 
Dictators across the region warned Marshall that a number of progressive Latin 
American governments faced pressure from local Communist movements to reject the 
evocation of reciprocity in favour of economic nationalism. Perón suggested that where 
Communists could not gain direct influence over governments they sought direct 
contact with the masses instead.48 The evocation of the spectre of international 
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Communism in the Civil War in Costa Rica certainly received more sympathetic hearing 
within the Truman administration. State Department officials like William Tapley 
Bennett Jr., of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs, identified the roots of 
the crisis in the connections between President Teodoro Picado Michalski and the 
Communist Vanguardia Popular party.49 The US Ambassador in San José had previously 
demonstrated support for Picado and considered him as a friend to the US and servant 
of democratic ideals and the inter-American way of life.50 The State Department had 
also accepted that Picado identified with the US and the democratic doctrine of the bloc 
of Western nations. Bennett now attempted to draw comparisons between the 
situations in Costa Rica and Czechoslovakia. He circulated a memorandum within the 
State Department that drew attention to an interview in the New York Times with a 
Costa Rican opposition leader warning that ‘few foresaw the Czechoslovak crisis, but 
now we have the same thing in our front yard.’51 Bennett also highlighted the 
description of Costa Rica made by the Peruvian founder of the American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as ‘the Czechoslovakia of the 
Western Hemisphere.’  
 
Marshall remained reluctant to draw these links between Czechoslovakia and Costa Rica 
however. Much of the intelligence community continued to dismiss the prospects of any 
Soviet opportunism in Latin America that risked antagonising the US.52 Marshall 
ultimately did not consider the threat of local Communism to be significant enough to 
discard his commitment to the principle of non-intervention. His primary focus for the 
Bogotá Conference remained a symbolic demonstration of the relationship between, 
rather than within, states. The shift in priorities towards the mobilisation of strategic 
resources did present an opportunity to realign the basis of cooperation between states 
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in the Western Hemisphere however. Rafael Trujillo proposed an inter-American 
agreement to be considered at the Bogotá Conference for the collective defence of 
regional resources from Communist penetration. Marshall regarded access to strategic 
resources in Latin America to be essential for US capabilities to meet any direct military 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although economic nationalism represented the 
immediate threat to this objective in the Western Hemisphere, the danger that 
Communists could increase the possibilities of this outcome led Marshall to instruct the 
Policy Planning Staff to find a position for negotiations at the Bogotá Conference on the 
proposals made by Trujillo. 
 
Kennan asked his new Deputy Director, George H. Butler, to use his regional experience 
to prepare recommendations for Policy Planning Study 26. Butler warned Marshall that 
Trujillo sought to exploit an agreement on anti-Communism in order to conflate the 
threat with their political opponents and justify repressive activities.53 As he anticipated 
further ‘extreme proposals that could increase international tension and give dictators 
legitimacy for repression,’ Butler advised Marshall to promote a more moderate 
resolution at the Bogotá Conference that simply made a strong declaration that 
Communism remained as odds with a shared inter-American way of life. Marshall 
agreed that the legitimisation of repressive activities could undermine the principle of 
reciprocity and pose a more serious danger to regional solidarity than the relatively 
insignificant influence of local Communism.  
 
Marshall immediately faced divisions at the Bogotá Conference on the issue of anti-
Communism as a basis for inter-American cooperation. The dictatorships of the region 
offered their support for the proposals made by Trujillo, but showed little resistance to 
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the alternative presented by Marshall. Even the Argentine delegation declared its 
willingness to follow the US in any declaration of war against the Soviet Union. The 
delegations from progressive Latin American governments continue to reject the Soviet 
Union and Communism as a significant threat and targeted the dictators of the region as 
the primary danger to their shared way of life. The conference steering committee 
approved proposals from the Mexican, Venezuelan, and Guatemalan representatives 
however, to extend their resolution to a condemnation of all totalitarian ideologies that 
showed ‘inconsistent with the tradition of the countries of America.’54  
 
Inventing Enemies in the Western Hemisphere 
Further negotiations on the agreement were disrupted by the shock assassination of the 
Colombian Liberal Party leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Although the violent riots that 
broke out across the city did not deliberately target the Bogotá Conference, delegates 
found themselves caught in the crossfire of a confrontation between the Colombian 
Army that remained loyal to the sitting Conservative government and the local police 
that supported the Liberal Party. Although he had previously remained reluctant to link 
the threat of local unrest to a broader ideological design for the Western Hemisphere, 
Marshall shifted his position after his experience in the Bogotazo. The direct encounter 
with disorder in Bogotá made it difficult for him to sustain the construction of a stable 
and coherent Western Hemisphere. 
 
A brief moment followed the immediate trauma of the Bogotazo before it could be 
symbolised and understood.55 The immediate reaction of Marshall revealed less 
concern for his personal security than the threat to the success of the Bogotá 
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Conference and his priority of a shining example of inter-American solidarity. As the 
eyes of the world scrutinised the efforts to establish a model of regional cooperation, 
Marshall considered it ‘not only important, but imperative that the conference 
continue.’56 He warned that any failure to let the unrest disrupt the proceedings of the 
Bogotá Conference would have negative implications for the credibility of the US across 
the world. Marshall implored his Latin American counterparts to continue their work ‘at 
all costs’ and ‘not take action to give the impression of defeat.’57 
 
The State Department agreed on the significance of the implications of the uprising; 
Lovett informed Marshall that ‘the unanimous feeling in Washington was that the 
continuation of the Conference was of greatest importance.’ The Acting Secretary of 
State later warned Marshall that whilst Congress and the press remained sensitive to 
the need not to appear to fail or run away from the Bogotá Conference however, they 
had begun to press for the US delegation to return to Washington to deal with the 
increasing reports of further revolutionary movements across Latin America, 
particularly in Costa Rica.58 Although he also appeared concerned about events 
unfolding across the region, Marshall insisted that his presence at the conference had 
‘done more in the way of “doing something about” Communist and revolutionary 
reported moves in Latin America than our return home would do.’59 
 
The Bogotazo provided Marshall with a harsh lesson in the shortcomings of his 
construction of a cohesive and stable space in the Western Hemisphere. The primary 
symbolisation of the Bogotazo then became the danger to order posed by international 
Communism. Congress and the US media immediately drew parallels with Pearl Harbor 
and ascribed the assassination of Gaitán to Soviet agents.60 Marshall also labelled the 
 225 
instigators of the Bogotazo as “evil” and informed Latin American delegations that the 
rioting had been a well organised and deliberate attempt of local Communists to 
sabotage the conference and the US position in Europe.61 
 
Local Communists had greeted Marshall to Bogotá with posters depicting him as a 
Nazi.62 Although these local Communists only had a small influence in the general strike 
called by the Confederation of Workers of Colombia during the riots, Marshall drew 
attention to press reports in Yugoslavia that connected the uprising in Bogotá to the 
larger threat of the international Communist movement. In a later address to the 
conference, the US Secretary of Commerce, W. Averell Harriman, insisted that even if 
Communists had not initiated the unrest, they had certainly exploited the opportunity 
to destabilise the government.63 
 
A new prioritisation of anti-Communism appeared once the proceedings of the Bogotá 
Conference resumed. Delegates immediately agreed upon Resolution 32 that called for 
measures to: 
 ‘eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted, or instigated 
by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals, that tend to 
overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in 
their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, 
subversive propaganda, threats or by any other means, the free 
and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in 
accordance with their democratic aspirations.’ 
The focus of Marshall became clear once he left the Bogotá Conference early to return to 
Washington less than 24 hours after securing this agreement.64 
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Resolution 32 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference signalled a re-presentation 
rather than a shift in strategic focus. Marshall now identified antagonism that 
undermined his construction of a coherent and unified space in the Western 
Hemisphere. Rather than abandoning this imaginary Marshall adopted an ideological 
strategy that treated this dysfunction as the consequence of an external intrusion rather 
than a necessary result of an inner dynamic within the inter-American system.65 In 
establishing links between internal subversion and “traces of the outside”, Marshall 
externalised the representations of danger to hemispheric order. Marshall could 
reinvent the space in the Western Hemisphere as ‘a social totality that is never really 
present’ and project an imagined community as if it ‘had always been.’66 
 
Marshall sought to demonstrate a shared identity in the Western Hemisphere that had 
proved elusive through the common estrangement of Communism. He simply 
obliterated the differences between the distinct tensions within the region through the 
establishment of “Communism” as a metasignifier that would re-present each danger. 
This new threat would assume the radicalism of the nationalists; the inadequacy of the 
indigenous, mestizo, mulatto, black and zambo; the ungodliness of the atheists; the 
repressive militarism of the caudillos; and the name of the Communists.67 But it was not 
that Communists would be considered a threat simply because they possessed such 
negative attributes; with the intervention of this established empty signifier, such 
properties would be evident because they were Communist. The identification of 
Communism as a new point de capiton would provide only the illusion of coherence in 
the meaning of a shared hemispheric identity however. Marshall focused more on anti-
Communism than the reconciliation of genuine tensions within the region. The 
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eradication of Communism as the obstacle preventing solidarity within the Western 
Hemisphere became his “fetishistic” pursuit.68 
 
(Re)inventing the Myths of Revolution 
The Bogotazo introduced a new ideological competition over the representation of the 
Western Hemisphere. Marshall acknowledged that his failure to demonstrate the 
credibility of regional solidarity and the role of the US as a Good Neighbour had created 
a vacuum that invited different meanings. He had warned during an address earlier in 
the year that ‘the great mass of the ill-favoured people of the world have come to realize 
all that they lack in comparison with the advantages enjoyed by others.’ The rising tide 
of expectations in the region simply meant that a growing number of Latin Americans 
would no longer tolerate the ‘unfairness of this situation.’ Marshall understood then the 
roots of the profound social unrest spreading across Latin America to be ‘based on 
something more than ideology.’69 He feared that local Communists could exploit rising 
anti-Americanism amongst the masses to undermine inter-American cooperation 
however.  
 
The CIA warned that the dissemination of anti-American propaganda by local 
Communists from across the region exerted further pressure on Latin American leaders 
to reject cooperation with the US in favour of more autonomous development.70 This 
serious danger to the principle of reciprocity revealed itself in Venezuela in particular. 
The US Ambassador in Caracas, Walter Donnelly, reported his feared that Communist 
elements that had infiltrated the main labour union for the oil industries, Fedepetrol, 
had become powerful enough to pressure the government of Rómulo Gallegos to 
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renegotiate the terms for collaboration with the foreign oil companies.71 This posed a 
significant problem for Marshall. Venezuela remained the only Latin American country 
to allow large-scale production and exportation of oil by private US enterprises.72 He 
had highlighted the profit sharing deal between these companies and the Gallegos 
government as a prime example of cooperation in developing vital strategic resources 
for the rest of the region.73 The positive response to his appeals to employ all measures 
necessary to increase oil production had only provided further encouragement of this 
model.74 The leaders of Fedepetrol now warned that the rise of Communism could only 
be prevented with the oil companies submitting to all of their demands. A Special 
Subcommittee of the House Committee of the Armed Services, led by Dewey Short (R-
MS), criticised the subsequent refusal of the Gallegos administration to offer any new 
concessions to US oil companies as ‘strictly and basically nationalistic.’75 
 
Social transformation gripped Latin America. Marshall recognised the danger in local 
Communists exploiting this unrest to undermine US interests in vital strategic 
industries across the region. Communist recruitment in labour unions only heightened 
his fear of more direct subversive activities.76 Reports surfaced of labour unions plans 
to follow the directions of the Cominform to keep the key industries in Latin American 
neutral in the event of war between the US and Soviet Union.77 The declaration that not 
one drop of oil would make its way to the US by the Congress of Oil Workers in Tampico, 
Mexico only provoked concerns of similar activities in Venezuela. The CIA identified 
their oil fields as one of the ‘most remunerative targets for industrial sabotage in the 
Western Hemisphere.’78 Marshall received frequent reports from the US Embassy in 
Caracas of Communist plots to damage oil installations.79 Ambassador Donnelly further 
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warned that Gallegos would reject efforts to find further means to secure resources 
from Communist sabotage.80 
 
Marshall realised the urgent need to shape new measures to address this threat to his 
strategic objectives of mobilising vital resources in the region. Butler had deferred full 
recommendations in Policy Planning Study 26 for specific measures to address growing 
anti-Americanism in Latin America until a comprehensive review could be conducted. 
He did warn Marshall of the serious ground lost in the propaganda war and advised that 
raising living standards as the most solid deterrent to Communism in Latin America 
however. Although he recommended that the Office of American Republic Affairs 
continue to develop measures to address the economic crisis in the Western 
Hemisphere, Butler realised that the ongoing lack in resources needed to improve Latin 
American economic conditions would make it difficult for the State Department to 
maintain the positive image of the US as a Good Neighbour. The prospects for 
persuading Congress to authorise the necessary funds to address the root problem of 
poverty remained poor. 
 
Marshall still considered it possible to recapture the hearts and minds of the Latin 
American people and prevent any further growth in the influence of Communism 
however. He hoped that some form of symbolic commitment to Latin American 
development would demonstrate that the best path for social transformation still lay 
with the American way of life and cooperation with the US. He looked to publicise the 
existing health and food programmes of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs to 
provide some credibility to US promises to improve living conditions across the 
region.81 Marshall authorised Louis J. Halle to publicise these limited programmes to 
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strengthen the social systems of Latin American neighbours in a series of articles.82 In 
an echo of the Truman Doctrine, Halle identified ‘hunger, disease, and ignorance’ as the 
‘principle allies of totalitarianism;’ he insisted that the State Department considered this 
a more serious danger to the Western Hemisphere that Soviet efforts to establish a 
military beachhead.83 The US remained committed to address the specific problems of 
Latin American countries rather than looking at the region only through the lens of 
conflict with the Soviet Union. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, 
joined Halle in an assertion that the IIAA programs ‘provide one solid and tangible 
answer to the critics who contend the Good Neighbour Policy is no more.’84  
 
The rising tide of expectations across Latin America meant that Marshall would need a 
firmer commitment to economic development than the limited programmes of the IIAA 
in order to maintain the cooperation of regional leaders in combating the danger of 
Communist subversion in key strategic industries. The importance of securing US access 
to vital oil resources in Venezuela even led to the involvement of President Truman as 
Gallegos joined him for a tour in the US.85 As he did not have the resources available to 
him to assure the cooperation of Gallegos with promises of economic cooperation, 
Truman relied instead on the myth of Simón Bolívar to promote his message. As part of 
his whistle-stop campaign during July Truman invited President Gallegos to dedicate a 
statue to el Libertador in the town of Bolivar, Missouri. On his return from Missouri he 
told reporters that he regarded Bolívar as the George Washington of South America.86 
He hoped that the comparisons drawn between the living myths of these two 
revolutionary leaders would identify the US on the side of both the historic 
independence movements and the future progress of their rising tide of expectations. 
The evocation of this shared experience would allow the US to direct social 
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transformation in Latin America along the ordered lines of a standard set by the 
American Revolution.87 
 
The intervention of Truman ultimately brought promises from Gallegos not to restrict 
the production of petroleum. The Venezuelan President insisted that he still had to 
reinvest revenue received from the resources into productive domestic enterprises, the 
diversification of industry and agriculture, and programs to improve standards of living 
however.88 Truman noted his pleasure that US oil companies had learned not to exploit 
opportunities to extract profits and that Gallegos cooperated with them on a shared 
profit agreement that continued to work within the free enterprise system.89 Gallegos 
also instructed his army to remain alert to dangerous Communist elements in the labour 
unions of vital strategic industries. Donnelly constantly provided Gallegos with facts and 
figures on Communist infiltration of labour unions and their activities around the oil 
fields.90 The CIA soon noted improvements in the situation as Acción Democrática 
demonstrated a growing awareness of the potential subversive threat.91 They would 
continue to monitor the activities of ‘expert saboteurs’ in the area however.92 The 
NSC/29 directive on the “Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in 
Foreign Countries”, requested that the CIA Director, Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, formulate 
a plan to secure the Venezuelan oil fields.93 
 
The cooperation between the Venezuelan government and US companies in developing 
strategic resources was once again identified as an ideal model for the region during a 
meeting held in Rio de Janeiro for economic officers stationed in US missions across 
Latin America.94 The economic specialists within the State Department warned that this 
Venezuelan model would be difficult to translate across the rest of the region however. 
 232 
The demands on increased production of vital resources without a commitment to 
assist in development meant that Latin American governments showed unwilling to 
rush through any reforms.95  
 
Marshall had used a similar approach to Truman a few months earlier at the Bogotá 
Conference.96 In acknowledging the decline in his personal credibility amongst Latin 
American leaders Marshall turned instead to the evocation of Bolívar to sell his strategic 
approach. El Libertador remained a symbolic patriarch for whom many Latin American 
leaders continued to look to for meaning. As the embodiment of a shared past and the 
promise, the authoritative figure of Bolívar had been used to legitimise diverse 
programs across Latin America.97 He had long stood as the embodiment of national 
identity in Venezuela, but had since been reconstructed as the Liberator of numerous 
Latin American countries.98  
 
Speaking extemporaneously after his formal address to the Bogotá Conference, Marshall 
evoked this cult of Bolívar to first justify his focus on the containment of the Soviet 
Union in Western Europe.99 He drew attention to the mural of Bolívar that hung in the 
room and drew parallels with Commander Simon Bolivar Buckner, who led the US 10th 
Army against the Japanese at Okinawa. Buckner gave his life, Marshall told the 
delegates, ‘for the peace and security of the Pacific, that it would no longer carry a threat 
to your western shores.’ That he shared his name with el Libertador, Marshall 
suggested, ‘indicates something of our common purpose and much more of our common 
bonds.’ Marshall concluded his eulogy of Bolívar to establish a shared revolutionary 
history of the Americas.100 
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In the clear absence of the shared principles of ‘liberty, unity, and friendship’ in the 
Western Hemisphere, the monument of Bolívar would simply stand in as ‘an enduring 
symbol of these great aspirations.’ Inter-American unity would not be defined within 
itself, but through its relationship to the myth of Bolívar.101 But naturalising Bolívar in a 
wider regional collective memory as a monument to the development of Pan-
Americanism would require the reinvention of the myth recognised in Latin America 
however. Although Bolívar honoured the American way of life in his infamous 
Angostura Address, he denounced US leaders on a number of occasions and had not 
even wanted US representatives at the Congress of Panama in 1826.102 The Truman 
administration appropriated the name of Bolívar as the ‘soul and symbol’ of 
hemispheric solidarity.103 But Latin American leaders would continue to see Bolívar as 
more of a “Pan-Latin Americanist” who believed in the existence of divergent traditions 
between the two Americas. Indeed they could look to the Liberator for an entirely 
different representation of the US. As Bolívar would tell a British diplomat in Bogotá: 
‘The US ... seems destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name 
of freedom.’  
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IV. COSTS of INCOHERENCE 
 243 
9. THE LIMITATIONS OF INCOHERENT STRATEGY  
 
The Bogotazo provoked serious reactions from across the Western Hemisphere. Juan 
Perón informed the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Bruce, that the graphic 
lessons from Bogotá should open everybody’s eyes to the real danger of revolution 
across Latin America.1 He suggested that raising living standards across the region 
remained the only genuine long-term solution for preventing fertile ground for 
Communism. The lack of serious resources had left Marshall without the means to 
improve economic conditions and direct social transformation in the Western 
Hemisphere however. The Argentine leader warned the State Department that if local 
Communists could not be bought off then it would be necessary to exterminate them. 
The State Department seemed to run out of ideas on combating Communism and by 
mid-October turned instead to neighbouring Latin American governments for 
suggestions on suitable measures to be carried out under the provisions of Resolution 
32 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference.2 
 
The State Department expressed some interest in the suggestion offered by Perón.3 
Ambassador Bruce had reported the informal recommendation offered by the Argentine 
leader for a secret inter-American conference to reach agreement on measures to stamp 
out Communism from the Western Hemisphere. It is unlikely he was aware of events in 
Peru the previous evening of October 27th, where General Manuel Arturo Odría 
Amoretti had led armed forces to overthrow President Bustamante. Harold H. Tittman 
Jr. had only officially assumed his position as Ambassador in Lima that day. He reported 
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back to the State Department two days later that Bustamante had resigned and fled to 
avoid any bloodshed. The coup succeeded without firing a shot.  
 
The social unrest that gripped the entire region over the next month led Marshall to 
reconsider important policies in inter-American cooperation. The recognition and 
assistance offered to Odría and other dictators provoked immediate criticism that the 
State Department had shifted to anti-Communism as the basis to assess relations with 
Latin American neighbours. The growing fears within the Truman administration after 
the Bogotá Conference of local Communist movements exploiting instability and 
engaging in subversive activities to disrupt access to vital strategic positions and 
resources certainly established new priorities, but the US remained largely an observer 
to the conservative reaction to revolutionary movements across the region. Events 
unfolded as a result of the earlier failures of Marshall to resolve significant tensions in 
his strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. He could not reconcile the 
differences between his commitments to the equal treatment of Latin American 
governments in the Good Neighbour Policy and the protection of shared progressive 
ideals. The ongoing prioritisation of limited funds for strategic objectives outside of the 
Western Hemisphere prevented Marshall from effectively pursuing either commitment. 
The only decision left for Marshall as rival forces from across Latin America took the 
matter into their own hands was to take sides. 
 
Discrimination in Military Cooperation 
At the start of October Paul C. Daniels reconsidered the prospects of submitting 
legislation for inter-American military cooperation to the upcoming 81st Congress. The 
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prioritisation of military assistance for Latin American governments under Marshall 
had proven disastrous for hemispheric relations thus far however. Military cooperation 
showed ineffective as a means for a strategic approach that focused less on addressing 
any Cold War threats in the Western Hemisphere than projecting the psychological and 
material power of the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War.  
 
The inherent tensions in the approach shaped by Marshall had emerged immediately 
after his decision to remove the embargos on arms sales against Argentina and the 
Dominican Republic and continued to plague later reconsiderations. The Policy 
Committee on Arms and Armament confronted the difficulty of discrimination between 
different Latin American governments in the Good Neighbour Policy after receiving 
instructions from Marshall to formulate general guidelines for arms sales. Although it 
initially decided to relax regulations on commercial licences and the Interim Allocations 
Program, the PCA ultimately determined in its PD-10 guidelines that arms sales would 
need to be considered ‘reasonable and necessary’ for either the maintenance of internal 
order, protection against external attack, or carrying out UN duties.4 The guidelines only 
invited further bureaucratic struggle to determine the meaning of such ambiguous 
criteria however. A common understanding of ‘reasonable and necessary’ would only be 
found through practical endeavours to find specific solutions to the problems in policies 
towards repressive regimes of the likes of the Dominican Republic and Honduras. 
 
A few months before the Bogotá Conference the State Department’s Chief of the Division 
of Special Inter-American Affairs, John C. Dreier, insisted that the regime of Rafael 
Trujillo should not receive equal treatment in its requests for arms sales. He drafted a 
memorandum that highlighted the conclusions of even the armed services that military 
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assistance to the Dominican Republic could be considered neither reasonable nor 
necessary for hemispheric defence or internal stabilisation.5 George H. Butler continued 
to make similar appeals from his position at the time as US Ambassador in Ciudad 
Trujillo that followed his initial recommendations that there could be ‘no justification 
for additional armament for the Dominican Republic.’6 He stressed that armaments had 
already proven too heavy a burden for ‘practically all of the Latin American Republics.’7 
But Butler also expressed concerns that arms sales would only provide a tyrant like 
Trujillo with further means to continue his campaign of terror against the unarmed 
people of the Dominican Republic.8  
 
Marshall maintained a commitment to equal treatment of all Latin American 
governments rather than find some means of discrimination on the basis of internal 
governance. The reconciliation of competing objectives continued to cause incoherent 
policies as Paul C. Daniels discovered on his arrival to Washington. As part of his first 
brief as Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Daniels met with Colonel 
Ordway and Lieutenant General Smith of the Army to discuss provision of military 
assistance to the Honduran armed forces as part of their broader plans to equip and 
train all Latin American militaries to contain internal unrest.9 Daniels had just left his 
post as Ambassador in Tegucigalpa and told his military counterparts that protecting 
the status quo would not serve US interests. Support for a repressive dictator like 
Tiburcio Carías Andino would only increase anti-American sentiment across the region. 
Ordway accepted the precedence of the political considerations made by the State 
Department over the preferences of the Army for military assistance. 
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Daniels did not pursue a straightforward approach however. On the one hand he 
facilitated the sale of aircraft that had been authorised for export to the Honduran 
regime during his time as Ambassador. On the other hand however, Daniels refused to 
act favourably on the formal requests for broader military assistance before scheduled 
elections.10 The Honduran Ambassador to the US, Julián R. Cáceras, expressed his 
frustration at these mixed signals. He stated his belief that the prohibition of military 
cooperation with non-democratic Latin American countries had been the policy of 
Spruille Braden and Ellis O. Briggs and not a continuing policy of the State 
Department.11 Braden had maintained a ‘tolerant and patient’ relationship with 
democratic governments, whilst treating dictatorships only with ‘aloof formality.’12 
Robert Newbegin informed Cáceras that ‘there was perhaps a difference in approach’ 
evident within the State Department, but ‘our outlook remained very much the same.’  
 
At the start of the year Marshall acknowledged that his strategic approach had failed to 
address the growing conflict in the region. He feared that this conflict endangered his 
priorities of an example of hemispheric solidarity and the projection of the US as a Good 
Neighbour just as the world prepared to cast their eyes upon developments at the 
Bogotá Conference.13 The PCA received instructions from Marshall to review their PD-
10 guidelines on arms sales to Latin American governments. The review led to 
exceptions to military assistance in addition to the criteria of ‘reasonable and 
necessary.’ Arms sales, including export licences for private suppliers, would no longer 
be authorised if deemed to constitute ‘special circumstances involving serious political 
disturbances or strained international relations.’14 
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Marshall authorised these amended guidelines shortly after the Bogotazo, but they did 
not determine an approach to address a growing threat of subversive activities 
undermining new strategic priorities in the region. Spruille Braden had earlier outlined 
a rationale for discriminating in favour of progressive democrats as a measure to 
combat Communism in Latin America. ‘If we fail to sustain and augment the enthusiasm 
for the practice of democratic ideals,’ Braden warned, ‘the void will be filled by 
pernicious “isms” imperilling our way of life.’15 He made it clear that the failure to 
establish democracy across Latin America only encouraged ‘the most dangerous and 
insidious threat of all to the American mode of life and democracy – Communism.’16  
 
Although Marshall rejected the interventionism of Braden, he did not shift the general 
attitude within the State Department that it was more favourable to collaborate with 
democrats rather than dictators in combating Communism. Butler and the Policy 
Planning Staff retained a faith in progressive Latin American democrats as the most 
effective deterrent to Communism. They shared CIA conclusions that the popular 
support won by Acción Democrática in Venezuela showed that ‘in the special conditions 
of Latin American politics, an active non-Communist progressive party constitutes one 
of the best guarantees against a strong Communist movement.’17  
 
In reflecting on his experience of the Bogotazo Marshall showed that even he would not 
realign inter-American cooperation on the basis of anti-Communism alone. He still 
considered it desirable to work with democrats to stabilise the region. Marshall called 
on Latin American leaders ‘not just to sit back and allow bad conditions to develop 
which played into the hands of the radical subversive communist elements but to take 
the initiative and themselves meet the problems facing their countries.’18 He specifically 
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encouraged them to educate the poor and underprivileged peoples of their countries in 
democratic ways. Marshall feared that ‘if this is not done the communists will certainly 
seize the chance to train and indoctrinate those future leaders in the ideologies and 
ways of communism.’ 
 
This outlook did not seem to be reconciled to the ongoing efforts to maintain friendly 
relations with all Latin American governments. The tension appeared most evident as 
George V. Allen addressed a Pan-American dinner in Washington with a celebration of 
the friendship between each of the American Republics – not as an ideal – but as 
accomplished fact.19  He singled out Cáceres as the ‘personal symbol of the friendliness 
and good will that animates the relations of the Good Neighbour republics.’20 The 
continued friendship and military cooperation with all Latin American governments 
revealed the inherent danger of the Good Neighbour Policy that placed the US in 
support of a repressive status quo in the likes of Honduras. It became increasingly 
evident that not everyone across the region would remain as tolerant as Marshall. 
 
A Spectator to Social Transformation 
A number of Latin American governments remained aware of their isolation from the 
Cold War and showed unwilling to cooperate with the US in securing strategic locations 
and resources from Communist subversion.21 The decision made by the Panamanian 
National Assembly shortly before the Bogotá Conference to reject proposals for US 
troops to defend the Canal from sabotage rang alarm bells within the Truman 
administration. Forrestal feared that the government of Enrique Adolfo Jiménez would 
be unable to defend vital strategic access to the Panama Canal Zone; he appealed for 
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Marshall to present at the Bogotá Conference an inter-American treaty on reciprocal use 
of military bases that would secure a direct US presence.22 Although he reaffirmed his 
commitment to military cooperation, Marshall refused to place the issue on the agenda 
and insisted on prioritising political affairs.23 The State Department warned that 
regional support for a multilateral agreement would be difficult to secure; many Latin 
American governments had welcomed the evacuation of US troops from the Panama 
Canal Zone.24 Perhaps more importantly, Marshall acknowledged the unwillingness of 
Latin American leaders to allow neighbours similar access to their strategic bases.25  
 
Marshall shifted his view after scheduled elections in Panama provoked fears of 
‘another Bogotá’ however.26 He feared that the Jiménez administration could not be 
relied upon to secure the Panama Canal Zone from reported plans of local Communists 
to destabilise the region and disrupt the elections. Marshall warned that direct US 
intervention could produce ‘extremely serious repercussions throughout [the] 
hemisphere.’27 The strategic importance of the Panama Canal led him to support 
directives from the US Army to defend the area if necessary however.28 The Army 
continued to pressure for a commitment to intervention amidst further reports of 
Communist subversive activities during the elections.29 
 
The situation deteriorated as street clashes followed the electoral victory for Domingo 
Díaz Arosemena. Reports that Díaz won through a falsified count of votes brought 
protests from supporters of the defeated candidate, Arnulfo Arias Madrid.30 Only the 
swift restoration of order after the inauguration of Díaz saved Marshall from the choice 
between maintaining his commitment to non-intervention and direct action to secure 
the Panama Canal Zone. The US Commander in Chief of Caribbean Command, General 
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Matthew B. Ridgway, requested an immediate meeting between the US Ambassador in 
Panama City, Monnet B. Davis, and the new government to secure a longer-term 
solution. Davis reported that Díaz pledged full cooperation in securing the Panama 
Canal from sabotage and either incarcerating or handing over into US custody ‘all 
persons deemed dangerous by Caribbean Command.’31 The collaboration of Díaz 
seemed to avert the immediate need for US presence to defend vital strategic positions 
and resources in the Western Hemisphere. But this cooperation with an undemocratic 
regime only revived for the State Department the issue of discrimination in military 
assistance. 
 
The equal treatment of democrats and dictators in even the limited measures of military 
assistance only continued to alienate established progressive allies in the region 
however. A number of liberal allies across South America expressed shared concerns 
over the level of confidence and support offered by the Truman administration to 
reactionary regimes of the likes of Argentina. Brazilian leaders revealed particular 
resentment to their established cooperation with the US receiving equal treatment to 
the Argentine regime despite Perón’s repeated attempts to undermine the unity of the 
region. 32 They criticised the US approach to military cooperation as treating brothers-
in-arms as stepchildren.33  
 
Marshall also received numerous complaints that limited arms sales from the US to 
Argentina undermined the security of neighbours.34 The Uruguayan Ambassador, Dr. 
Domínguez Cámpora, continued to express his fears that Perón planned to dominate the 
region.35 He warned the State Department that Perón would not use overt aggression, 
but rather seek to support an indigenous coup. The Paraguayan Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs, Dr. César A. Vasconsellos, insisted that his government would stand up for 
democratic ideals, but warned that it would be too weak to oppose Argentina.36 From 
his new position as US Ambassador in Montevideo, Ellis O. Briggs requested some 
measure of support from the State Department for Uruguay and other democratic allies 
in the region.37 Both the State Department and CIA found no reason to dismiss the 
appeals of the Argentine Foreign Minister to reject accusations against Perón 
however.38 Briggs received the response that Argentina’s neighbours could only be 
provided with assurances of equal reciprocal assistance in accordance with the Rio 
Treaty and the negotiation of a new informal agreement of friendship.39 
 
Marshall would not reverse his commitment to non-discrimination when the 
heightened tensions with the Soviet Union made friendly relations with Argentina more 
important.40 The US Embassy in Buenos Aires continued to remind Marshall that whilst 
‘war with Russia must be considered at least as a possibility,’ then ‘wise policy towards 
Argentina would ensure that it would be on the US side in the event of war.’41 Marshall 
did not simply shift support towards reactionary regimes able to demonstrate an ability 
to secure US interests in the Cold War however. The State Department made it clear to 
the Argentine government that it would not receive any special treatment in military 
cooperation; the priority of the US remained to not be seen as working with one country 
over another.42 
 
A number of progressive leaders in Central America and the Caribbean showed less 
willing to tolerate US cooperation with reactionary regimes than some of their 
neighbours to the South. The State Department continued to monitor the activities of 
the Caribbean Legion in preparing revolutionary attacks against the dictatorships in the 
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region.43 The commitment to neutrality ensured that the State Department remained a 
spectator to these serious developments however. Although progressive Latin American 
governments in the likes of Cuba reaffirmed their commitment to prevent their territory 
being used by the Caribbean Legion for armed expeditions they maintained their 
ideological opposition to the dictators of the region. President Carlos Prío publicly 
criticised ‘the anachronistic presence of dictators on our continent’ and called for a 
democratic bloc to fight against them.44 His Foreign Minister added that ‘it was not right 
to condone dictatorships in other parts of the world and not in nearby waters.’45  
 
Serious political disturbances in the Caribbean and Central American became more 
frequent throughout 1948 as the dictators in the region – in particular the “Three Ts” of 
Nicaragua’s “Tacho” Somoza, the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, and Honduras’ 
Tiburcio Carías –joined together to resist the perceived threat posed by the likes of 
Cuba, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.46 ‘Nothing unites men quicker than a threat,’ noted 
Somoza; ‘so it was inevitable that we dictators should get together.’ The progressive 
leaders of the region frequently warned of the aggressive military cooperation amongst 
this reactionary grouping and urged the US to provide them the necessary support to 
defend against them.47 The State Department could only offer another restatement of its 
commitment for equal treatment of each Latin American government. 
 
The Failure of US Strategy in the Western Hemisphere 
Marshall did not appear to appreciate the problems caused by the equal treatment of 
Latin American governments in military assistance. He remained concerned instead that 
the limited capacity to supply arms only undermined the natural development towards 
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a balance of power in the region. The effective collaboration of Latin American allies in 
securing US interests from the threats of instability and subversion still depended, in 
large part, on the provision of necessary military materiel. The refusal of Congress to 
authorise funding for arms sales had led Marshall to undertake a number of provisional 
measures to safeguard the future of inter-American military cooperation. He even 
authorised proposals for sending technical experts to assist in setting up military 
factories in Latin America making standardised US arms.48 The need for a more effective 
and permanent regional solution for military assistance ensured that Marshall turned 
his attention once again to promoting legislation within Congress.49 
 
Marshall regarded the authorisation of funds for arms sales as essential. He had 
received warning from the Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, shortly before 
the Bogotá Conference that the Interim Allocations Program, which was being used to 
provide military assistance in the absence of Congressional approval of the Inter-
American Military Cooperation Act, was failing to deliver the quantities and qualities of 
arms that Latin American leaders deemed necessary to stabilise and secure their 
countries.50 Symington requested that the State Department authorise unlimited 
commercial sales of arms requested by Latin American militaries and extend the interim 
program without waiting for legislation.51 
 
Marshall sympathised with the rationale provided by Symington. Marshall had warned 
before the war that reneging on any pledges to provide arms to Latin America would 
lead to doubts of US sincerity in its larger commitment to inter-American cooperation.52 
Even Acheson and Braden had accepted the arguments made by the War Department at 
the end of the war that the US should uphold its ‘moral commitment of sort’ to meeting 
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military assistance commitments in order to avoid any damage to their reputation as an 
ally.53 More importantly however, the ongoing crises across the region had led many 
Latin American leaders to become increasingly mindful of an arms race in the Western 
Hemisphere. Marshall remained alert to their warnings that if the US could not supply 
arms then they would be forced to seek assistance from outside the Western 
Hemisphere.54 Marshall looked once again to the Policy Committee on Arms and 
Armament for recommendations. The Secretary of the PCA, Earl D. Sohm, advised 
Marshall to pursue further legislation before extending the Interim Allocations Program 
as unauthorised sales would further undermine precarious executive-legislative 
relations.55 The State Department would need to renew its pursuit of Congressional 
authorisation for another draft of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act.56  
 
Marshall regarded military cooperation to be vital for securing the Western 
Hemisphere, but he understood that obtaining Congressional authorisation for a 
program of arms sales to Latin America would not be an easy task. Although securing 
necessary funding for inter-American military cooperation had proven difficult during 
1947, whilst the danger of open hostilities in the Cold War seemed more remote, the 
risk of armed confrontation with the Soviet Union did not dramatically improve the 
prospects for success; it only further shifted the focus away from the Western 
Hemisphere. Kennan in particular continued to warn of the serious danger of 
overstretching financial capabilities and stressed the importance of matching available 
resources to commitments in areas of vital interest.57 He made it clear that Latin 
America remained strategically unimportant.58  
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Although a number of major developments in the Cold War throughout 1948 made 
securing access to the strategic resources in the Western Hemisphere more urgent, they 
also led to further demands to redirect limited funds elsewhere. Firstly the shock Soviet 
blockade of Berlin led to demands from the armed services for prioritisation of 
expenditure on military preparedness to counter Soviet aggression in Europe. General 
Lucius D. Clay reported from Berlin that war could break out with ‘dramatic 
suddenness.’59 Although they recognised that any defence of the blockaded US sector 
would be difficult and of questionable strategic interest, the Truman administration 
identified the symbolic significance of the first major confrontation with the Soviet 
Union. Many officials simply deferred to the lessons of Munich and feared that 
capitulation would undermine US credibility and encourage further Soviet aggression in 
order to occupy the whole of Germany.60 Dean Acheson made clear the significance of 
the situation in Berlin: ‘We couldn't afford to have the Russians win in Berlin; otherwise 
Europe was down the drain.’ Although Truman had already submitted a proposal to 
Congress in January for an increase in military budgets for FY 1949 to $10 billion, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff requested supplementary funding of around $9 billion for 
immediate military expansion.61 
 
The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform a few days after the blockade 
transformed the strategic climate of the Cold War even further. ‘The breach between 
Tito and the Kremlin is the most significant development in international Communism 
in twenty years,’ reported the CIA.62 The refusal of Josep Broz Tito to accept the 
absolute leadership of the Kremlin for Yugoslavia seemed to strike a symbolic blow for 
the Soviet Union in its sphere of influence. The decision made by Stalin to establish an 
economic blockade around the country only demonstrated the contrast to the inter-
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American solidarity found in the final agreement at Bogotá. Kennan regarded the Tito-
Stalin split as an opportunity to shift the strategic focus from securing the US orbit in 
Western Europe to the active liberation of the Soviet sphere of influence. He proposed 
operations for mobilising resistance to Soviet control in Eastern Europe that would 
force the Kremlin to either open up its sphere of influence and risk losing influence over 
satellites or clamp down on it at considerable political and economic cost.63  
 
The refocus of US global strategy ‘from solely a policy of containment into a policy of 
coercion’ did not come without danger for the Western Hemisphere. Kennan expressed 
concerns that the defiance displayed by Tito would force Moscow to look for ways to 
reconcile nationalism with ‘monolithic Soviet unity.’ He feared that the damage to Soviet 
prestige caused by further US activities in their sphere of influence could antagonise the 
Kremlin into similar actions in the US orbit. The CIA also warned that the lack of 
capabilities for direct aggression in the Western Hemisphere would not prevent the 
Soviets from becoming ‘actively interested in the development of indecisive, 
diversionary situations which will cause the US to over-extend its commitments and 
expend its resources.’64 The prioritisation of actions in both Western and Eastern 
Europe only continued to redirect resources away from the pursuit of strategic 
objectives in the Western Hemisphere however.  
 
The strain on US resources led Congress once again to reject a draft of the Inter-
American Military Cooperation Act.65 Despite his appeals to the Chairmen of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Easton and 
Arthur Vandenberg, Marshall failed once again to convince them of the urgency of 
mobilising regional defences.66 Congress actually exacerbated the problem of restricted 
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means to pursue strategic ends in the region. An amendment to the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 effectively ended the “interim program” that the Truman administration 
had relied on to sell excess arms to Latin America.67 Daniels concluded that the State 
Department could only pursue yet another revised version of the IAMCA or seek 
broader legislation to cover appropriations for arms sales to Latin America.68 The Office 
of the Counsel advised Marshall that Congress however, would not only continue to 
dismiss any specific regional program of military sales, but also insist on prioritising 
assistance to Western Europe within any broader program.69 Marshall faced the difficult 
reality of pursuing strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere without the 
necessary commitment of resources to realise them. 
 
This had a significant impact on US relations with Latin America. Marshall ultimately 
had to accept the unfeasibility of the objective of regional standardisation of arms and 
his inability to prevent Latin American governments from purchasing arms from 
outside of the Western Hemisphere. The authorisation of licences for private sources to 
export arms remained the only option for the State Department.70 The limited provision 
of commercial licences failed to meet Latin American demand however. On the one 
hand, even the small interim supplies and private sales of arms provided a symbol of the 
US as an obstacle to democratic progress in Latin America. On the other hand however, 
the lack of a significant program of military assistance only removed US influence and 
created a space for other powerful actors to use forces to shape the destiny of the 
region. 
 
The conflict in Costa Rica demonstrated the lack of US influence in developments across 
the region. After being ousted by the movement led by José Figueres, the Costa Rican 
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President, Teodoro Picado, revealed that he had been left ‘broken hearted’ by the 
inability of the Truman administration to provide the quantity and quality of arms 
needed to defend his government.71 The fact that Figueres received military assistance 
from neighbouring countries made it even more difficult to take. At the same time 
however, José Figueres criticised the Truman administration for supplying the Picado 
government with arms to repress his democratic movement.72 The US Ambassador in 
San José, Nathaniel P. Davis, simply insisted that the small quantity of materiel acquired 
through the Interim Allocations Program could not influence the outcome of the conflict. 
This tension between the symbolism and the inadequate amount of arms supplies 
remained evident once fighting broke out again after an armed group of reactionary 
exiles crossed from Nicaragua back into Costa Rica.73 The State Department could not 
meet the request from the Costa Rican government for arms needed to repel the 
invasion.74  
 
The disarray evident in the US approach to military assistance for Latin America left 
Marshall to rely on the collective agreement at the Bogotá Conference on new inter-
American procedures for signatories to settle disputes by pacific means. The State 
Department reaffirmed a commitment to utilise this machinery in the anticipation that 
it would relieve the need for the US to arbitrate in regional conflicts.75 The established 
procedures showed to be of limited use however; they only sanctioned the recourse to 
armed self-defence in the face of a clear belligerent state actor.76 A neutral position in 
the event of revolutionary activity and civil unrest would prove difficult to maintain. 
Marshall essentially possessed no serious measures to influence the course of the social 
transformation across Latin America. State Department officials were reduced to efforts  
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Without the means to address the conflict, State Department officials were reduced to 
silence the speculation around revolutionary activity that undermined the image of 
solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.77 
 
The illusion of harmony in the Americas continued to evaporate with the rising tide of 
revolution however. The Truman administration could only watch from afar as a 
dangerous pattern unfolded across the region. The inability to demonstrate the 
credibility of US support for social change in Latin America only left a vacuum to be 
filled by those willing to take a more active role in political and economic development. 
Marshall remained more of an onlooker as local Communists continued to exploit the 
instability caused by the dynamics of social transformation. Latin American leaders 
facing mounting unrest within their countries took the matter into their own hands. The 
destabilisation of the region led a number of governments to prohibit Communist 
parties and instruct their police forces to round up and incarcerate any known 
Communists.78 Such repressive measures even appeared in countries like Chile, where 
President González Vileda came to power with their support. The reactionaries of the 
region such as Argentina adopted ever stronger measures that would essentially 
perpetuate the poverty of economic and political conditions across the region.79 
Strategy in the Western Hemisphere drifted into incoherence as Marshall and the rest of 
the Truman administration were left only to observe and explain rather than shape 
developments across the region. 
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Volume IX) 
71 710.J/4-648: Telegram, Department of State, “Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting 
Secretary of State,” 06.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 818.00/4-1348, Department of 
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State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America 
and Panama Affairs,” 13.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX) 
72 Ulate also warned that the government had passed arms on to Communists to repress 
the movement. See 731.39/3-1548, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela 
to the Secretary of State,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX) 
73 818.00/12-1248: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Nicaragua to 
the Secretary of State,” 12.12.1948  (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 
74 818.00/12-11148: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to 
the Secretary of State,” 11.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); Ibid 
75 839.00/8-648, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of 
the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 26.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)  
76 Following the invocation of the Rio Treaty, the Council of American States called upon 
both Costa Rica and Nicaragua to abstain from hostilities and respect the principle of 
non-intervention. It also voted to convene an emergency meeting of Foreign Ministers 
to resolve the tensions. 818.00/1201248, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by 
Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central and Panama Affairs  (FRUS 
1948 Volume IX); 818.00/12-1448, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State 
to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 14.12.1948  (FRUS 1948 
Volume IX); New York Times, 14.12.1948 and 25.12.1948. See also the text of the 
American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, 30.04.1948, is available at the website of the OAS. 
(http://www.oas.org/Juridico/english/treaties/a-42.html)  
77 819.00/8-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant 
Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 09.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, 
Volume IX) ; 810.00/9-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by 
the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 29.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, 
Volume IX) 
78 Time, 03.05.1948 
79 See for example, 835.00/10-1148, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry 
Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 11.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 
711.35/11-448: Airgram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the 
Secretary of State,” 04.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 
10. THE FAILURE OF INCOHERENT STRATEGY 
 
Only weeks after the coup in Peru the Venezuelan Army Chief of Staff, Marcos 
Evangelista Pérez Jiménez, successfully led a group of army officers in overthrowing the 
government of Rómulo Gallegos. The Truman administration did have an indirect hand 
in these coups. The State Department shared the assessments of the CIA that the 
military leadership in both Peru and Venezuela had attempted to restore their influence 
after their failure to secure necessary assistance from the US had led increasingly to 
their exclusion from government.1 The inability of the Truman administration to 
provide economic assistance meant also that the military juntas managed to enlist 
conservative elements from the landowning classes, business sector, and professionals 
who all feared the nationalist measures adopted by their governments to address the 
economic crises faced across the region.2 
 
The Truman administration did not look upon the coups favourably however. The 
President even personally wrote to Gallegos: 
‘My Dear Friend. The overthrow of your Government came as a 
great shock to me, and I have personally concerned myself with 
this question from the beginning.’3 
Truman informed his deposed Venezuelan counterpart that the State Department had 
begun to review the situation. As it did so however, the region descended into chaos. 
The governments in Guatemala and Chile successfully suppressed military plots. 
Reactionary elements also faced serious threats of upheaval. In El Salvador a group of 
young military officers succeeded in overthrowing the reactionary President General 
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Salvador Castaneda Castro.4 Argentina plunged into a state of instability after a failed 
attempt to assassinate Perón.5 The government of Juan Natalicio González Paredes in 
Paraguay managed to crush a fierce revolt from within its own Colorado Party.6 This 
government had only just come to power earlier in the year after another military coup 
forced out President General Higinio Moríngo. 
 
Marshall acknowledged the urgent need to reassess the US relationship with these new 
undemocratic regimes. He had already recognised a serious problem after neighbouring 
Latin American governments refused to follow his lead in offering diplomatic 
recognition of the new regime in Peru.7  Marshall had instructed Lovett to ask each of 
the US Ambassadors in the region for recommendations on next steps.8 The responses 
led Lovett to the conclusion that serious tensions in the existing approach to diplomatic 
recognition had to be reconciled.9 The Rio Treaty had simultaneously affirmed the 
desirability of continuous relations and the inconsistency of the use of force to effect 
political change with the shared values of the Western Hemisphere. Gallegos blamed the 
agreement of Resolution 35 at the Bogotá Conference for his ousting however; the 
application of this agreement by the State Department had been the “mother” of the 
military coups towards the end of 1948.10 Time magazine also identified the State 
Department’s commitment to continuous diplomatic recognition under Resolution 35 as 
giving reactionary military leaders across the region a “green light” to take power 
through the use of force.11  
 
Marshall did not deliberately seek to establish a new anti-Communist coalition in the 
Western Hemisphere. He offered support to new military dictatorships primarily as a 
result of his failure to reconcile enduring tensions in his commitment to the Good 
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Neighbour Policy. The lack of measures to shape developments across the region left 
Marshall to ensure Latin American cooperation in securing US interests. 
 
Recognising Reactionaries 
Diplomatic recognition had proven a difficult and controversial issue in the Western 
Hemisphere. Marshall had appeared in his first few months as Secretary of State to be 
less interested in using diplomatic recognition as a strategic instrument to shape the 
development of the region than as another symbolic demonstration of the US 
commitment not to dominate Latin American neighbours or interfere in their domestic 
affairs. The State Department considered the issue of whether to withhold recognition 
of the interim leadership in Nicaragua of Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa after a coup initiated 
by Anastasio Somoza installed him as a puppet in May 1947.12 Marshall did not seek to 
reconcile the promotion of democracy and constitutional change with the competing 
objectives of non-interference in Nicaraguan affairs; he simply established the position 
of the US based on those of the majority of Latin American neighbours.13 After making 
enquiries as to their course of action towards the permanent appointment of Victor 
Manuel Róman y Reyes to the Nicaraguan Presidency, Marshall announced his formal 
decision to withhold recognition.  
 
Initial disagreements amongst delegates to Petrópolis over whether to refuse 
recognition of representatives of the Román y Reyes regime in Nicaragua ensured that 
Marshall had to address these issues again. He hoped to keep the US from making any 
decisive judgement and insisted that he would respect the majority decision of the other 
delegations.14 Throughout proceedings he continued to observe the response of the 
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Latin American delegations to Nicaraguan appeals for recognition.15 But the tension 
between ambitions for political freedom in Nicaragua and the projection of the US as 
Good Neighbour was clear. Norman Armour informed a delegation of Nicaraguan 
observers that US and the other Latin American delegations would need to be convinced 
that the new government represented the will of the people.16 In a telegram to Marshall 
a few days earlier however, Robert Lovett restated the need for the US to ‘follow the 
majority’ on the issue of recognition for Nicaragua.17 He acknowledged the oppression 
of the new puppet regime, but the ‘wise’ and ‘judicious’ policy was to avoid ‘giving the 
impression of taking the lead in a manner which might be interpreted as pressure or 
tutelage.’ 
 
The shift in position of a number of Latin American governments after the Rio 
Conference to recognise the regime of Román y Reyes regime made it problematic for 
the State Department to maintain this approach of simply following the majority 
however.18 Lovett acknowledged that the Nicaraguan regime, like it or not, had the 
attributes and qualities of a stable de facto government; intelligence reports also 
showed that it would maintain control throughout the near future. He stressed that the 
lack of unanimity constituted an important change in environment for US policy that 
needed to be addressed. Both Armour and Daniels suggested in different meetings that 
the lack of democratic participation in Nicaragua created conditions for the 
continuation of non-recognition.19 Lovett also noted that US policy had not changed, but 
he emphasised that the hope to remain in harmony with a broad section of other Latin 
American governments meant that the State Department position would be largely 
influenced by their views.20 
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An approach of conforming to regional consensus became impossible once the 
Guatemalan government led proposals not to extend an invitation for Nicaragua to the 
Bogotá Conference. Marshall sought to avoid any position that would swing the decision 
and set the tone for future inter-American relations. The US representative to the 
Credentials Committee, Walter Donnelly, received simple instructions to declare that 
the State Department had no opinion on recognition and would raise no objections to 
any majority decision.21 The Committee eventually reconciled the differences between 
the representatives after agreement on an Argentine proposal to invite states, rather 
than governments; the seating of a Nicaraguan delegation at the Bogotá Conference 
would not constitute recognition of its regime.  
 
This solution did not provide Marshall with a more general approach to diplomatic 
recognition. Different initiatives presented by the delegations from Guatemala and 
Ecuador meant that Marshall would not be able to avoid the issue at the Bogotá 
Conference however. In identifying anti-democratic regimes as the primary ‘danger to 
the unity, solidarity, peace and defense of the continent,’ the Guatemalan government of 
Juan Arévalo proposed an agreement on withholding diplomatic recognition as an 
instrument for political change.22 The Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola government in 
Ecuador asserted that Good Neighbour relations necessitated continuous relations 
between all American Republics however. Inspired by the earlier Estrada Doctrine 
adopted in 1930 by the Mexican government, the Ecuadoran government proposed an 
inter-American agreement abolishing the practice of recognition altogether.23 
 
Marshall turned to the Policy Planning Staff to provide recommendations for a position 
on these proposals. Kennan admitted his unfamiliarity with his region and left Butler in 
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charge as he departed instead for Japan to shape plans for a strategy of containment in 
the Far East.24 Butler had demonstrated some support for the Guatemalan initiative 
during his time as Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo. He had consistently opposed any 
actions to weaken the US commitment to democratic principles and at one point even 
recommended his own recall as protest to the Trujillo regime.25 Support for the 
Guatemalan proposal would not be considered beyond the conventions of recent US 
diplomacy. A focus on democratic ideals and constitutional change had existed in some 
form from the administration of Woodrow Wilson up to the policies of Braden under the 
Truman administration.26 Recent democratic advances across the region, in the likes of 
Venezuela and Paraguay, were also enthusiastically welcomed in both Washington and 
American popular opinion.27 
 
Once Butler and the Policy Planning Staff began soliciting advice from current and 
former State Department officials however, they soon found considerable opposition to 
the Guatemalan proposal. Dana Munro argued that non-recognition had become 
counter-productive and the State Department would need to gradually retreat from the 
non-recognition of the likes of Nicaragua.28 Laurence Duggan also suggested that non-
recognition was useless if not supported by additional sanctions; without them he 
considered it imperative for the State Department to maintain a continuity of relations 
that would keep open official diplomatic channels. Opposition to the Guatemalan 
initiative was made primarily on grounds that it constituted intervention. The chief 
architect of the Good Neighbour Policy, Sumner Welles, had already criticised the 
Truman administration’s use of non-recognition as a political weapon in an article 
published in Foreign Affairs at the end of 1947.29 The Policy Committee established by 
Truman to prepare for the Bogotá Conference expressed similar opposition and insisted 
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that any policy of diplomatic recognition should not imply any approval of the 
government in question. 
 
The Ecuadoran proposal better represented some of the sensitivities of several Latin 
American Republics that identified non-recognition as constituting interference in 
domestic affairs. Arosemena was amongst Latin American leaders recognising that their 
own survival depended largely upon recognition by the US. He had come to power in 
August 1947 after a diverse group led by Colonel Carlos Mancheno Cajas overthrew 
President José Maria Velasco Ibarra.30 Marshall only managed to avoid a divisive 
decision on recognition because the Ecuadoran Junta was able to swiftly restore 
constitutional government whilst he was attempting to ascertain the reaction of other 
Latin American Republics.31 The State Department Policy Committee preparing for 
Bogotá now recommended US support for the Ecuadoran proposal in the hope that a 
move towards the Estrada Doctrine would remove Latin American suspicions that the 
US sought to interfere in the their internal affairs.32 
 
A commitment to non-interference, in order to maintain an image of the US as Good 
Neighbour, conflicted with Butler’s own priorities of securing shared hemispheric 
ideals. But his approach to inter-American relations was complicated by the need to 
establish a PPS position within a global context. Attitudes towards recognition were 
similarly divided at this level. Several participants in a study group established by the 
Council on Foreign Relations to examine political prerequisites for participation in the 
Marshall Plan insisted that recognition should be regulated by the principles of 
individual liberty enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.33 Other members 
however, suggested that a moral code could not always be followed; many shared 
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Marshall’s view that the benefits of breaking relations with the Soviet Union had not 
outweighed the interests in maintaining official contact with Moscow.34 In pulling 
together these divergent concepts into the final conclusions of Policy Planning Study 24, 
Butler identified more with the institutionalised attitudes of the PPS.35 Kennan had 
developed a broad realist framework that focused on a narrow conception of US 
interests and dealt with the world ‘as it is’; he had argued in PPS/23 against making 
foreign policy commitments for reasons of ‘altruism and world benefaction.’36 Butler 
needed to establish a recognition policy that served US interests and ‘refrained from 
offering moral and ideological advice.’37 
 
Butler concluded that US interests required a flexible response. As the State Department 
would benefit from different approaches to specific cases, his first recommendation was 
to avoid any rigid formula for a policy of recognition. Butler acknowledged that 
Marshall’s priorities of inter-American consultation would remain important, but he 
advised that the US should maintain its freedom of decision. In drawing up guidelines 
for a general policy, Butler ultimately concluded that recognition should not be 
considered primarily as a political weapon. But US interests required action in specific 
cases. There were clear advantages to withholding recognition of regimes that were 
either imposed by force, lacked popular support, refused to respect international 
obligations, or posed a threat to neighbouring countries. 
 
Butler still interpreted US interests in promoting political freedoms in the Western 
Hemisphere. He warned against reducing the criteria for de facto recognition to the 
effective control of the territory and administration of the State and an ability to uphold 
international obligations; regional stability would not be restored with assurances of 
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recognition that would signal a “green light” for reactionaries to impose their rule by 
force. He also cautioned against support for the Ecuadoran proposal that would be 
perceived as weakening the US commitment to democratic principles. Butler rejected 
the Guatemalan initiatives for recognition, but he still inserted the requirement of a 
‘general acquiescence of the people of a country in the government in power.’  
 
Butler did not rule out action to shape the region, but the flexibility of PPS/24 provided 
Marshall with rationale for continued adherence to the majority position in the region. 
Shortly after authorising the study, Marshall declared that the moment was still not 
opportune for granting recognition of Nicaragua.38 If a general resolution approved at 
the Bogotá Conference pointed towards the renewal of relations however, he would 
look favourably on recognising the Nicaraguan government. 
 
Marshall faced a serious impasse at Bogotá. His interpretation of Good Neighbour 
relations as the avoidance of any unilateral decision that could be perceived as tutelage 
precluded any decisive action to resolve the crises in the region. Marshall would need to 
rely instead on the joint endeavours of the American Republics to reach agreement on a 
solution. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, suggested to 
regional leaders that mutual compromise was the price of any good agreement.39 The 
State Department sought to follow the majority of American Republics on numerous 
issues, but failing a regional consensus a compromise would avoid accusations of US 
unilateralism. The fundamental antagonism dividing the region between progressive 
and authoritarian governments however, ensured that serious multilateral cooperation 
to find such a compromise, let alone unanimous agreement, would be difficult. 
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The outcome of negotiations at Bogotá on the issue of diplomatic recognition 
symbolised the real price of a good agreement; the compromise assured by Daniels took 
from divergent proposals rather than resolve the differences between them.40 The 
problem of de facto recognition was left altogether to be addressed later by the Juridical 
Committee. The rest of the language used remained ambiguous and open to 
interpretation. Resolution 35 did declare disapproval of non-recognition as a tool for 
unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of another American Republic. The 
delegates would not accept the Ecuadoran proposal to abolish recognition however; 
opposition led by the Guatemalan delegation ensured that agreement could only be 
found in a declaration of the desirability of continuous diplomatic relations. The 
inclusion of the ‘Exercise of the Right of Legation’ ensured that withholding recognition 
would not bring charges of intervention.41 But the Guatemalan initiative for collective 
action against anti-democratic regimes was undermined by agreement that recognition 
should not imply approval of any regime.  
 
Resolution 35 ensured the flexibility of response recommended by Butler, but this also 
left open the possibility for further struggle over its meaning. The US delegation 
prioritised the conclusion of a symbolic agreement that would demonstrate the absence 
of US tutelage over genuine reconciliation of the tensions threatening hemispheric 
peace. It was more important to demonstrate an example of the US commitment to the 
Good Neighbour than an example of hemispheric solidarity. Marshall’s strategic 
approach sought to project the universality of the US rather than the Western 
Hemisphere; hemispheric particularity only provided a suitable geographic space for an 
asymmetric response in the Cold War. As a result however, Marshall simply failed to 
translate his strategy of containment in the Western Hemisphere into a coherent 
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approach to both the persistent Latin American dictatorships and the growing regional 
movements for democracy. 
 
Deserting Democrats 
The inherent tensions in Resolution 35 appeared almost immediately. The Costa Rican 
Civil War ended after Picado resigned his Presidency and Santos Leon Herrera assumed 
office as provisional leader. Despite the questions concerning its legitimacy, the US 
Ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davis, recommended recognition of the new 
government as soon as it gained control of the machinery of the state.42 Only an 
agreement between Figueres and Ulate, which stipulated that the former would lead a 
revolutionary junta for 18 months before the latter became the first constitutional 
President of the Second Republic, diffused the unrest in Costa Rica. Marshall considered 
the appearance of restored constitutionality to be enough to announce that diplomatic 
relations would continue.43 In light of this however, the State Department had to 
consider reinstating relations with Nicaragua.44 The Truman administration’s eventual 
recognition of the Nicaraguan regime did not necessarily represent an abandonment of 
democratic ideals; it was neither ‘synonymous with approval’ nor a guarantee of 
‘intimate cooperation.’45 Shortly afterwards Marshall adopted the same approach 
towards a new regime in Paraguay that came to power through unconstitutional use of 
force. The US Ambassador in Asunción, Fletcher Warren, informed him that the de facto 
government had been accepted by people, albeit “lethargically”.46 
 
The coups in Peru and Venezuela towards the end of the year forced closer inspection of 
the US approach to diplomatic recognition however. The criticism of the US 
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commitment to Resolution 35 was made most clearly by Gonzalo Carnevali. The 
Venezuelan Ambassador, who remained loyal to Gallegos, was informed by Daniels of 
the regret felt across the State Department at the eradication of constitutional 
democracy in his country.47 Carnevali interrupted as Daniels stressed that this regret 
did not alter the desirability in continuous diplomatic relations as stated in Resolution 
35 however. He insisted that ‘there were many things in life that were desirable, but it 
was not always practical or possible to have them.’ Carnevali reminded Daniels that 
Gallegos was recognised as a democrat within every home throughout Latin America.48  
 
The Latin American reaction to the coups that threatened to eradicate democracy in the 
Western Hemisphere led Marshall to acknowledge the need for an immediate review of 
the US commitment to Resolution 35. A number of progressive leaders from across the 
region complained that this commitment had only emboldened reactionary elements to 
intervene without fear of interference from US.49 Marshall received appeals to 
reconsider concerted action to prevent further regimes coming to power through the 
use of force. The Colombian Foreign Minister, Eduardo Zuleta Angel, declared that 
‘something must be done to defend the effectiveness of democracy in the Americas.’50 
Serafino Romualdi also warned of the threat to the free labour movement in the region 
and the possible tragedy of saving ‘Western Europe from the menace of totalitarian 
communism only to wake up one morning and find that democracy has disappeared 
from our backyard in Latin America.’51 A sub-committee of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs offered similar warnings after a 25-day fact-finding mission in Latin 
America. The members of the committee criticised Resolution 35 as giving a ‘green light 
to political adventurers’ across the region.52 
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The process of review within the State Department brought immediate complaints from 
the new regimes. The State Department made it clear to them their concerns about the 
recent overthrows of governments and simply wanted to consider possible steps to 
prevent any further coups and consolidate democracy in the region.53 The leaders of 
these regimes insisted that their actions had been in defence of democracy in their 
countries.54 The new Ambassador-designate for Venezuela also appealed to the State 
Department to confer immediate recognition of his government with the reminder that 
‘the important thing in hemispheric relations was unity.’55 US diplomatic 
representatives in their capitals also warned Marshall against further delays in 
recognition that could cause offense or damage the prestige of the new regimes.56 Any 
alienation of the military juntas could endanger bilateral relations and have further 
unforeseeable consequences for inter-American relations. 
 
The armed services in the US provided stronger support for the new regimes. The 
Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, emphasised the desirability of maintaining 
relations with the new regimes that would keep US military missions in each country.57 
He believed that many of the new leaders that attended US military schools would 
cooperate fully in protecting the strategic interests of the US. Both the Air and Ground 
Missions in El Salvador, for example, expressed their satisfaction in ‘finding many good 
friends in positions of importance.’58 Royall similarly welcomed the promises of the new 
Venezuelan Minister of National Defence, Delgado Chalbaud, to use every possible 
measure to protect US oil interests.59 The leaders of the US oil companies operating in 
Venezuela also welcomed commitments from the regime to offer new concessions and 
reverse the established policy of shared profits.60 Although the US Ambassador in 
Caracas, Walter Donnelly, recognised the prospects of the reactionary government 
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providing ‘fertile ground for underground growth [of] Communism,’ he reported his 
conviction that the new regime would be pro-American.61 He warned that the refusal to 
recognise the regime would only risk destabilising this relationship and place US lives, 
property, and interests in danger.62 
 
This crisis in Latin America led Kennan to make his first serious assessment of the role 
of the Western Hemisphere in containment. Marshall had turned to him to find a 
solution for reconciling the tension between the objectives of securing democracy in the 
region and maintaining friendly relations with each of the Latin American governments. 
Kennan recruited the assistance of the Office of American Republic Affairs in his 
reassessment of the established position on diplomatic recognition. He ultimately 
reasserted the earlier findings in PPS/24 however; there would be no favourable course 
for the national interest in withholding recognition of new regimes. He advised Marshall 
that more guarantees of stabilisation could be offered by working with the new regimes 
rather than opposing them. Kennan also warned that the prospect of other Latin 
American governments recognising the new regimes would leave the US without 
enough support in maintaining a position on a ‘thorny and difficult issue’ that he did not 
consider to be of primary importance at this time. 
 
Kennan concluded that it still remained important for the State Department to make 
sure this decision on recognition played well in global opinion. The US commitment to 
continuous recognition could not be interpreted as a departure from the shared 
principles of democracy as agreed at Petrópolis and Bogotá. Although he did not 
consider the need for a genuine commitment to democracy in the Western Hemisphere, 
Kennan expressed concerns for the image of the US projected into the psychological 
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struggle of the Cold War. In doing so he finally acknowledged the symbolic role for 
containment that Marshall shaped for US strategy in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
Kennan could only offer two limited recommendations however. In the absence of a 
clear timetable for the resumption of diplomatic relations the State Department should 
allow some delay.63 He suggested that recognition should be accorded after an interval 
neither so short as to be undignified nor so long as to make a prestige issue of the 
recognition question.’ This would satisfy countries like Chile that had begun to feel that 
the delay had already made the point.64 For the progressive governments of Guatemala 
and Cuba that had indicated the possibility of indefinite withholding of recognition, 
Kennan suggested publicising language added to the notification of resumed diplomatic 
relations that condemned ‘the use of force as an instrument of political change [as] 
deplorable, inconsistent with the acknowledged ideals of American Republics and 
increasingly dangerous to all countries in this Hemisphere.’65 
 
The attachment of notes on the importance of democratic principles to the 
announcements made in early January of the recognition of new regimes did not save 
the State Department from fierce criticism however.66 The CIA warned that Latin 
Americans increasingly viewed the US position as a commitment not to demonstrate 
any leadership or engagement in the region.67 Dr. Alberto Rodriguez Larreta accused 
the State Department of ‘indifference’ towards the conditions found across Latin 
America.68 He stressed that a strong statement of support from the US would have 
constituted a ‘great point of leverage for the democracies against totalitarian 
tendencies.’ Kennan certainly could not reconcile the tensions in the approach shaped 
by Marshall to find a coherent strategy for preventing Communism in Latin America.69 
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Marshall failed to translate containment into a coherent strategic approach for the 
Western Hemisphere. The US essentially remained an observer to the growing dynamic 
of revolution and reaction in the region. The commitments in the Good Neighbour Policy 
to principles such as non-discrimination and non-intervention did not leave the Truman 
administration neutral in these developments however. The price of power ensured 
that inaction placed the US on the side of the most dominant actors. President Truman 
concluded his first term with a private note that expressed his concerns that the 
commitment to non-intervention could find the US in the unfortunate position of 
supporting dictatorships across Latin America.70 The symbolic importance of positive 
representations of the US in the psychological struggle of the Cold War meant that the 
only action remaining for the Truman administration was to turn to the related 
constructions of Latin American inferiority and US exceptionalism as ideological 
rationale to explain developments in the region. 
 
Imagining Two Americas 
The upheaval across Latin America towards the end of 1948 exposed the illusion of 
coherence in US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Alongside the persistence of Latin 
American underdevelopment, the reactionary coups prompted renewed scrutiny within 
Washington of the US relationship with the rest of the region. The imaginary of an 
organic and cohesive political space in the Western Hemisphere began to disappear as 
the Truman administration noted of their Latin American neighbours that ‘the basic 
trouble is that we really have much less in common with these people than we like to 
pretend.’71 Any reservations towards a shared identity in the Western Hemisphere 
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represented an inherent tension within the Good Neighbour Policy rather than an 
abandonment of it however. The announcement of the Good Neighbour Policy by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt did not entirely remove the imaginary of “two Americas” 
established by Theodore Roosevelt shortly before the declaration of his Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine.72 Despite the commitment to regional solidarity in his first direct 
address to Latin American leaders as President, Franklin D. Roosevelt still referred to 
‘your Americanism and mine.’73  
 
The identification of Latin America as a neighbour rather than Self retained a distanced 
Otherness that should be manifest in an agonistic rather than antagonistic 
relationship.74 This agonistic relationship in the Good Neighbour Policy found its best 
representation in a metaphor of family. Roosevelt extended on behalf of the people of 
the US ‘a fraternal greeting to our sister American Republics.’75 Marshall continued to 
frame his rhetoric of the Good Neighbour Policy with the same fraternal and sororal 
terms. In his official addresses at both Petrópolis and Bogotá he promised to cooperate 
with sovereign and equal ‘sister republics.’76 At the heart of this discourse was the idea 
that the US recognised the equal potential of Latin American peoples to realise accepted 
shared ideals.77 In building flourishing democracies and economies the Good Neighbour 
Policy still identified obligations and responsibilities however. 
 
Impatience with Latin American political immaturity at the end of the Second World 
War had led George H. Butler to rearticulate the family metaphor of the Good Neighbour 
Policy as justification for intervention to ensure ordered development in the region: 
‘Children in spite of being weak and helpless as compared with 
adults are not permitted because of that fact to play with fire 
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before they start a conflagration nor are they permitted wantonly 
to destroy property or to abuse weaker playmates.’78  
Butler argued that the principle of non-intervention had been erroneously based upon 
an ideal that every “sister” acted in a manner that would not undermine the welfare of 
the inter-American family. He insisted that history and experience had shown that some 
“sisters” were less mature and worse behaved than others. The identification of the US 
with this paternal role amongst the family of hemispheric nations required the Truman 
administration to discipline any further violations of “family values” as ‘an act of love, 
not power.’79 
 
Marshall renewed his commitment as a symbolic rejection of such paternalism. The 
persistence of Latin American underdevelopment did mean that recognition of the need 
for tutelage of immature Latin Americans appeared evident throughout his time as 
Secretary of State. A hierarchy of races that guided the tutelage of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries had become indefensible in the rhetoric of the Good Neighbour Policy, but 
such assumptions found more acceptable expression in a discourse of modernisation 
that identified the need for immature Latin Americans to reject their irrational and 
“backward” traditions in order to follow the example of the US.80 In his speech to the Rio 
Conference, Marshall encouraged Latin American delegates to follow the model that had 
‘enabled the US to prosper.’ Although Latin America travelled the same development 
path, Marshall implied that “historical experience” and “maturity” bestowed 
responsibility on the US to lead their way.  
 
Such paternalism appeared clearer in economic relations. An anonymous high-ranking 
State Department official writing in the New York Times under the pseudonym 
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“Americus” argued that Latin America ‘must bring its economic thinking into line with 
modern principles if it wishes to improve its living standards.’81 Marshall and other 
State Department officials used language such as “uninformed” and “unwise” to criticise 
Latin American efforts to formulate their own solutions to economic problems.82 John J. 
McCloy even called for the Chilean government to ‘keep quiet for a while’ so the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could work out something to 
repair the “messy” state of their economy.83 Although it appeared benign, such language 
betrayed the assumptions that US officials knew Latin American interests better than 
them. The efforts to shape an autonomous desarrollismo model of development that 
identified the dependent relationship on the US as the reason for Latin American 
backwardness certainly provoked impatience within Washington. The Truman 
administration could not accept the idea that Latin Americans could shape a better 
understanding of their underdevelopment. They felt that only when Latin Americans 
came to look upon the US as a Good Partner as well as their Good Neighbour would they 
benefit from a useful education in development.84 
 
These constructions of hierarchy received mixed welcomes amongst Latin American 
leaders. The reactionaries of the region identified an opportunity to use the metaphor of 
family to rationalise the absence of political liberties within their countries.85 In terms 
of political development Somoza compared Nicaragua to a baby: ‘Nobody gives a baby 
everything to eat right away. I'm giving 'em liberty—but in my style. If you give a baby a 
hot tamale, you'll kill him.’86 The new dictatorship in Peru also informed the State 
Department towards the end of 1948 that their immature people were ‘not yet ready for 
either the British or American type of democracy.’87  
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Many progressive Latin American leaders remained eager to maintain the cooperation 
of the Truman administration in their development. An awareness of their failure to 
build a shining example in the Western Hemisphere provoked fears that the Truman 
administration increasingly regarded them as ‘a poor relation, troublesome, 
bothersome and unnecessary.’ The integration of Western Europe into the US sphere of 
influence only further removed assurances from being defined as Other by the US.88 
Although one Truman administration official described the Marshall Plan as the ‘logical 
extension of the Good Neighbour Policy,’ Latin American leaders regarded the 
prioritisation of US commitments across the Atlantic as representative of a return to the 
old colonial divisions that would exclude from the same benefits of modernity enjoyed 
by the rest of the “Free World”.89 
 
The Truman administration had certainly identified Europe as the site to demonstrate 
the success of the US model of economic progress. As the battle to win the hearts and 
minds of the “Third World” with a comprehensive solution for their underdevelopment 
had yet to fully begin, there appeared to be less immediacy to demonstrate a similar 
example in the Western Hemisphere. It gradually became evident that Marshall 
considered his commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy to be more important for 
projecting a positive image of the US than building a genuine solidarity in the region. 
Marshall did not assert the superiority of the US over Latin America in so much as he 
ignored the differences within the Western Hemisphere entirely. This ‘prejudice of 
equality’ concealed the differences within the region by simply identifying each 
neighbouring Latin American country with an ego-ideal of the exceptional US nation.90 
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This projection of a particular identity onto the rest of the region actually remained 
central to the functioning of US exceptionalism. The absence of a collective historical 
memory in the founding of the US created the need to prioritise spatial over temporal 
conceptions of exceptionalism. The limited territories of the US at that point meant that 
both the spatial and temporal concepts of a “land of liberty” guaranteed by Divine 
Providence and Manifest Destiny appeared better aligned in the construct of a New 
World of the Americas.91 The reduction of Latin American “Otherness” to an American 
“Sameness” in this prejudice of equality meant that Marshall would always struggle to 
identify neighbours as truly equal without seeing them as identical or as different 
without seeing them as inferior however.92 The persistence of Latin American 
underdevelopment would continue to be considered a fundamental obstacle to the 
realisation of a universal American identity.93 The impact of the reactionary coups in 
Latin America on the psychological struggle of the Cold War meant that they would 
need to be rationalised as the enduring fate of “backward” countries in the periphery 
rather than the inevitable result of the US model of development.  
 
Latin American leaders would not be so ready to identify themselves as the inferior 
Other in a construction of two Americas however. In fact they increasingly identified the 
US as the fundamental obstacle to building an exceptional Western Hemisphere. Since 
the declaration of Nuestra America by José Martí there had always been a feeling that 
the US remained less faithful to the ideals of the New World.94 One State Department 
official noted the enduring Latin American criticism of the prevalence of consumerism 
and the pursuit of materialism in US culture that betrayed their conception of the 
importance of spirit in universal American ideals.95  
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The complex dynamics of identity in the Western Hemisphere suggest that these 
divergent constructions of material and spirit should be considered representative less 
of an imaginary of two Americas than being locked in a dialectical understanding of a 
universal America.96 Their own historical experience had led Latin American leaders to 
construct a different interpretation of American exceptionalism.97 Latin American 
resistance to the US and its model of development should be considered less as anti-
Americanism than an alternative definition of Americanism. The dual signification of 
America as both nation and continent ensured that it stood for the Part as well as the 
Whole. As such it became synonymous to other universal truths such as freedom and 
liberty.98 Marshall sought to use the particular space of “America” the hemisphere to 
project the universality of “America” the nation. The complex constructions of this 
American Self made it impossible to fix a ‘sure sense of identity’ required to define clear 
strategic objectives.99 The inherent emptiness of this identity prevented Marshall from 
monopolising an understanding of the master signifier of America from its security to 
its development. America remained a site of hegemonic struggle for the numerous 
domestic and Latin American leaders attempting to ‘have a hand in cooking the stew.’100 
This complex struggle ultimately ensured the incoherence of US strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
  
THE INCOHERENT NEIGHBOUR 
 
A difficult recovery from a kidney operation in December 1948 eventually forced 
Marshall to leave the Truman administration before it began its second term in January 
1949. The President announced the resignation with only praise for the important role 
played by his ‘indispensable’ Secretary of State.1 Marshall had successfully contained 
the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Truman insisted that the appointment of Dean G. 
Acheson would not signal a shift from this successful strategy. The tenure of Marshall 
had not been a complete triumph however. He left behind him a rising tide of revolution 
in the Western Hemisphere for Acheson to deal with. 
 
A lack of coherence defined Marshall’s strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. 
The key to understanding this incoherence is a tension between the particular and the 
universal inherent to the strategy of global containment. Kennan neglected Latin 
America as he focused resources and attention on ensuring the success of a particular 
demonstration in Western Europe of the universal appeal of US leadership and the 
American way of life. Marshall agreed with the prioritisation of Western Europe in the 
psychological struggle with the Soviet Union and did not see the need to bring the Cold 
War to the Western Hemisphere. But he did identify a vital role for the region as a 
particular space for another symbolic example to be projected into the Cold War. 
Marshall aimed to demonstrate the global credibility of the US as a Good Neighbour 
through the context of relations with Latin America. 
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A neglect of problems specific to the region ensured the failure of this symbolic 
demonstration of the Good Neighbour Policy in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall 
attempted to explain the persistence of Latin American underdevelopment and 
preserve the imaginary of a shining example of solidarity in the Americas with 
representations of exceptionalism and the danger of Communism. The reactionary 
coups at the end of 1948 ultimately forced the Truman administration to find another 
ideological rationalisation that would prevent blame falling on their strategic approach. 
 
The identification of Latin American inferiority in a construction of “two Americas” not 
only protected the credibility of the image of the US as a Good Neighbour but also 
provided justification for considering the region only as a source of vital resources 
necessary for the success of symbolic examples in other theatres. The absence of a 
coherent strategic approach however, ensured ongoing struggle within the Truman 
administration on the most effective approach to pursue even this strategic objective.  
The strategic solution formulated by Marshall essentially failed to address, and even 
contributed to, the tide of revolution creating small currents across Latin America. This 
tide continued to rise after the departure of Marshall to destabilise the region to an 
extent that not only endangered US access to vital strategic resources, but also 
threatened to represent a symbolic defeat in the psychological struggle of the Cold War. 
 
 
Reconstructing the Good Neighbour Policy 
Standard narratives of US relations with Latin America discern the dismantling of the 
Good Neighbour Policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. A fresh insight into 
US relations with Latin America during the Truman administration reveals that 
Marshall reconstructed rather than abandoned the Good Neighbour Policy. The 
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marginalisation of Spruille Braden shortly after his appointment as Secretary of State 
made it easier for Marshall to renew the commitment of the US to the Good Neighbour 
Policy. Perhaps more important remained the fact that the indeterminate meanings of 
principles in the Good Neighbour Policy could be reframed by Marshall in terms of a 
global strategy of containment. The reflection of the established traditions and 
narratives of the Good Neighbour Policy made it appear as if the strategic approach 
shaped by Marshall had remained necessary all along.  
 
This rearticulation of the Good Neighbour Policy into an interpretation of containment 
in Latin America also ensured its continuation after the departure of Marshall. In his 
first major address on hemispheric relations as Secretary of State, Acheson informed a 
meeting of the Pan-American Society in September 1949 of his intention to continue the 
inter-American cooperation needed for ‘waging peace in the Americas.’2 The State 
Department hailed the speech as the most complete restatement of the Good Neighbour 
Policy under the Truman administration.3 Acheson recognised the need to rebuild 
bridges between the US and Latin America. Despite his reputation Marshall had failed to 
persuade regional leaders of the sincerity of his commitment to inter-American 
cooperation. The decision not to replace Braden had removed a vital link for Latin 
American leaders to the Truman administration and signalled to them a disregard for 
expertise on specific regional problems. In his appointment of Edward G. Miller Jr. to fill 
the long vacant regional post, renamed as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Acheson hoped to send a clear message that Latin America would no 
longer be neglected. Miller received warm welcome as he embarked upon a tour of each 
Latin American nation. 
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Acheson and Miller acknowledged the limitations of the renewed commitment to the 
Good Neighbour Policy however. Marshall had failed to restore the solidarity of the 
Western Hemisphere. Although the persistence of dictatorships and the reversal of 
earlier democratic advances towards the end of 1948 did not represent a deliberate 
attempt to obstruct Latin American development, Marshall showed unable to address 
the rising tide of expectations across the region for political and economic progress. He 
failed to reconcile central tenets of the Good Neighbour Policy, such as non-
discrimination and non-intervention, to Latin American demands. The lack of effective 
strategic instruments to direct social transformation left a vacuum in inter-American 
relations to be filled with anti-Americanism or alternative models of development. 
 
Acheson sought to reconcile these inherent tensions with a more coherent 
conceptualisation of the Good Neighbour Policy. He gave instructions in early 1950 to 
Louis J. Halle of the Policy Planning Staff to prepare an article that would complement 
Kennan’s X article with a coherent outline of an approach towards Latin America.4 Halle 
published “On a Certain Impatience with Latin America” in Foreign Affairs under the 
pseudonym “Y”.5 The difficulty of the task that Marshall had faced in interpreting 
containment became clear in the failure of Halle to identify a more coherent approach to 
securing the success of a symbolic example in the Western Hemisphere. A commitment 
to the Good Neighbour Policy left the Truman administration all but a spectator to the 
conservative reaction across the region. Halle focused instead on providing an 
explanation for the persistence of Latin American underdevelopment that protected the 
image of the US as a Good Neighbour. 
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On a Certain Impatience with Latin American Underdevelopment 
Marshall did not deliberately neglect the development of Latin America. Rather he failed 
to reconcile the Good Neighbour Policy to the rising tide of expectations across the 
region. Left with a choice Marshall considered it more important to project a positive 
image of the US as a Good Neighbour that respected the sovereignty of Latin American 
states than intervening to advance democracy. He also prioritised the successful 
demonstration of economic development in Western Europe that denied resources for a 
similar example in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall relied on concealing the 
inequalities across the region with a prejudice of equality that identified Latin American 
neighbours to an exceptional ideal of development within the US sphere of influence. 
The reactionary coups of late 1948 represented a regression in Latin American 
development that demanded a new ideological rationalisation however. 
 
Halle identified certain impatience within the US with Latin American 
underdevelopment that brought the fraternal relationship of the Good Neighbour Policy 
into question. He noted that even public opinion in the US had reacted to the coups ‘in 
the manner of a stern father in the privacy of his home after his children have publicly 
embarrassed him.’ Assumptions of Latin American inferiority pervaded much of the 
Truman administration. Acheson attributed the underdevelopment of Latin America 
simply to the ‘Hispano-Indian culture – or lack of it.’6 Kennan came to similar 
conclusions after a tour of the region. He had finally decided to prepare a review of 
strategy in the region after coming to realise that if the US lost the Cold War struggle in 
Western Europe then ‘Latin America would be all [the US] would have to fall back on.’7 
Kennan acknowledged that ‘we are only gradually becoming conscious of irrelevance of 
our national experience to contemporary problems of other peoples.’8 But his lack of 
 304 
understanding of the specific problems faced in Latin America left him to depend upon 
simple schemata of racial categorisations for meanings of ‘the tragic nature of human 
civilisation’ in Latin America.9 In the report of his tour Kennan suggested that the 
colonial wound passed on through the indigenous peoples and the importation of black 
slaves hindered Latin American progress.10  
 
Kennan regarded Latin American inferiority as significant in translating containment 
into the context of the Western Hemisphere. He had already warned that Communism 
exercised a fatal fascination over emotional and irrational Latin minds. Anglo-Saxon 
peoples had become ‘experienced in the practices of representative government’ and 
developed a ‘greater political maturity as well as a certain sobriety of social thought.’ 
The Latin people however, stood before Communism ‘like the bird before the cobra, 
seized with dread foreboding, yet unable to detach its eye or remove itself from the 
advance.’11 Kennan considered a paternal relationship with Latin America as necessary 
to protect ‘our raw materials’ in the region.12 
 
This blunt rejection of the traditions of the Good Neighbour Policy came as a great shock 
to many within the State Department. Marshall had institutionalised a commitment to 
fraternal relations with Latin America that ultimately led Miller to prevent the 
distribution of Kennan’s recommendations.13 The failure to address the rising tide of 
expectations across Latin America ultimately revealed the rhetoric of fraternal 
cooperation as empty however. The assumption that the rest of the region needed to 
follow US leadership along a historical path towards progress had been inherent in the 
approach pursued by Marshall. He acknowledged the benefits of inter-American 
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cooperation only to the extent of a shared understanding of political and economic 
development along the general guidelines outlined by the US. 
 
The Truman administration maintained its commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy 
that incorporated these teleological assumptions of development. Halle warned against 
any replacement in the future of expressions of what “we” must do to realise a common 
purpose with demands for what “you” must do to live up to “our” ideals. He regarded 
the coups only as a setback in an otherwise steady progress towards political and 
economic maturity in Latin America. Halle noted that Latin American neighbours had 
not gained their independence after coming of age like the US. The origins of political 
and economic freedoms in the US bestowed upon it a ‘special position’ as a ‘first among 
equals’ within the region.14 Halle recommended a continuation of the approach pursued 
by Marshall that encouraged Latin American governments to follow the US example but 
remain cautious of any deviations that endangered their vital interests. 
 
Fighting for Freedom in the Western Hemisphere 
The Y article did not represent an attitude within the Truman administration that the 
Cold War had arrived in the Western Hemisphere. It did provide rationale for 
reconsidering the Latin American role in the Cold War however. Kennan had certainly 
identified a peripheral role for Latin America in his original formulations of 
containment. The escalation of hostilities in the Cold War and the failure to maintain an 
exceptional model of solidarity eventually led Marshall to identify the Western 
Hemisphere more with its traditional function as a source of strategic materials. To 
trace the path from the original conception outlined in the X article to its translation 
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into the context of Latin America in the Y article is not to follow a necessary progression 
that determines the latter as the necessary outcome of the former however.  
 
Marshall was presented with a number of different approaches to the pursuit of 
interests in the Western Hemisphere. He ensured some convergence within the Truman 
administration after shifting the State Department position on the security agenda of 
the armed services. But his reputation and authoritative leadership only created an 
illusion of coherence that concealed bureaucratic tensions continuing to simmer below 
the surface appearance of consensus. An understanding of a strategy of containment in 
the Western Hemisphere requires a rejection of the exogenisation of the national 
interest as a necessary response to the threat of the Cold War. State Department 
officials had not disciplined themselves to the pursuit of self-evident interests. Rather 
they articulated for Marshall an entirely different construction of the Western 
Hemisphere and the role of the US within it.  
 
These differences resurfaced without Marshall at the helm. Miller noted significant 
disagreements between the State and Defense Departments as they worked together as 
they considered how to secure access to strategic raw materials in Latin America for a 
war effort in Korea.15 The Defense Department continued to identify their priority in the 
region as inter-American military cooperation.16 They regarded a program of arms 
sales, provided for in the Military Defense Assistance Act and NSC-56/2, to be the most 
suitable approach to securing the cooperation of Latin American militaries in 
safeguarding US interests.17 Marshall had not stamped out the opposition to inter-
American military cooperation that had been institutionalised within the State 
Department however. The new Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, John 
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C. Dreier, wrote a memorandum for Miller restating his earlier warnings that military 
assistance conflicted with the objectives of Latin American political and economic 
development pursued by the State Department.18  
 
The marginalisation of Braden had made it easier for Marshall to cooperate with his 
military colleagues on regional security. The appointment of Miller to fill his post made 
a noticeable difference for the representation of State Department positions on inter-
American relations. Miller recommended that Acheson defend the political and 
economic objectives of the State Department from the focus on militarisation in the 
Defense Department.19 He also sought the support of the Policy Planning Staff against 
efforts to force an unaffordable program of militarisation on Latin American 
neighbours.20 To stabilise the region Miller still considered it necessary to address Latin 
American political and economic aspirations: ‘Nowhere in the world is “the revolution 
of rising expectations” more in evidence that in Latin America and our own actions are 
directly responsible for this.’ 
 
Marshall acknowledged that the redirection of limited resources for the economic 
reconstruction of Western Europe reduced prospects for obtaining necessary funds to 
assist development in the Western Hemisphere. The escalation of hostilities in the Cold 
War made the cooperation of Latin America in securing US interests more important; 
yet it also made appropriations for regional assistance programs a lower priority. The 
appointment of Paul H. Nitze to replace Kennan as the Director of the Policy Planning 
Staff signalled a shift away from this prioritisation of strategic strongpoints however.21  
The NSC-68 memorandum indicated a move towards a strategic perimeter approach of 
containment wherever threats appeared: 
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‘The assault on free institutions is world wide now, and in the 
context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free 
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.’22 
This perimeter approach did not rule out the prioritisation of symbolic examples 
however. The importance of Western Europe to the psychological struggle of the Cold 
War had simply shifted to a new danger in Korea. After the symbolic defeats in the 
losses of China and the atomic monopoly, Acheson had considered it necessary to ‘think 
of Korea as a world matter.’23  
 
Miller complained to Nitze that the detailed focus on each area in NSC-68 failed to give 
sufficient importance to the Western Hemisphere.24 Although he acknowledged that 
overstretched resources still made it difficult to provide direct assistance for Latin 
American development, Miller warned that the neglect of Latin America would have an 
adverse impact on inter-American relations. He considered economic cooperation 
necessary to ‘offset deteriorating relations with Latin America because of other 
programs elsewhere in the world.’ 
 
Marshall had failed to close the gap between means and ends that would enable the 
integration of approaches to specific regions into a coherent strategy of global 
containment. The difficulty of this task became evident after Miller turned to Halle for 
recommendations on integrating an approach to the Western Hemisphere into the 
global strategy outlined in NSC-68.25 Halle acknowledged that the strategic objectives in 
NSC-68 of strengthening the Free World from the Kremlin design needed to be 
‘interpreted in terms of the special features that characterize the American states as a 
regional community sharing the hemisphere, and the special relations that the US 
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consequently maintains with them.’ But his conclusions for general objectives differed 
little from those developed by Marshall. 
 
Marshall did not bring the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere. Rather he focused on 
using the US position in the region to project the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War 
confrontation in Western Europe. Halle similarly recognised a need to use the inter-
American system as an instrument to encourage Latin American support for the US in 
the cause of saving freedom around the world. He recommended convening a meeting 
of Foreign Ministers to ‘adopt the principle that the defense of the hemisphere is not to 
be achieved only along its beaches but by political, economic, and psychological action 
overseas.’ Halle considered it important to reassure Latin American leaders of 
participation with the US in the ‘war for all men’s minds.’ 
 
Marshall had failed to win Latin American hearts and minds however. Halle 
recommended a ‘more direct, aggressive approach’ to countering Communist 
propaganda that exacerbated the deterioration in US relations with Latin America and 
called for active measures to spread pro-American sentiment across the region: 
‘Men live and die for ideas. If we wish the people of Latin America 
to assimilate the concept of a hemisphere coalition, we must make 
it real to them by translating it into the terms of a coalition of the 
peoples.’  
Halle acknowledged, like Marshall before him, that the persistence of social unrest made 
engagement with the Latin American economic agenda the most important action.  
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Halle identified the neglect of Latin American economic development as the biggest 
failure of the strategy shaped by Marshall. The Western Hemisphere remained the only 
major area without a full program of assistance for economic development. Miller could 
see no alternative however. The assumption of more duties in other parts of the world 
meant that the Good Neighbour Policy no longer remained the sole program of the US.26 
A limitation of resources meant that the Truman administration would need to continue 
to demonstrate its commitment to Latin American development through the same 
means pursued by Marshall. The Point IV programs of technical assistance that the 
President announced in his inaugural address expanded the limited programs 
previously pursued by Marshall through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.27 The 
Truman administration would also continue to depend upon promoting measures of 
self-reliance and private enterprise for the development of vital strategic resources. 
Miller and Halle had no more resources available to them than Marshall. As a result they 
also depended upon persuading Latin American leaders to pursue their development 
agenda by following the example of the US.  
 
The incoherence caused by the failure to reconcile the complex tension between the 
universal and particular ultimately ensured the difficulty in integrating the Western 
Hemisphere into a coherent global strategic approach. Marshall confronted strategic 
drift on his arrival at the State Department as Braden failed to convince the rest of 
Washington that democratic idealism represented the best approach towards Latin 
America. A similar failure to find a general consensus on the renewed commitment to 
the Good Neighbour Policy made by Marshall and his successors became clear in late 
1950 as Halle provided Miller with a ‘post-mortem’ of a meeting with the Policy 
Planning Staff.28 He informed the Assistant Secretary that most of the members of the 
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PPS admitted not reading the paper they had drafted on the role of Latin America in 
global strategy. The entire staff had also forgotten their agreement to lead the project 
with the cooperation of the Office of American Republic Affairs and instead simply used 
the paper prepared by Halle. 
 
Despite the apologies offered by the PPS, Halle did not consider it worthwhile to 
recommend a reassessment of the paper. He warned Miller that the PPS was ‘so busy 
catching fast ones that it is not in as good a position as the operational bureaus to think 
in terms of long range policy.’ A continued neglect for the importance of Latin America 
was evident in the recommendation of one member of the PPS that the administration 
simply retain a budget without a defined strategic approach towards the Western 
Hemisphere. Halle highlighted the ‘complete frivolity’ of the meeting in his remarks that 
the high-point occurred ‘when almost the entire staff rushed to the window to see some 
fire engines.’ The lack of any further consideration in the following year meant a 
strategic approach towards the Western Hemisphere once again began to drift.  
 
Legacy of the First Global Strategist 
Marshall made a significant impact on US strategy after his appointment as Secretary of 
State. The importance of this contribution led Truman to turn to him in late 1950 to 
replace Louis A. Johnson as Secretary of Defence and assume the burden of leadership 
once again.29 The President honoured the role that Marshall played within his 
administration a few months later. He sent a tribute message to be read out as the 
Virginia Military Institute Corps of Cadets honoured Marshall at the 50th reunion of his 
graduating class with the dedication of an entrance arch: 
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‘Once again our nation looks to him for leadership and guidance in 
the struggle between free men and those who would snuff out 
freedom.... I consider it a high privilege to pay me personal 
respects and my humble tribute to a truly great American, George 
Catlett Marshall – an inspirational leader who deserves the thanks 
and appreciation of all America and the nations of the free world 
for his life of unselfish dedication to the best interests of 
humanity.’30 
Although Marshall should certainly be remembered as a Servant of the Nation and his 
inspirational leadership perhaps merits the label of Saviour of Europe, Truman showed 
all too willing to overlook the failings of Marshall and build a legacy.  
 
The myth surrounding Marshall appeared evident in the statements made by Bernard 
Baruch, who was also in attendance at the VMI ceremony. The elder statesman hailed 
Marshall as the author of a global strategy that saved the Free World once and could 
save it again. He referred to Marshall as ‘history’s first global strategist.’ Baruch 
highlighted the specific attributes that made Marshall stand out as a strategist: 
‘A great leader of troops naturally is zealous when his men 
become locked in battle, that every resource be marshalled which 
might increase the chance of their winning or of decreasing their 
losses. The very qualities which made him so valiant a leader of 
troops would make him impatient of any limitations of his action. 
But the organiser has to think not only of the man fighting on the 
one front but of all the fronts of war and defense. He must weigh 
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each theatre and its relative importance upon the scales of globe 
flung strategy.’ 
The lessons learned in the Korean experience clearly influenced Baruch. But Marshall 
had certainly demonstrated such traits beforehand. ‘We must not jeopardise our sound 
overall strategy to exploit local success in a generally accepted secondary theatre,’ he 
had insisted during wartime planning in 1943.31 
 
Such an interpretation of global strategy neglects the complex relationship between 
primary and secondary theatres of action however. The initial strategic successes that 
Marshall managed in Western Europe were mitigated by the failures in the Western 
Hemisphere. The incoherent integration of particular approaches belies his reputation 
as a global strategist. Marshall rarely demonstrated an understanding of the strategic 
context specific to Latin America. His projection of US exceptionalism onto the Western 
Hemisphere only created an illusion of coherence. Marshall ultimately set a course for 
US strategy in the Western Hemisphere that failed to deal with the rising tide of 
expectations across Latin America.32 He left the Truman administration drifting towards 
a rising tide of revolution. 
 
An understanding of the failings of the incoherent strategic approach shaped by 
Marshall has implications for studies of subsequent relations between the US and Latin 
America. The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower had to deal with the rising tide of 
revolution left unaddressed by Marshall. A National Intelligence Estimate warned 
Eisenhower that the autonomous development pursued by the Guatemalan government 
of Jacobo Árbenz threatened to set a dangerous precedent for the rest of the region.33 
The National Security Council expressed further fears that Guatemala represented the 
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‘leading example of Communist penetration in the American Republics.’34 Even if not 
under Communist control, Halle cautioned that any success of the Guatemalan 
government to demonstrate an alternative model of development that appealed to 
neighbouring governments would damage the prestige of the US in its own 
“backyard”.35 
 
Eisenhower acknowledged the significance of the symbolic: ‘The only solution to a lack 
of credibility was more credibility; the only sense to a lack of commitment, yet more 
commitment.’36 Yet his Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. 
Holland, feared that the commitment to non-intervention at the Bogotá Conference 
would obstruct the US in defending the credibility of its sphere of influence. The 
Western Hemisphere, he complained, was ‘the only area in the world that the US has 
formally renounced the right to take unilateral measures against Communism.’37 Halle 
warned against unilateral intervention that would be perceived around the world as an 
act of single-mindedness and lawlessness.38 As the Eisenhower administration 
recognised the need to maintain, at least the pretence of, the image of a Good Neighbour 
they developed covert plans rather than openly violating the principle of non-
intervention. Although the backlash across the region from the overthrow of Árbenz left 
Halle to warn that in repeating such actions ‘we may commit errors of historic 
significance,’ Eisenhower left office after authorising similar covert action against the 
new threat posed by the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba.39 
 
An interdepartmental group on Cuba established by John F. Kennedy identified a shift in 
the Cold War battleground from the core to the periphery.40 They feared that the Soviet 
Union would provide enough economic assistance to Cuba to demonstrate an effective 
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example of the Communist model of development to appeal to neighbouring Latin 
American governments. A Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems had 
already expressed concerns about Soviet designs to guide rising discontent with poor 
standards of living towards support for Communism.41 They further warned that ‘the 
United States has stated no clear philosophy of its own, and has no effective machinery 
to disseminate such a philosophy.’ The Eisenhower administration had not remedied 
the failure of Marshall to present Latin America with an appealing model of 
development. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, even acknowledged 
that economic dependency undermined the formal commitment to treat Latin 
Americans as political equals. At the same time he had expressed feared that the US 
remained ‘hopelessly far behind the Soviets in developing controls over the minds and 
emotions of unsophisticated peoples.’42 
 
A former architect of the Good Neighbour Policy, Adolf A. Berle Jr, advised Kennedy of 
the new symbolic significance of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere:  
‘While the great Cold War could not be decisively won in the Latin 
America theatre, it obviously could be lost there, and that 
situation seemed to me and to most of the Committee very 
dangerous.’ 
Acheson had earlier warned that success in Western Europe, and then later Korea, held 
the key to the entire global strategy of containment. Berle now similarly warned that: 
‘Either we build a true and brilliant community in the Western Hemisphere – or we go 
under.’ 
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The Special Assistant to Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, recommended that the Cold War 
battle of image required the US to present itself as a transformative force in the political 
and economic development of Latin America. A commitment to this development in the 
Alliance for Progress aimed to recover Latin American cooperation and restrain the 
revolutionary fervour across the region. Latin American leaders warmly welcomed the 
engagement with their economic agenda they had long appealed for. The Alliance for 
Progress would never achieve the same success of the Marshall Plan however; the 
balance of payments in the deficit in the US prevented assistance on any similar scale.  
 
On the one hand the New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration did not fully 
appreciate the limitations of their ability to shape the world. The bold ambitions for 
Latin American development would never be realised with the resources that they 
showed prepared to commit. On the other hand the Alliance for Progress had been 
exposed as more of an exercise to provide symbolic examples rather than a genuine 
commitment to Latin American development. The First Meeting of the Working Group 
on Problems of the Alliance for Progress noted that:  
‘There may be very real merit in concentrating efforts on a few 
cases which can become demonstrations of what we are able to do 
when we set our minds to it. Too much dispersion may lead to 
inconspicuous results; concentration of effort may make 
demonstrations possible.43 
Such limited commitments would not appeal to leaders across the region however.  
 
Kennedy showed no less able than Marshall to address the rising tide of revolution in 
Latin America. Like Marshall before him he attempted instead to identify his program 
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with the enduring legacy of Simón Bolívar. In his famous Carta de Jamaica of 1815 
Bolívar insisted that the peoples of the New World had awoken to their oppression at 
the hands of European colonialism: ‘The veil has been torn asunder. We have already 
seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness.’44 Kennedy 
referred back to this passage to claim that the Alliance for Progress addressed a new 
oppression of poverty, hunger, and social injustice.45  
 
Like Marshall before him Kennedy would not succeed in reframing the myth of Bolívar 
however. A Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere failed to materialise; Latin 
American leaders no longer expected the US to appear as the Good Neighbour. Few 
blamed Kennedy for this failure.46 But the growing number that identified the US as the 
source of their oppression had only to look to the next lines in the vision of Latin 
American liberation outlined by Bolívar in his Carta de Jamaica: 
 ‘The chains have been broken; we have been freed, and now our 
enemies seek to enslave us anew. For this reason America fights 
desperately, and seldom has desperation failed to achieve victory.’ 
As Latin Americans continued their desperate fight to victory, Kennedy came to the 
realisation that ‘Latin America was the most dangerous area in the world.’ Although few 
had recognised it at the time, both the desperation and the danger had originated in 
Marshall’s earlier appropriation of the name America for his incoherent strategy of 
containment. 
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